King is dead, long live the King’: Principle applicable in the MENA region. In effect, all countries of the area, be they republics or monarchies tend to abide by this principle. The consequences of such custom have had bearings throughout millennia. The recent advent of oil exports related revenues brought the limelight to shed a little light in the MENA sunny skies.
Libya’s battle for Tripoli alongside ongoing mass anti-government demonstrations that toppled autocratic leaders of Algeria and Sudan demonstrate that both popular Arab protests that in 2011 forced four presidents out of office and the counterrevolution it provoked are alive and kicking.
Protesters in Algeria and Sudan are determined to prevent a repeat of Egypt where a United Arab Emirates and Saudi-backed military officer rolled back the achievements of their revolt to install a brutal dictatorship or of Yemen, Libya and Syria that have suffered civil wars aggravated by interference of foreign powers.
In Libya, Field Marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar, the UAE-Saudi-Egyptian-supported warlord, hopes that his assault on the capital Tripoli, the seat of the country’s United Nations-recognized government, will either end the conflict militarily or at the very least significantly increase his leverage in peace talks.
In all three countries, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two Gulf nations most determined to maintain the Middle East and North Africa’s autocratic structure at whatever cost, have sought to either bolster military resolve to remain a decisive political force or support the rise of forces that fit their agenda.
The aid package contributed to deepening divisions among the opposition that has vowed to continue street protests until full civilian rule has been achieved despite the ousting of president Omar al-Bashir, the resignation of senior military officers, including the intelligence chief, and the arrest of Mr. Al-Bashir’s brothers.
Mr. Al-Hussein returned to Khartoum this month from two years in exile in the kingdom, where he served as an African affairs advisor to the Saudi court, after having been unceremoniously sacked in 2017 on suspicion that he was a Saudi intelligence asset.
Moreover, the head of Sudan’s military council, Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan and his deputy, Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, a paramilitary commander known as Hemeti, developed close ties to the Gulf states in their former roles as commanders of the Sudan contingent fighting in Yemen in support of the Saudi-UAE alliance.
A commander of feared Arab militias accused of genocide in Darfur, General Dagalo is widely viewed as ambitious and power hungry. His Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are deployed across Khartoum.
Western officials privately describe General Dagalo as “potentially Sudan’s Sisi,” a reference to Egyptian general-turned-president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi who came to power in 2013 in a UAE-Saudi-supported military coup.
Mr. Al-Sisi has introduced one of the most repressive systems in recent Egyptian history. Western diplomats said General Dagalo’s ambitions virtually guaranteed that the military would not fully surrender power in any negotiated transition.
The military’s role in deposing president Hosni Mubarak as a result of a popular revolt in 2011 and subsequently restoring the military’s grip on power coupled with concern about General Dagalo inspired one of the Sudanese protesters’ chants: “It’s either victory or Egypt.”
Saudi Arabia and the UAE together with Egypt and Bahrain have diplomatically and economically boycotted Qatar for the past 22 months in a bid to force the Gulf state to tow their geopolitical line.
For now, Mr. Haftar’s offensive has way laid a UN-sponsored peace conference that was expected to achieve an agreement that would have ensured that Islamists would continue to be part of the Libyan power structure.
Mr. Haftar, like his regional backers, accuses the Tripoli government of being dominated by Islamists, the bete noir of the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
On a visit to Saudi Arabia days before launching his attack on Tripoli, Mr. Haftar reportedly was promised millions of dollars in support in talks with Saudi King Salman, and his powerful son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, in defiance of a United Nations arms embargo.
The battle for Libya could prove to be Mr. Haftar’s most difficult military offensive. His Libyan National Army (LNA) already controls Libya’s second city of Benghazi and much of rest of the country where it met relatively little resistance.
The battle also serves as a warning to protesters in Sudan and Algeria whose demands for fundamental change risk upsetting the UAE, Saud Arabia and Egypt’s applecart.
With no swift victory in sight in the battle for Tripoli, Libya risks another round of protracted war that could be aggravated by the fact that it is as much a domestic fight as it is a multi-layered proxy war.
Unlike Sudan, Libya has passed the corner. Years of civil and proxy wars have devastated the country and laid the groundwork for further violence. Algeria and Sudan still have a chance of avoiding the fate of Libya, or for that matter Syria and Yemen.
As the battle in Tripoli unfolds, Libya looms large as a live example of what is at stake. Protesters are up against forces whose backers have proven that there is little they will shy away from to achieve their objectives. Libya is but the latest example.
