Recent setbacks in financing for development should therefore focus policymakers’ attention on the need for decisive national strategies so these best intentions might be realized. Harnessing the necessary resources could be achieved through a combination of revenue mobilization, attracting private finance, and supporting financial sector development. Policy makers will need to engage in collective action and practice a new multilateralism in support of global goals.
A new UN study, prepared with significant contributions by the IMF, the World Bank Group, the World Trade Organization, the United Nations Development Program and other UN agencies, takes a deep dive into how countries and the international community are faring in mobilizing the needed financing.
The financing needs are not small change—an IMF study earlier this year estimated additional annual spending needs by 2030 would be $2.6 trillion in low-income and emerging markets for the big-ticket SDGs delivering education, health, power, roads, water and sanitation to growing populations. The financing challenge is particularly large in low-income and fragile states given their low starting point, rapid population growth, and often weak growth trajectory accounting for one-fifth of the total financing needs.
While the financing challenges are large, they are not overwhelming for most countries.
The UN report also notes that some recent developments may make mobilizing financing more difficult. Global growth has likely peaked, trade restrictions are intensifying, some emerging markets are experiencing capital flow reversals, and debt risks are rising with about thirty low-income countries at a high risk of debt distress or in debt distress. We are indeed at a delicate moment for the global economy as the IMF Managing Director remarked earlier this month.
Meeting the financing challenge
The Financing for Sustainable Development Report makes over 40 specific recommendations to UN member states to better align financing with investments in the sustainable development goals. Four proposals merit particular attention:
Develop a financing framework. Financing is often the weakest part of national SDG plans: a recent study showed that over three-quarters of 107 national plans do not contain costings or financing details. The report makes concrete recommendations on how to operationalize a financing framework and illustrates how some countries developed plans identifying both public and private flows.
Medium-term revenue strategies. The report recommends building a national consensus for medium-term revenue strategies that can support reforms through the political cycle by highlighting the link between additional revenues and effective and equitable public services. Indonesia provides a good example of an ambitious revenue strategy that aims to raise revenue from 10 to 15 percent of GDP over the medium term (explained in this IMF book ). Revenue strategies may be bolstered by global coordination on international corporate tax reform.
Actions to support debt sustainability. An in-depth discussion of debt risks provides a rich menu of actions to help countries spot vulnerabilities early on, and better manage their debt. The report highlights that all debt crisis situations are different and discusses ongoing efforts and challenges for debt-restructuring in the Gambia, Republic of Congo, and Mozambique.
Prepare for future crises. Even the best laid plans, strategies, and tools may not prepare developing countries adequately for future financial crises and spillovers from advanced economies. The report reiterates the importance of ensuring the adequacy and comprehensiveness of the global financial safety net, including through the ongoing review of IMF financing arrangements.
While the financing challenges are large, they are not overwhelming for most countries. Particularly strong efforts will be needed to move the needle in Africa and parts of the Middle East, with national policies to support SDG investments, and international cooperation to find solutions to new and emerging challenges. The Financing for Sustainable Development Report makes an important contribution to identifying necessary actions.
Governments in the Middle East are becoming more
receptive to growing private sector involvement in their economies because
public sector debt in many markets is ballooning, an official from the World
Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) has said.
Speaking on an investors’ panel debate at the
Global Financial Forum in Dubai on Monday, the IFC’s Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) director, Mouayed Makhlouf, said: “For the first time,
because of the massive rise in public debt across the region, we see a
difference. Our narrative with these governments has changed. Now, they are coming to us and they are saying
‘can you help us with the reforms?'”
Makhlouf said that the MENA region needs to create
300 million new jobs – “basically, double the population” by 2050 due
to the burgeoning youth population in the region, and that Egypt alone needs to
create around 700,000 jobs per year, although he said it is MENA’s fastest
growing economy currently, with GDP growth of 5.3 percent, compared with a
regional average of around 2-3 percent.
“The social contract in MENA is as such where
most of the services (are) provided by the public sector. But what you have ended up with… is a huge
public debt that has been rising for the past few years,” he said, adding
that debt-to-GDP ratios stand at around 96 percent in Egypt, 97-98 percent in
Jordan and 150 percent in Lebanon.
“For us, the main thing we need to find in
this region are… growth and jobs. And
I really believe both of these things can only come through a larger private
sector participation,” Makhlouf said.
