Here is a story told by Professor Paul Bierman about divestment from fossil fuel how-to get rid of this earth’s malefic resource of easiness. In short, it is about salvaging what remains of the earth’s goodness and secure an unaltered future for the coming generations.
For over a century, burning fossil fuels has helped propel our cars, power our businesses, and keep the lights on in our homes. Even today, oil, coal, and gas provide about a lot of our energy needs.
Divesting is the act of removing any financing of the fossil fuel industry, increasingly found to be an unethical industrial human activity. The fossil fuel divestment movement that started gaining attraction in 2010 could not have begun if no palliative industry can procure all that necessary energy.
In recent years, the divest movement from fossil fuels has grown to a multi-trillion dollar movement involving numerous institutions worldwide. And thanks to stricter policies to address the climate crisis, fossil fuels are gradually becoming yesterday’s energy source. They could soon be considered, were it not for the Big Oils and their lobbies, as a nasty, dirty and nuisance liable to damage the planet’s soils, air and above all, its climate. Luckily, Fossil Fuel complicity being no longer hidden, divestment is gradually brought about and sustained by the likes of the professor here.
A fossil fuel divestment ‘how-to’
As a climate scientist, I find fossil fuel divestment to be critical low-hanging fruit, even if its effects are largely symbolic. But it never ceases to amaze me how we struggle to get it done.
At the University of Vermont (UVM) where I’ve taught since 1993, the divestment movement lasted a decade and got nowhere. Then — in less than a year — it happened. A growing student movement did the work. Emboldened by Mike Mann’s visit to campus and Greta Thunberg’s youth activism, students ramped up pressure on the University administration (which initially pushed back with standard lines about fiduciary responsibility). Some savvy students even noticed — buried deep on UVM’s web site — that the Green Fund, a small piece of our endowment, yielded better growth than the rest of UVM’s investment portfolio. Even that reasoned argument fell flat until public action by students and faculty allies threatened UVM’s well-manicured image as the “Environmental University.” In our image, and in the image of Williams College, lies the power for change.
When more than 100 students arrived with signs and speakers at the UVM fall Board of Trustees public comment period (scheduled at 8:30 a.m. on Saturday, October 26, 2019), the dialogue began to change. At the winter meeting several months later, I, along with students, appealed to the board to divest and diversify (to me, these are tightly linked). Hundreds of students cheered under the watchful eyes of several armed UVM police and through rope barricades isolating the board. Still nothing changed. But TV cameras rolled.
When the same students planned to disrupt admitted students’ day visits a month later (we need to convince students to attend UVM since their tuition pays our salaries), decision makers noticed. I was Nordic skiing at dusk when my cell phone rang. It was the provost. She asked, Would I stop the student “activists” from protesting tomorrow? I said no. But I advised that she call and speak to them directly — hear their voices. The students had an audience and the log jam began to break. The board got a new chair. A committee was formed. By summer, the president celebrated “our” decision to divest because it demonstrated UVM’s true environmental mettle.
Our actions may have had a price. In December, UVM proposed to terminate the geology department — one of the big players in climate-change research on campus. Soon after, I was told by a dean that some in the administration had labeled me a “troublemaker.” A few weeks later, the emails and phone calls began. I’ve now heard from staff, faculty, a dean, and a large donor that some of UVM’s leadership team doesn’t believe climate change is real. So far, UVM has declined Freedom of Information Act requests from reporters to release relevant emails. Change does not come easily and without a cost.
What is clear to me now is that concerted student action, in the public square and supported by faculty (and alums!), is key to making change. Divestment means challenging established economic and management power structures; it’s not easy, and it carries risks. But it’s the right thing to do. In the words of the late John Lewis, “Never, ever be afraid to make some noise and get in good trouble, necessary trouble.” The climate crisis mandates we make some noise and get in some good trouble. Every one of us.
Paul Bierman ’85 is a Professor of Geology at the University of Vermont. He lives in Burlington, VT.
Ian Simm, Founder & Chief Executive at Impax Asset Management, writes about achieving a Corporate net-zero possibly through a more sophisticated approach required of all, big or small corporations of all countries. So here it is.