The king’s fate is at stake in the fighting in streets of southern Tripoli. His fate hangs like a sword of Damocles in the balance in the streets of Algiers and Khartoum.
Dr James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, an adjunct senior research fellow at the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute and co-director of the University of Wuerzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture.
The economic performance of lower-income developing countries will be crucial to reducing poverty further. Although these economies face significant headwinds, they could also seize important new growth opportunities – especially with the help of digital platforms.
MILAN – The global economy is undergoing very large structural shifts, driven by three megatrends. One is the digital transformation of the foundations on which economies are built and run. Another is the growing purchasing power and economic strength of emerging economies, and China in particular. Lastly, there are broad-based political-economy trends, which include rising nationalism, various forms of populism, political and social polarization, and a possible breakdown of the multilateral framework within which the global economy has functioned since World War II.
The media devote most of their attention to the economic, social, and regulatory challenges arising from these megatrends, and to the trade, investment, and technology tensions between China and the United States. Yet a significant share of the world’s population lives in poor countries, or in poorer parts of developing countries. Furthermore, the rapid reduction in global poverty over the past three decades is primarily the result of sustained growth in developing economies.
The future growth prospects of today’s early-stage (that is, lower income – some growing and others not) developing countries will be of huge importance in reducing poverty further. Although these countries face significant headwinds, they could also seize important new growth opportunities – especially with the help of digital platforms.
The headwinds are certainly considerable. For starters, advances in digital technologies – robotics, machine learning, sensors, and vision – directly threaten the labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly upon which lower-income, non-resource-rich economies have traditionally relied.
Moreover, climate change has had its greatest economic impact in the tropical and subtropical regions where most lower-income countries are located. The effects of global warming are highly disruptive in fragile economies, and, taken together, constitute a major new obstacle to growth.1
Fertility rates, meanwhile, remain astonishingly high in some countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. In a few of the poorest – Niger, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo – the rate is 6-7 children per female. The resulting flood of new entrants to the labor market is far outstripping the number of jobs available.
No known growth model can accommodate or keep up with this kind of demographic surge. Even sustained economic growth of around 7% per year won’t be enough. And although fertility tends to decline as incomes rise, that does not happen immediately. Empowering women, therefore, may be the most effective way of starting to address the challenge.
Conflict also disrupts growth. Although many conflicts appear to have a religious or ethnic basis, some scholars believe that their root cause may be economic, with ethnic divisions serving as a way to exclude other groups from access to scarce resources and opportunities. Whatever its source, inequality of opportunity has a highly disruptive effect on governance and hence growth.
But these obstacles are not insurmountable. For one thing, developing countries now have huge potential export markets in middle-income countries, and no longer depend entirely on advanced economies for access to global markets.
There is also a renewed awareness of the importance of infrastructure in enabling growth. In addition to roads, railways, and ports, electricity and digital connectivity are crucial. In this regard, the rapid expansion of cellular wireless technology, combined with the installation of high-capacity undersea broadband pipes around Africa, represents major progress. Meanwhile, China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” – though criticized by much of the West, and the United States in particular – could bring dramatic improvements in physical and digital connectivity to Central Asia and parts of Africa.
Further advances in critical infrastructure will create important growth opportunities for developing countries via e-commerce, mobile payments, and related financial services. The experience of China strongly suggests that these digital platforms, and the ecosystems that develop around them, are powerful engines for incremental, highly inclusive growth.
China, of course, is a very large, homogenous market. If smaller, lower-income developing countries are to benefit from equally rapid inclusive growth, the digital platforms will have to be regional and international in scope.
Some are starting to emerge. Jumia, a Nigeria-based e-commerce platform covering 14 African countries, recently went public on the New York Stock Exchange, amid considerable excitement. True, the company faces similar obstacles to those that Asian and Latin American platforms previously had to overcome, including a lack of reliable payment systems, low trust between buyers and sellers, and logistics and delivery bottlenecks. But the experience of other regions shows that these shortcomings can be addressed over time.
The bigger risk to these platforms stems from the inevitable and necessary increase in regulation of the Internet around the world. In particular, diverse national regulatory regimes may inadvertently or deliberately disrupt or block the international development of e-commerce ecosystems, hurting lower-income countries in the process. Avoiding the creation of such unintended obstacles should therefore be a high priority for the international community.
Today’s lower-income countries already face a tough task in trying to emulate the impressive growth of developing economies before them. An underperforming global economy, and rising national and international tensions, will make that task even harder. If the world is serious about reducing poverty further, it must pay far more attention to their progress.