In a separate panel on the outlook for the region’s
banking sector, JP Morgan‘s Asif Raza said that the decline in oil prices
that began in 2014 had created opportunities for
international banks to advise governments that are looking to
diversify on how to embark on “monetisation and privatisation” of
Kamal, MENA head of corporate banking at Citi, said that governments had run up deficits as oil
revenues fell, and had financed these through “various instruments where
banks have been involved”.
“And we expect to see that continue over the
next 2-3 years.”
Although total GCC fixed income issuance declined
by 16 percent year-on-year to $145.3 billion in 2018 as oil prices rallied,
according to Kamco Research, JP Morgan’s Raza said the current pipeline is
A faster flow
Raza said that at this stage last year, “over
$15.4 billion worth of issuance was done in the MENA region – this year, it’s
He added that in 2018, “the loan market
was (at an) all-time high in this region”. Figures published earlier this month from
Acuris showed that syndicated loan activity in the MENA region last year
outstripped bond issuance – with $133 billion of syndicated loans issued,
compared to $89.5 billion in bonds.
Raza said that at the top end of the corporate
banking market, “there’s lots of activity still happening”.
“There’s still quite a decent pipeline of
financing and refinancing,” he said.
However, Citi’s Kamal argued that the market has
been much tougher for SMEs in recent years.
“I believe that there is room for improvement
for all countries in the region as far as creating the right balance for SMEs
(is concerned),” he said.
He said that “time and again” in tougher
economic times large corporates, government-related entities and even government
departments have delayed payments to SMEs, which causes cashflow problems and
affects their ability to repay creditors.
“And some of the legal framework that
surrounds the corporate sector – we all know about bounced cheques and the
consequences of that. In summary, what
happens is SMEs can’t stay back in a number of cases (to) fight through these
cycles. So, we see skips, people leave
and that does not leave a very strong impact as far as consumer confidence is
Yet funding shortages for private sector firms can
also create opportunities – not least for the region’s private equity sector,
according to Karim El-Solh.
Speaking on the investment panel, El-Solh said that
his firm’s pipeline “has increased dramatically as a result of a lack of
availability of funding for businesses elsewhere.
“The IPO market is not open; the bank
liquidity has dried up so for us it’s an opportunity to come and be a provider
of growth capital. We are seeing more
companies, better quality companies, we’re acquiring controlling stakes at
lower valuations,” he said.
Makhlouf said more opportunities need to be created
for the private sector, stating that levels of private sector involvement in
the economy in the region lag behind other emerging markets.
“MENA region is only one-fifth in terms of
private sector participation compared to Latin America,” he said.
This article originally appeared on Fast Company, it was republished by the World Economic Forum on 8 March 2019. It is to be noted that in the eastern end of the MENA region, notably in the Gulf Cooperation Countries, Asian populations and investments happily cohabitate with the respective native minorities.
By Parag Khanna, Senior Research Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore
This excerpt is from Parag Khanna’s book “The
future is Asian”. The book was chosen as February’s book for the World
Economic Forum Book Club. Each month, a new book will be selected and discussed
in the group. The author will then join in on the last day of the month to
reply to some questions from our audience.
When we look back from 2100 at the
date on which the cornerstone of an Asian-led world order began, it will be
2017. In May of that year, sixty-eight countries representing two-thirds of the
world’s population and half its GDP gathered in Beijing for the first Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) summit. This gathering of Asian, European, and African
leaders symbolized the launch of the largest coordinated infrastructure
investment plan in human history. Collectively, the assembled governments
pledged to spend trillions of dollars in the coming decade to connect the
world’s largest population centers in a constellation of commerce and cultural
exchange—a new Silk Road era.
The Belt and Road Initiative is the
most significant diplomatic project of the twenty-first century, the equivalent
of the mid-twentieth-century founding of the United Nations and World Bank plus
the Marshall Plan all rolled into one. The crucial difference: BRI was
conceived in Asia and launched in Asia and will be led by Asians. This is the
story of one entire side of the planet—the Asian side—and its impact on the
Asians once again see themselves as
the center of the world—and its future. The Asian economic zone—from the
Arabian Peninsula and Turkey in the west to Japan and New Zealand in the east,
and from Russia in the north to Australia in the south—now represents 50
percent of global GDP and two-thirds of global economic growth. Of the
estimated $30 trillion in middle-class consumption growth estimated between
2015 and 2030, only $1 trillion is expected to come from today’s Western
economies. Most of the rest will come from Asia.