Corporate net zero: we need a more sophisticated approach
The private sector holds the key to decarbonising the economy over the next quarter century. As countries set “net zero” or equivalent targets backed by carefully designed roadmaps for sectors such as energy, transportation and food, there’s a widespread assumption that “national net zero” should mean “net zero for all”, including “corporate net zero” (CNZ) for today’s businesses. Although there are some benefits to unpacking national net-zero targets in this way, there are also several important drawbacks. A more sophisticated approach is urgently required.
Ahead of the COP26 conference in Glasgow later this year, governments are likely to set or raise national targets for decarbonising their economies. In much of the world, the private sector will mobilise to serve rapidly expanding markets, for example for electric vehicles or plant-based food. Experience suggests that we’re about to witness a huge amount of creative destruction as entirely new industries are born, nascent sectors flourish and demand for products and services we once considered permanent fades, threatening or even destroying what have been large companies – a fate similar to landline-based telephony or, potentially, to cash-based transactions.
As the opportunities and risks linked to climate change become mainstream for many companies and their stakeholders, corporate net-zero targets have several attractions. Faced with a simple message that they should develop, analyse and act on specific climate change opportunities and risks, management teams will not only identify ways to improve the company’s risk-adjusted returns but may also produce or facilitate breakthroughs for their customers or suppliers, for example by placing bulk orders for low-carbon products.
Similarly, multiple CNZ commitments across a sector may enable discussions around possible collective action, for example the establishment of clusters to generate and consume “green” hydrogen. Early action by companies can encourage governments to develop further their policies to mitigate climate change, while corporate pledges may unlock capital to catalyse new climate-friendly activities, for example in nature-based solutions.
The drawbacks of a blanket adoption of corporate net zero
And yet there are several crucial drawbacks to the blanket adoption of corporate net-zero targets.
First, and most obvious, is the definition and interpretation of net zero. Apart from the ambiguity around each entity’s pathway to net zero (i.e. “how much, by when?”), the role for offsets is contentious – for example, should a cement manufacturer be able to account for the carbon benefits of its investments in peatland restoration, or if we allow this, does that create a moral hazard (to pollute)? And how should low-carbon technologies be treated: for example, when a new wind farm is built, does it really make sense that the entity purchasing the electricity gets the carbon benefit while the investor (or wind farm owner) receives no such boost to their own carbon accounting?
Second is capital inefficiency. To ensure there’s sufficient “creative destruction” as we reset our economy, we need to avoid hampering the essential sunsetting of certain activities in favour of new ones. The law of diminishing returns predicts that, as companies implement efficiency measures and cost-competitive technologies to reduce their emissions, they will need to consume more and more capital to save the next tonne of carbon, for example, steel manufacturers seeking to switch to direct hydrogen reduction. At the same time, companies producing alternative products, for example construction materials based on wood, may offer much higher financial returns on an equivalent amount of capital with much lower risk. Faced with a choice, investors are likely to prefer the latter.
Third, skills. To pivot successfully to entirely new activities, today’s companies need to harness alternative expertise. For example, can today’s oil majors with their competence in seismology and the handling of liquids, realistically develop a competitive advantage in the development of power projects and in electricity trading to outcompete today’s power generators?
Fourth, value chain effects. Notwithstanding the challenges of measuring so-called “Scope 3” emissions, a company that pursues a net-zero position without concern for its customers or even its suppliers may unwittingly hold back climate change mitigation across the “system” (i.e., the wider economy). For example, if the renewable energy supply required to enable a manufacturer of insulation material to become net zero costs significantly more than the fossil fuel supply it used previously, the price of its product will rise, thereby reducing its potential to assist customers with their energy savings.
Fifth, the “someone else’s problem” effect. It’s too easy for today’s management team to commit a company to long-term targets that they personally won’t be around to deliver on.
And lastly, confusing signals. As decarbonisation progresses, management teams may be faced with a conflict between achieving financial objectives and delivering on the company’s net-zero pledge. This may not matter at the outset, but once the “early wins” in emissions reduction have been secured, difficult conversations about the trade-off between financial and environmental outcomes are, in my view, inevitable.
Climate change resilience first
So, what’s to be done? A sound starting point is to use “corporate net zero” as an agenda item for a deeper discussion on climate change between companies and their investors. But rather than starting that conversation by simply insisting on the adoption of net-zero targets, investors should seek to assess whether the company is already or aiming to become “climate change resilient” using the framework recommended by the Taskforce on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (“TCFD”) which covers both emissions reductions and physical climate risks.