Michael Spence, a Nobel laureate in economics, is Professor of Economics at NYU’s Stern School of Business, Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Advisory Board Co-Chair of the Asia Global Institute in Hong Kong, and Chair of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda Council on New Growth Models. He was the chairman of the independent Commission on Growth and Development, an international body that from 2006-2010 analyzed opportunities for global economic growth, and is the author of The Next Convergence – The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World.
Hunger continues to rise in the Near East and North Africa region where over 52 million people are undernourished.
Conflicts and widening rural-urban gaps hamper the region’s efforts to end hunger by 2030.
8 May 2019, Cairo/Rome – Hunger in the Near East and North Africa region (NENA) continues to rise as conflicts and protracted crises have spread and worsened since 2011, threatening the region’s efforts to achieve the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including Zero Hunger.
Conflict continues to be the main driver of hunger across the region. More than two-thirds of hungry people in NENA, approximately 34 million people, live in conflict-affected countries, compared to 18 million hungry people in countries that are not impacted directly by conflict.
Stunting, wasting, and undernutrition are also far worse in conflict countries than in the other countries.
“Conflicts and civil instability have long-lasting impacts on the food and nutrition security of both affected and surrounding countries in the regions” said Abdessalam Ould Ahmed, FAO Assistant Director-General and Regional Representative for the Near East and North Africa.
“The impact of the conflict has been disrupting food and livestock production in some countries and consequently affecting the availability of food across the region,” he added.
“Rising hunger is also compounded by rapid population growth, scarce and fragile natural resources, the growing threat of climate change, increasing unemployment rates, and diminished rural infrastructure and services” Ould Ahmed underscored. The report highlights that the region is not facing just a hunger crisis as some of the highest rates of obesity are also found in countries within the region, putting pressure on people’s health, lifestyles and national health systems and economies. Addressing obesity requires food systems that ensure that people have access to healthy nutritious food and also increased public awareness and information on the risks associated with overweight and obesity.
Inadequate rural transformation hampers efforts to eradicate hunger and malnutrition by 2030
The report shows that not only do conflicts undermine the region’s Zero Hunger efforts, but also the degree of rural transformation.
“Countries that are not in conflict and have gone furthest in transforming rural areas in a sustainable way including through better management of water resources, have achieved better food security and nutrition outcomes than those in conflict or with lower levels of rural transformation,” Ould Ahmed said, noting how the report stresses that more efforts are needed to boost rural employment, stimulate economic growth in rural areas, reduce urban-rural gaps, and improve agricultural productivity and rural infrastructure and services.
The report highlights how unemployment, particularly for young people and women across all age groups is a significant challenge in the NENA region and is often higher than in other regions of the world. This is aggravated by rural-urban gaps – with significant disparities in living standards and poverty rates between rural and urban areas – and differences in labour productivity between traditional agriculture and industry and services. This gap is deepened by differences in access to education, health as well as other public services and housing.
At the same time, rural areas accommodate around 40 percent of the population, where the majority of poor are living. The report shows that the average wages for those employed in agriculture are likely to be far below those of workers outside the sector. Partially as a result of lower wages in agriculture, rural areas in the NENA region generally have higher income poverty rates than urban areas. On average, rural poverty is about twice as high as poverty in urban areas.
Transforming agriculture to achieve Zero Hunger
At a regional level, there are significant opportunities for transforming agriculture in a sustainable way, starting with the provision of improved access to markets for farmers, promoting investments in agriculture, transfer of technology and other innovations, more efficient and effective management of water resources, as well as key policy changes that support the shift from subsistence farming to commercial and diversified production systems.
“There is a great need to encourage our region’s farmers to produce according to the comparative advantage of the region,” Ould Ahmed said, highlighting that the NENA region has a great potential in the production of crops and livestock products that are least intensive in arable land and water and more intensive in use of labour.
The report highlights that greater efforts and actions are needed to support the development and implementation of policies and programmes to abolish rural-urban differences.
Key facts and figures
Number of hungry people in the Near East and North Africa: 52 million, 33.9 million are in conflict countries directly and 18.1 million in non-conflict countries.
Children under five affected by stunting (low height-for-age): 21.1 percent.
Children under five affected by wasting (low weight-for-height): 8.7 percent.
Children under five who are overweight (high weight-for-height): 9.1 percent
Note to editors: NENA countries include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
A new tide of people power is rising in Africa. On April 2, a nonviolent resistance movement in Algeria succeeded in pressuring Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign after 20 years as president. Nine days later, protesters in Sudan were celebrating the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan’s president of 30 years, after a three-month-long uprising against his regime.