Asia produces and exports, as well as
imports and consumes, more goods than any other region, and Asians trade and
invest more with one another than they do with Europe or North America. Asia
has several of the world’s largest economies, most of the world’s foreign
exchange reserves, many of the largest banks and industrial and technology
companies, and most of the world’s biggest armies. Asia also accounts for 60
percent of the world’s population. It has ten times as many people as Europe
and twelve times as many people as North America. As the world population
climbs toward a plateau of around 10 billion people, Asia will forever be home
to more people than the rest of the world combined. They are now speaking.
Prepare to see the world from the Asian point of view.
To see the world from the Asian point
of view requires overcoming decades of accumulated—and willfully
cultivated—ignorance about Asia. To this day, Asian perspectives are often
inflected through Western prisms; they can only color to an unshakable
conventional Western narrative, but nothing more. Yet the presumption that
today’s Western trends are global quickly falls on its face. The “global
financial crisis” was not global: Asian growth rates continued to surge, and
almost all the world’s fastest-growing economies are in Asia. In 2018, the
world’s highest growth rates were reported in India, China, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Uzbekistan. Though economic stimulus arrangements and ultralow
interest rates have been discontinued in the United States and Europe, they
continue in Asia. Similarly, Western populist politics from Brexit to Trump
haven’t infected Asia, where pragmatic governments are focused on inclusive
growth and social cohesion. Americans and Europeans see walls going up, but
across Asia they are coming down.
Rather than being backward-looking,
navel-gazing, and pessimistic, billions of Asians are forward-looking,
outward-oriented, and optimistic.
These blind spots are a symptom of a
related oversight often found in foreign analyses of Asia, namely that they are
actually about the United States. There is a presumption that Asia (and frankly
every other region as well) is strategically inert and incapable of making
decisions or itself; all it is waiting for is the US leadership to tell them
what to do. But from the Asian view, the past two decades have been
characterized by President George W. Bush’s incompetence, President Barack
Obama’s half-heartedness, and President Donald Trump’s unpredictability.
The United States’ laundry list of perceived
threats—from ISIS and Iran to North Korea and China—have their locus in Asia,
but the United States has developed no comprehensive strategy for addressing
them. In Washington it is fashionable to promote an “Indo-Pacific” maritime
strategy as an antidote to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, failing to see how
in reality Asia’s terrestrial and maritime zones cannot be so neatly separated
from each other. For all their differences, Asians have realized that their
shared geography is a far more permanent reality than the United States’
unreliable promises. The lesson: the United States is a Pacific power with a
potent presence in maritime Asia, but it is not an Asian power.
The most consequential misunderstanding
permeating Western thought about Asia is being overly China-centric. Much as
geopolitical forecasters have been looking for “number one,” many have fallen
into the trap of positing a simplistic “G2” of the United States and China
competing to lead the world. But neither the world as a whole nor Asia as a
region is headed toward a Chinesetianxia, or harmonious global system guided by
Chinese Confucian principles. Though China presently wields more power than its
neighbors, its population is plateauing and is expected to peak by 2030. Of
Asia’s nearly 5 billion people, 3.5 billion are not Chinese.
Asia’s future is thus much more than
whatever China wants. China is historically not a colonial power. Unlike the
United States, it is deeply cautious about foreign entanglements. China wants
foreign resources and markets, not foreign colonies. Its military forays from
the South China Sea to Afghanistan to East Africa are premised on protecting
its sprawling global supply lines— but its grand strategy of building global
infrastructure is aimed at reducing its dependence on any one foreign supplier
(as are its robust alternative energy investments).