This should cover the four areas outlined by TCFD:
First, governance: what changes has the company considered and made to ensure that climate change issues are managed comprehensively over a long timeframe?
Second, strategy: how has the company’s business strategy evolved in response, what alternatives has management considered and what will be the impact on the company’s expected return on invested capital?
Third, risk and opportunity: has the company mapped out the key changes in these areas arising from climate change and implemented programmes to monitor them over a long timeframe?
And fourth, metrics, targets and reporting: is the company’s planned reporting in this area likely to provide decision-useful information to shareholders and other stakeholders?
These conversations should lead to a comprehensive, rational plan for each company to manage climate change issues over time, tailored to its individual circumstances. For some, the optimal result will be to adopt a (simple to communicate) corporate net-zero target described in a way that avoids the drawbacks discussed earlier. For others (and in particular, in hard-to-abate sectors), a more appropriate response would be (a) a business plan focused on the efficient use of capital in the context of a wider set of risks, (b) imaginative and proactive collaboration with peers and government to shape new markets, and (c) clear communication with all stakeholders.
We need to be careful that “corporate net zero” does not turn into “one-size-fits-all”. The failure to take a thoughtful and sophisticated approach to these issues is likely to result in management confusion, muddled or misleading external communication and perhaps most significantly, the misallocation of capital. Now is the time to get our proverbial ducks in a row!Report this
The current enthusiasm for “corporate net zero” is understandable, but there are significant drawbacks that are set to lead to confusion and unintended consequences. My take on why, in the face of climate change, companies should follow TCFD guidance and reporting, prioritising sound strategy and resilience.
NATURAL GAS NEWS‘ Geopolitical Implications of Global Decarbonization for MENA producing countries by Pier Paolo Raimondi and Simone Tagliapietra, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) is an expert’s hindsight in the foreseeable future of the region.
Endowed with half of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region represents a cornerstone of the established global energy architecture. As the clean-energy transition gains momentum worldwide, this architecture might shrink—challenging the socio-economic and geopolitical foundations of the region in general, and of its oil and gas-producing countries in particular.
Geopolitical Implications of Global Decarbonization for MENA producing countries
February 21, 2021
This challenge has two dimensions: domestic and international. Domestically, a decline in global oil and gas demand would reduce revenues for producing countries. Considering the profound dependency of these countries on oil and gas rents (the ‘rentier state’ model), this could have serious economic and social consequences. Internationally, the global clean-energy transition might push producers towards a fierce competition for global market share, exacerbating geopolitical risks both regionally and globally.
In 2020, MENA oil and gas producers experienced a situation that some observers have described as a preview of what the future might look like for them beyond 2030, as global decarbonization unfolds. The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in an unprecedented crash in global oil demand. At the same time, oil prices collapsed (for the first time in history, the benchmark West Texas Intermediate entered negative territory) due to a lethal combination of falling demand and OPEC+ coordination failure. All this generated a perfect storm for MENA oil- and gas-producing countries, which led to unprecedented macroeconomic imbalances.
The evolution of oil markets, national stability, and prosperity as well as international influence are closely linked in the MENA region, but MENA oil- and gas-producing countries are far from homogenous. Different countries are likely to experience different impacts from the global clean-energy transition, depending on a number of domestic and international factors.
MENA producers are likely to be affected by the differences in the trajectories for oil and gas markets, the speed of the energy transition in different world markets, increased competition between energy producers, and increasing penalties for carbon intensity in production.
While gas is set to play a role in the global energy mix for decades, oil is expected to lose relevance as a result of decarbonization policies and technological developments in electric vehicles. BP’s 2020 Energy Outlook warned about the imminence of peak oil demand. In its business-as-usual scenario, oil demand is set to recover from the pandemic by 2025 but drop slowly thereafter. In its rapid-energy-transition scenario, oil demand drops from around 100 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2019 to 89 mb/d in 2030 and just 47 mb/d in 2050. Such a scenario would represent a challenge for MENA oil producers. By contrast, in the business-as-usual scenario, gas demand is expected to increase from 3.8 trillion cubic meters (tcm) in 2018 to 5 tcm in 2040, underpinned by a massive coal-to-gas switch in Asia and elsewhere. Such a scenario would be beneficial for MENA gas-producing countries such as Qatar and Algeria, which could remain geopolitically relevant by providing an important transition fuel to a decarbonizing world.