The nonviolent overthrows of Bouteflika and Bashir are not aberrations. They reflect a surprising trend across the continent: despite common perceptions of Africa as wracked by violence and conflict, since 2000, most rebellions there have been unarmed and peaceful. Over the past decade, mass uprisings in Africa have accounted for one in three of the nonviolent campaigns aiming to topple dictatorships around the world. Africa has seen 25 new, nonviolent mass movements—almost twice as many as Asia, the next most active region with 16.
The AU said it noted “with deep regret” that the military had not stepped aside and handed power to civilians within a 15-day period set by the AU last month.
The bloc also reiterated “its conviction that a military-led transition in Sudan will be totally unacceptable and contrary to the will and legitimate aspirations, to democratic institutions and processes, as well as respect for human rights and freedoms of the Sudanese people”.
The military assumed power in Sudan after toppling the country’s long-time ruler Omar al-Bashir following months of anti-government protests.
It promised to hold elections within two years but protesters have rejected that and remained on the streets of the capital, Khartoum, demanding immediate civilian rule.
The council, led by General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, has been negotiating with protest leaders on the formation of a new transitional government. But the two sides are divided over the role of the military, which is dominated by al-Bashir appointees.
The UAE Government, in cooperation with the World Economic Forum (WEF), has opened the Centre for Fourth Industrial Revolution in the UAE at AREA 2071, Emirates Towers in Dubai, the first of its kind in the region and the fifth globally.
In line with the rapid global changes and developments of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the Center aims at preparing strategies, policies and developing solutions to the most pressing challenges in the region and the world. In addition, it works towards developing mechanisms, applications and uses for the fourth industrial revolution in the UAE.
Mohammed Abdullah Al Gergawi, Minister of the UAE Cabinet Affairs and The Future, vice chairman of the Board of Trustees and managing director of Dubai Future Foundation stated that the opening of the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution reflects the vision of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Vice President and Prime Minister of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai.
Al Gergawi also highlighted that the UAE is continuously developing new business models that are dependent on technology and the outcomes of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, to join global efforts for shaping a better future.
Borge Brende, president of WEF said: “In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, countries and businesses need to move fast or risk getting left behind. Emerging technologies like artificial intelligence and blockchain have the power to benefit everyone, but they must be shaped strategically to maximize the benefits and mitigate the risks.”
“We are looking forward to working with the UAE to accelerate the impact of the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution Network’s work in this area and scale projects globally” Brende added.
The opening of the Centre was attended by His Excellency Omar Sultan Al Olama, Minister of State for Artificial Intelligence, Deputy Managing Director of Dubai Future Foundation, His Excellency Borg Brenda, President of the World Economic Forum, Her Excellency Dr Aisha Bint Butti Bin Bishr, Director General of Smart Dubai, His Excellency Khalfan Belhoul, CEO of Dubai Future Foundation, alongside a number of senior representatives from the local government and the World Economic Forum.
The Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution (C4IR UAE) is a collaboration between the Dubai Future Foundation (DFF) and the World Economic Forum (WEF).
An affiliate center of C4IR San Francisco, opened in 2017, C4IR UAE researches key focus areas in the fourth industrial revolution network: Blockchain and Distributed Ledger, AI and Machine Learning, and Precision Medicine.
Blockchain is the first project area launched under C4IR UAE in 2019 and will look into the governance frameworks around implementing blockchain across government sectors. The center will also trial a supply chain pilot, focusing on the correct governance protocols and practices with regards to security, data privacy and identity verification within blockchain. Across the three project areas, C4IR UAE aims to showcase UAE case studies, policy, and governance frameworks to WEF’s global network, as well as develop new research and policy around relevant UAE 4IR topics.
The Centre’s official launch follows the MOU signing that took place at the Annual Meeting of the Global Future Councils at the World Economic Forum in Davos earlier this year, in the presence of His Highness Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, Crown Prince of Dubai and Chairman of Dubai Executive Council.
The Centre for Fourth Industrial Revolution in the UAE, seen as the fifth of its kind in the world after the United States of America, Japan, India and China, comes as part of the strategic partnership between the UAE government and the World Economic Forum.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), keeps on pressing on all economic and policy issues of the day in every country. Doing so for all these years, it has, in the end, amassed such knowledge and experience that enabled it to have a worldwide view of the latest trends. Tackling corruption in government could save $1 trillion in taxes, but not only that as we were recently told, it could also resolve many of the plethora of all related issues throughout all regions in the developing and developed world alike. A point in case is elaborated on this particular article that is republished here for its obvious importance, especially for those developing countries of the MENA region.