China’s launching the Belt and Road
Initiative doesn’t prove that it will rule Asia, but it does remind us that
China’s future, much like its past, is deeply embedded in Asia. BRI is widely
portrayed in the West as a Chinese hegemonic design, but its paradox is that it
is accelerating the modernization and growth of countries much as the United
States did with its European and Asian partners during the Cold War. BRI will
be instructive in showing everyone, including China, just how quickly colonial
logic has expired. By joining BRI, other Asian countries have tacitly
recognized China as a global power—but the bar for hegemony is very high. As
with US interventions, we should not be too quick to assume that China’s
ambitions will succeed unimpeded and that other powers won’t prove sufficiently
bold in asserting themselves as well. Nuclear powers India and Russia are on
high alert over any Chinese trespassing on their sovereignty and interests, as
are regional powers Japan and Australia. Despite spending $50 billion between
2000 and 2016 on infrastructure and humanitarian projects across the region,
China has purchased almost no meaningful loyalty. The phrase “China-led Asia”
is thus no more acceptable to most Asians than the notion of a “US-led West” is
China has a first-mover advantage in
such places where other Asian and Western investors have hesitated to go. But
one by one, many countries are pushing back and renegotiating Chinese projects
and debts. Here, then, is a more likely scenario: China’s forays actually
modernize and elevate these countries, helping them gain the confidence to
resist future encroachment. Furthermore, China’s moves have inspired an
infrastructural “arms race,” with India, Japan, Turkey, South Korea, and others
also making major investments that will enable weaker Asian nations to better
connect to one another and counter Chinese maneuvers. Ultimately, China’s
position will be not of an Asian or global hegemon but rather of the eastern
anchor of the Asian—and Eurasian—megasystem.
The farther one looks into the
future, therefore, the more clearly Asia appears to be—as has been the norm for
most of its history—a multipolar region with numerous confident civilizations
evolving largely independent of Western policies but constructively coexisting
with one another. A reawakening of Western confidence and vitality would be
very welcome, but it would not blunt Asia’s resurrection. Asia’s rise is
structural, not cyclical. There remain pockets of haughty ignorance centered
around London and Washington that persist in the belief that Asia will come
undone as China’s economy slows or will implode under the strain of nationalist
rivalries. These opinions about Asia are irrelevant and inaccurate in equal
measure. As Asian countries emulate one another’s successes, they leverage
their growing wealth and confidence to extend their influence to all corners of
the planet. The Asianization of Asia is just the first step in the Asianization
of the world.
These are the findings of a new World Economic
Forum study which shows the world’s sovereign wealth funds collectively
own $8 trillion
Global decarbonisation could turn fossil fuel-reliant
economies into ‘stranded nations’ unable to unlock the value of carbon-based
assets and infrastructure.
These are the findings of a new World Economic
Forum study, which shows the world’s sovereign wealth funds collectively
own $8 trillion (£6.1tn) in assets but currently invest just
0.19% of this figure in green energy.
It says economies that are heavily dependent on
fossil fuel resources with more than 10% of their total wealth based in carbon
assets could become “stranded” – it says they must act now to develop the
“human capital and economic diversification” to continue to thrive.
The report acknowledges some fossil fuel-dependent
countries have already begun to diversify their economies for impending energy changes but
notes progress is slow.
It says this could pose a serious problem because
as much as three-quarters of energy is expected to come from green sources by
Maha Eltobgy, Head of Shaping the Future of
Long-Term Investing, Infrastructure and Development at the WEF, said: “To protect their economic futures,
countries whose economies rely on fossil fuels need to prepare now for the impending global shift away
from these resources.
“The resource dependent, fossil-fuel-rich nations
that have diligently-built large sovereign wealth funds to manage the economic
challenges of the Age of Oil must now consider how to use this vast wealth to
prepare for the Age of Green Energy.”
The February 20, 2019 Peninsula reported that Qatar witnessed the highest valued IPO in 2018 in the MENA region with the listing of Qatar Aluminum Manufacturing Company (QAMCO) on the Qatar Stock Exchange (QSE), raising $745.6m in Q4.
FTSE Russell announced the entry of QAMCO to the
FTSE Index within the first week of trading, owing to the positive response
generated by the IPO (it was 2.5 times oversubscribed). The Qatar exchange has
performed well in 2018 with prospects of inflows from investors tracking
emerging-market indexes after the relaxation on foreign ownership curbs, the
latest EY MENA IPO Eye report noted.
Phil Gandier (pictured), MENA Transactions Leader,
EY, said: “The successful subscription of the Qatar Aluminum Manufacturing
Company (QAMCO) reflects the strength of Qatar’s economy, and the government’s
mandate towards supporting capital markets and privatization as it pursues
diversification of the economy.”