In the MENA region, Qatar seems to be the best positioned to preserve its geopolitical role, thanks to its significant liquified natural gas (LNG) capacity and its geographical location between Europe and Asia. Nevertheless, gas-producing countries will not be immune to the challenges posed by decarbonization policies in the long run. Gas demand is especially difficult to predict starting in the second half of the 2030s, as a result of increasing cost competition in power generation from renewables, as well as stricter environmental regulations (e.g. the EU Methane Strategy). It will thus be of paramount importance for MENA gasproducing countries to cut emissions in their gas value chain, in order to preserve their position and geopolitical influence.
The speeds of the energy transition in different world regions will also affect MENA geopolitical shifts. For instance, Europe’s oil and liquids demand is expected to decrease from the current 13.3 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 8.6 Mtoe in 2040, according to the International Energy Agency’s stated-policies scenario. By contrast, Asia-Pacific countries’ oil and liquids demand is set to increase from the current 32.5 Mtoe to 37.9 Mtoe in 2040. Thus, MENA producers more exposed to the European market are likely to suffer more—and earlier—from the global decarbonization process than others more exposed to Asian markets. That is, energy demand will increasingly dominate energy geopolitics, especially in an oversupplied energy market.
In such a scenario, export portfolio composition and diversification will determine the evolution of geopolitical influence for MENA oil and gas producers. Exporters that depend heavily on European markets will see their geopolitical position erode and their revenues fall. For example, Algeria, which mostly exports gas via pipeline to Europe, has been an essential element of the European gas supply architecture. Unless it manages to decarbonize its gas exports, this important role will shrink as the European Green Deal is implemented. In 2019, 85 per cent of Algeria’s total gas exports flowed to Europe, 62 per cent via pipeline (mainly to Italy and Spain). By contrast, LNG provides more flexibility to gas exporters, which will enable them to respond effectively to the geographical shifts of the energy demand. Qatar is the world’s top LNG exporter. In 2019, Qatar exported 83 per cent of its total gas exports via LNG. Of this volume, 67 per cent was directed to Asia Pacific countries. Asian markets are expected to drive energy demand growth in general and LNG in particular until 2030. Oil and gas producers will increasingly try to gain market share in such growing energy markets.
While energy demand will be crucial in the future, energy supply issues will not disappear. Competition among producers will persist, and even increase in the foreseeable future. The peak of oil demand will create a harsher world of more intense competition and tighter revenues for MENA oil producers. Regional oil and gas producers are likely to pursue different supply strategies, which will need to deal with the consequence of the global energy transition.
The transition indeed raises an existential dilemma—requiring a choice between maximizing production, which would weaken higher-cost exporters, and coordinating production cuts to increase prices, which could deprive governments of vital revenues. These are not trivial issues, as maximization of production would put into question established assumptions about saving reserves for future production and avoiding stranded assets. An intensification of competition among producers could thus undermine coordinated actions (e.g. OPEC agreements), which are important to oil price stability. This was illustrated by the collapse of OPEC+ talks in March 2020—spurred by disagreements between Saudi Arabia and Russia on the introduction of production quotas, as the two were also competing for market share with US shale oil producers—and the consequent fall in oil prices.
Another example of the growing competition among producers is the growing opposite visions between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia that emerged openly during OPEC talks in late 2020. Although they managed to reach an agreement within OPEC, the UAE’s ambitious plans to increase its oil capacity from about 4 mb/d to 5 mb/d by 2030 puts further pressure on the traditional alignment among Gulf OPEC producers. Moreover, in late 2020 the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company announced a $122 billion investment plan for 2021–2025, suggesting that the UAE had abandoned its more cautious approach to the oil sector. The plan suggested that MENA national oil companies might gain a growing share of world oil and gas production in the future. That is also due to (Western) oil companies’ decisions to cut their capital expenditure and other investments. Such decisions are motivated mostly by low oil prices and their commitment to decarbonization.