No country is immune to corruption. The abuse of public office for private gain erodes people’s trust in government and institutions, makes public policies less effective and fair, and siphons taxpayers’ money away from schools, roads, and hospitals.
While the wasted money is important, the cost is about much more. Corruption corrodes the government’s ability to help grow the economy in a way that benefits all citizens.
But the political will to build strong and transparent institutions can turn the tide against corruption. In our new Fiscal Monitor, we shine a light on fiscal institutions and policies, like tax administration or procurement practices, and show how they can fight corruption.
Political will can turn the tide against corruption.
Corruption helps evade taxes
We analyze more than 180 countries and find that more corrupt countries collect fewer taxes, as people pay bribes to avoid them, including through tax loopholes designed in exchange for kickbacks. Also, when taxpayers believe their governments are corrupt, they are more likely to evade paying taxes.
We show that overall, the least corrupt governments collect 4 percent of GDP more in tax revenues than countries at the same level of economic development with the highest levels of corruption.
A few countries’ reforms generated even higher revenues. Georgia, for example, reduced corruption significantly and tax revenues more than doubled, rising by 13 percentage points of GDP between 2003 and 2008. Rwanda’s reforms to fight corruption since the mid-1990s bore fruit, and tax revenues increased by 6 percentage points of GDP.
Corruption also prevents people from benefiting fully from the wealth created by their country’s natural resources. Because the exploration of oil or mining generates huge profits, it creates strong incentives for corruption. Our research shows that resource-rich countries, on average, have weaker institutions and higher corruption.
Corruption wastes taxpayers’ money
The Fiscal Monitor shows that countries with lower levels of perceived corruption have significantly less waste in public investment projects. We estimate that the most corrupt emerging market economies waste twice as much money as the least corrupt ones.
Governments waste taxpayers’ money when they spend it on cost overruns due to kickbacks or bid rigging in public procurement. So, when a country is less corrupt, it invests money more efficiently and fairly.
Corruption also distorts government priorities. For example, among low-income countries, the share of the budget dedicated to education and health is one-third lower in more corrupt countries. It also impacts the effectiveness of social spending. In more corrupt countries school-age students have lower test scores.
Corruption is also a problem in state-owned enterprises, such as some countries’ oil companies, and public utilities like electric and water companies. Our analysis suggests that these enterprises are less efficient in countries with high levels of corruption.
Where there is political will, there is a way
Fighting corruption requires political will to create strong fiscal institutions that promote integrity and accountability throughout the public sector.
Based on the research, here are some lessons for countries to help them build effective institutions that curb vulnerabilities to corruption:
Invest in high levels of transparency and independent external scrutiny. This allows audit agencies and the public at large to provide effective oversight. For example, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Paraguay are using an online platform that allows citizens to monitor the physical and financial progress of investment projects. Norway has developed a high standard of transparency to manage its natural resources. Our analysis also shows that a free press enhances the benefits of fiscal transparency. In Brazil, the results of audits impacted the reelection prospects of officials suspected of misuse of public money, but the impact was greater in areas with local radio stations.
Reform institutions. The chances for success are greater when countries design reforms to tackle corruption from all angles. For example, reforms to tax administration will have a greater payoff if tax laws are simpler and they reduce officials’ scope for discretion. To help countries, the IMF has built comprehensive diagnostics on the quality of fiscal institutions, including public investment management, revenue administration, and fiscal transparency.
Build a professional civil service. Transparent, merit-based hiring and pay reduce the opportunities for corruption. The heads of agencies, ministries, and public enterprises must promote ethical behavior by setting a clear tone at the top.
Keep pace with new challenges as technology and opportunities for wrongdoing evolve. Focus on areas of higher risk—such as procurement, revenue administration, and management of natural resources—as well as effective internal controls. In Chile and Korea, for example, electronic procurement systems have been powerful tools to curtail corruption by promoting transparency and improving competition.
More cooperation to fight corruption. Countries can also join efforts to make it harder for corruption to cross borders. For example, more than 40 countries have already made it a crime for their companies to pay bribes to gain business abroad under the OECD anti-corruption convention. Countries can also aggressively pursue anti–money laundering activities and reduce transnational opportunities to hide corrupt money in opaque financial centers.
Curbing corruption is a challenge that requires persevering on many fronts, but one that pays huge dividends. It starts with political will, continuously strengthening institutions to promote integrity and accountability, and global cooperation.