In a more competitive world, some MENA producing countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have the economic advantage of vast oil reserves (298 and 97 billion barrels, respectively), the lowest production costs (under $4 per barrel), and the least carbon-intense production. In the next years, due to expected higher carbon prices, carbon intensity will play a key role in determining which oil and gas producers will be able to preserve their geopolitical influence. MENA oil producers with higher production carbon intensity, such as Algeria and Iraq, might thus lag behind.
The global energy transition can also impact MENA oil- and gas-producing countries’ governance, due to their heavy dependence on revenues from these resources. To address this issue, regional oil and gas producers have launched several strategies (referred to as Visions) aimed at economic diversification (e.g. by increasing productivity, strengthening the private sector, and developing non-oil sectors), as well as increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix. These Visions were largely developed as a response to the 2014 oil price drop; COVID-19 and the acceleration of the global energy transition make it necessary to accelerate them. A country’s chances of success at this are likely to be affected by domestic factors including population size, government capacity, and financial ability to implement diversification measures.
Countries with a large, young, and growing population (Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) will encounter significant obstacles to the transformation of their rentier-state model. By contrast, countries with a smaller population, like the UAE and Qatar (9.7 and 2.8 million inhabitants, respectively) are likely to find it easier to adjust.
The ability to govern and finance major domestic socio-economic transformation will also be crucial. For example, North African countries could exploit their geographical vicinity to Europe and become major clean-electricity suppliers. In this sense, the recent EU Hydrogen Strategy considers imports of 40 GW of green hydrogen from the EU’s eastern and southern neighbours. However, countries like Algeria and Libya are experiencing major social and political instability, which undermines such scenarios and discourages the needed foreign investments. Thus, countries with major governance issues like Algeria, Libya, and Iraq are expected to lag behind on energy and economic diversification. The risk is that these countries will focus political energies on an intensifying fight for a share of the diminishing global oil and gas market, rather than on a strategy to reorient their economy. By contrast, countries with stronger governance are better equipped to transform their economies, bear the negative consequences of the transition in the short term, and navigate the geopolitical evolution.
The availability of large foreign exchange reserves will be crucial for the transformation of MENA producing countries. With such reserves, countries could offset the negative economic effects of lower oil demand and revenues in the short term, while investing in renewable energy projects for the medium and long term. Thus, countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar (with $500, $108 and $38 billion of foreign reserves, respectively) are potentially well equipped to manage the negative effects of lower revenues and foster economic transformation. Additionally, countries with large sovereign wealth funds could use them as an integral part of the diversification effort, for example to finance research and development and renewable-energy projects in MENA countries.
Producers with large foreign exchange reserves, sizable sovereign wealth funds, and small populations to appease are potentially the best placed to navigate the uncharted waters of the global energy transition.
MENA oil and gas producers have also considered developing their high renewable-energy potential, especially solar. This could help them pursue several goals, including economic diversification and reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. It could also free additional oil and gas volumes, currently used to meet fast-growing domestic energy demand, for sale abroad to produce additional revenue—thus avoiding the negative economic effects of growing energy consumption and positioning themselves as major renewable powers in a low-carbon future.
More recently, MENA oil and gas producers have begun to consider the growing interest in hydrogen as a way to preserve their geopolitical influence and remain pivotal actors in the future energy system. Given the region’s abundant renewable energy and carbon capture and storage potential, MENA countries could be at the forefront in both the green and blue hydrogen markets. In the short and medium term, blue hydrogen could benefit from its cost advantages. In the longer term, the MENA countries could exploit their excellent solar conditions and low-cost renewables in order to produce and export green hydrogen. Three MENA oil producers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman) have announced major hydrogen plans. For example, in July 2020 an international consortium announced plans for a $5 billion green renewables and hydrogen plant in Saudi Arabia, which aims to begin shipping ammonia to global markets by 2025. In September 2020 Saudi Arabia shipped 40 tons of blue ammonia to Japan in a pilot project undertaken by Saudi Aramco and the petrochemical giant Sabic.
The global energy transition will inevitably affect MENA oil- and gas-producing countries, both macroeconomically and geopolitically. However, not all MENA countries will see their geopolitical influence change in the same way. Some countries are better equipped than others to offset the negative effects domestically and internationally. Internationally, MENA oil and gas producers will start to focus more on energy demand differences among world regions. MENA countries with lowest-cost and least-carbon-intensive production are better positioned to preserve their geopolitical influence. Moreover, export portfolio composition and diversification will crucially define whether a country will lead or lag behind in the energy transition. Oil and gas producers are also endowed with an abundant renewable potential, another possible route to future energy leadership.
Nevertheless, competition among producers will remain or even increase, potentially undermining coordinated efforts to stabilize oil prices. Due to the strong link between hydrocarbons and the nature of the state in the MENA region, the domestic sphere will be a key element in the geopolitical shifts. Population size, strong governance, and the financial ability to adapt to change will help some MENA oil and gas producers to preserve their geopolitical role, while managing domestic socio-economic transformation.
From concrete to steel, how construction makes up the ‘last mile’ of decarbonization
February 16, 2021
As companies and countries worldwide map out how they will hit net-zero emissions by 2050, some elements of the vast shift are relatively straightforward: Cars will go electric; power grids will adopt clean energy.
But when it comes to buildings, engineers and policymakers alike hit a hurdle: Even a house covered with solar panels is likely to contain concrete and steel—some of the most intractable sectors when it comes to emissions. To make truly low-carbon buildings, researchers say we must embrace breakthrough technology, from hydrogen to carbon capture, and explore new ways of designing concrete, industrial products, and even houses themselves.
The stakes are high. Between the energy they consume and their construction, buildings are responsible for nearly 40% of the world’s emissions, according to the International Energy Agency. To truly produce a zero carbon house, office, or shop, every industry involved in its construction and maintenance must be decarbonized first, says Dabo Guan, a professor of climate change economics at University College London’s Bartlett School of Construction and Project Management.
When buildings are constructed, “they trigger the whole economic supply chain,” says Guan. “And the emissions of the supply chain are very big.”
“Like making a cake”
When it comes to concrete, “the only thing we use more as humans is water,” says Jeremy Gregory, executive director of MIT’s Concrete Sustainability Hub.
At the heart of concrete is cement: the key binding agent that turns sand and water into one of the world’s most ubiquitous materials. In 2019, the world produced roughly 4.1 billion tons of cement, according to the IEA. It’s also extremely hard to decarbonize. Cement itself must be formed at extremely high temperatures and is the product of a chemical process that naturally produces carbon dioxide. Collectively, it is responsible for up to 8% of global emissions, says Gregory.
Because it’s extremely difficult to use renewable energy to produce the energy intensity needed for ultrahigh temperatures, truly low-carbon cement will likely rely oncarbon capture, storage, and utilization, which prevents CO2 from being released into the atmosphere, either by injecting it into the ground or—potentially—into the concrete itself.
There is also another approach that could help, says Gregory: diluting, or even replacing, the cement in concrete. These options already exist: The ancient Romans used volcanic ash as a binding agent to make concrete. But it’s possible to use a large number of waste products, including fly ash—a by-product from coal plants. Some blends can reduce the carbon intensity by as much as 70% compared to conventional cement and will produce a product that’s just as good.
It’s “sort of like making a cake,” says Gregory. “You can use whole wheat flour. It’ll still look like a cake. It’ll just taste a little bit different.”
Reduce, reuse, recycle
Steel struggles with some of the same problems as concrete. Mainly, it must be produced at high temperatures, and, to a lesser degree, some CO2 also results from the process. Steel has one advantage—it can more easily be recycled—but that, too, has challenges. There is not enough to meet demand, and reprocessing requires energy, says Richard Curry, a program manager at Sustain, the Future Steel Manufacturing Research Hub based at the University of Swansea in Wales.
Logistically, recycling can be challenging and degrade the quality of the metal. As with concrete, the most feasible solutions are carbon capture, utilization, and storage—even if those are not yet commercially mainstream.
Embracing better design—from buildings to infrastructure to, yes, electric cars—to make them easier to disassemble so that their parts can be accessed and recycled could help, says Cameron Pleydell-Pearce, Sustain’s deputy director.
Another option, he says, is reusing.
“One of the things that we’re looking at in a very great level of detail is the degree to which we can understand which product and trace which product is coming out of a steel mill at a particular point, and then what happens to it as it goes through its life cycle,” he says.
Unlike even recycling, that would offer a major advantage: It comes with almost no CO2 emissions at all.
Warm in winter, cool in summer
When it comes to design, there’s another potential solution staring us in the face: drawing inspiration from what our buildings used to look like.
A traditional house in New England, for example, would have had south-facing windows, maximizing the sunshine and minimizing the darkness in winter, says Anna Dyson, the founding director of Yale University’s Center for Ecosystems in Architecture.
Houses all over the world have traditionally been designed and built to best work with the climate, she adds, but “over the course of the 20th century, as buildings became more and more reliant on cheap fossil fuels, then it wasn’t so required to be really, really careful about orientation and working with climate.”
Also, to manage the indoor temperatures, houses were built in shapes and sizes that suited their climates. In humid locations, home designs included ample ventilation and steep roofs to enhance air flow. In arid climates with hot days and cold nights, houses were roomy and light-colored to reflect heat. Those principles, along with making use of biodegradable materials, from timber to straw to coconut husks and bamboo, are ideas that some architects like Dysonare now looking back to.
Of course there are no silver bullets. Houses still need energy for lights and heating, preferably clean energy, Dyson points out. And now we face the prospect of not just making houses that are suited to the next 100 years, but also finding ways to retrofit the ones that have already lasted a century.
“We’ve got a long way to go,” says Dyson. “But we’ve got a lot that we can do with design.”
Africa climate change report reveals heat rising north and south, the Sahel getting wetter per Willem Van Cotthem, University of Ghent, Belgium in today’s Desertification blog.
Africa needs to prepare better for climate change by responding to a wide range of potential risks, a multi-agency report led by the UN World Meteorological Organization (WMO) said on Monday, the first in a series of continent-by-continent assessments.
“In recent months we have seen devastating floods, an invasion of desert locusts and now face the looming spectre of drought because of a La Niña event. The human and economic toll has been aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic,” WMO Secretary-General Petteri Taalas said in a statement.
Filling the gap
The report aims to fill a gap in reliable and timely climate information for Africa, which translates into a lack of climate-related development planning, said Vera Songwe, Under-Secretary-General, and Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).
Africa has been warming progressively since the start of the last century, and in the next five years, northern and southern Africa are set to get drier and hotter, while the Sahel region of Western Africa will get wetter, WMO’s Regional Strategic Office Director, Filipe Lucio, told a press conference.
“Overall, Africa needs to take action. Action is needed today in terms of adaptation, but also is needed tomorrow in terms of mitigation”, Lucio said.
The agricultural sector is key to building climate resistance, since it is the dominant employer and it relies on the use of water and energy – both heavily implicated in climate change, he said.
Northern and southern areas under threat of aridity and desertification would benefit from reforestation, which helps to prevent water runoff and creates vegetation which supports the hydrological cycle.
Policy changes are also recommended in transport, energy, infrastructure and industry. Financing has improved with the establishment of a UN-backed Green Climate Fund but there are still limitations in terms of the continent’s ability to tap into such funds, he added.
Climate change has contributed to a jump in food insecurity, mosquito-borne disease and mass displacement in the past decade, and the rise in sea levels has led to unusual weather patterns such as Tropical Cyclone Idai, which hit Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe in 2019.
It showed the need for communities to learn about the risks and for impact-based warnings about the appropriate actions to take.
A day after the cyclone made landfall, it appeared to have dissipated and people thought the worst was over. But then disaster struck when flooding followed, overwhelming Mozambique’s major port city of Beira, Lucio said.
“People were asked to find refuge in appropriate places but the city of Beira was never built to withstand a category-5 tropical cyclone. So that means the building codes need to be changed, but the building codes cannot be changed using what tropical cyclones used to be like in the past.
“They need to have forward-looking analysis to anticipate the trends into the future and start designing infrastructure and other systems taking into account the changing nature of these tropical cyclones.”
Author, Willem Van Cotthem is Honorary Professor of Botany, University of Ghent (Belgium). Scientific Consultant for Desertification and Sustainable Development.
The United Nations (UN) celebrated on May 10th, 2021, the first edition of the International Day of the Argan Tree, an endemic tree in Morocco.
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