The MENA region saw 26 IPOs raise $2,946.2m in
2018. Compared to 2017, IPO activity saw a decrease year-on-year with volume
declining by 23.5 percent and value declining by 24.6 percent.
In the North African markets, Egypt, Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia recorded eight deals for a total value of $381.6m in 2018.
Egypt recorded the highest number of
deals with four IPOs in the year worth $276.5m, followed by Morocco with two
IPOs worth $88m, while Algeria and Tunisia recorded one IPO each worth $9.5m
and $7.6m respectively.
The IPO of Sarwa Capital on the Egyptian Stock
Exchange raised $123.2m during Q4 2018. The government of Egypt delayed the
sell-off of a 4.5 percent stake in the state-owned Eastern Tobacco Company owing
to market volatility. Many private IPOs
tentatively planned for the quarter were also pushed to 2019 citing market
In Morocco, the IPO of Mutandis SCA raised $44.0m
in Q4, making it the second IPO in 2018 on the Casablanca Stock Exchange.
The Algiers Stock Exchange witnessed the first SME
to introduce its capital on the stock market, with the IPO of AOM Invest Spa
raising $9.5m during Q4 2018. The Algiers Stock Exchange has opened the SME
segment as part of the financial market’s modernization project, with the
objective of increasing its contribution to the mobilization of savings and the
financing of the economy.
Gregory Hughes, MENA IPO Leader, EY said: “While
the capital markets in the MENA region are moving at a cautious pace, we saw a
healthy diversification in sectors when compared to the dominance of REITs seen
in the previous quarter of the year. Despite
current macroeconomic conditions, the MENA region witnessed 26 IPOs in the
year, which is extremely encouraging.”
Globally, IPO activity continued to slowdown in Q4
2018, with 326 IPOs raising $53.7bn, marking a decrease of 34 percent and 10
percent respectively, compared to Q4 2017. This can be attributed to current market
volatility, oil prices and ongoing global trade issues which have delayed
processes and left a lot of uncertainty regarding the execution of IPOs in the
D’abord, d’où vient la Crise entre le Qatar et ses Voisins? Si elle est la plus grave depuis la création du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe (CCG) en 1981, elle n’est pas la première. En 2014, Riyad, Abou Dhabi et Manama avaient retiré pendant huit mois leurs ambassadeurs du Qatar (sans rupture des relations diplomatiques et de blocus).
Les griefs entre le Qatar et notamment l’Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats Arabes Unis sont donc anciens mais le véritable catalyseur de la crise de cette semaine est la nouvelle administration américaine.
Alors qu’en 2014, les raisons de la brouille faisaient suite au printemps arabe et à la résurgence et au soutien des Frères Musulmans – parmi d’autres groupes islamistes – par le Qatar, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis ont vu ces groupes et ce mouvement comme une menace fondamentale envers leurs existences. par exemple, le coup d’État soutenu par l’Arabie saoudite et les EAU en Egypte en 2013 était censé remettre les mouvemennts des Frères Musulmans et le Qatar à leur place, ce qui a été le cas dans une large mesure. Doha a cependant continué à abriter la Confrérie sur son sol, comme le dirigeant du Hamas, ce qui reste un obstacle dans les relations avec d’autres membres du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe, dont l’Arabie saoudite et aux Émirats arabes unis.
Doha avait aussi soutenu des groupes entre 2011 et 2013 notamment dans ces « guerres civiles du Golfe » par procuration. En Libye, les « Brigades de défense de Benghazi » ont été liées au Qatar tandis qu’en Syrie, Doha a soutenu des groupes militants rivaux de ceux soutenus par l’Arabie Saoudite.
Pourquoi cette crise éclate maintenant?
Les experts ont avancé plusieurs raisons. Une explication est celle du renforcement de la relation entre Israël, l’Arabie saoudite et les Émirats arabes unis et leur volonté en commun de couper le Qatar du Hamas. De même, les relations de Doha avec Téhéran inquiètent Riyad et Abu Dhabi notamment en raison de deux appels téléphoniques récents entre l’Emir Tamim Al-Thani et le Président Hassan Rouhani.
Le veritable vecteur de la crise fut cependant l’attitude de la nouvelle administration américaine. Donald Trump et son équipe ont envoyé le message que Washington sera un allié beaucoup plus ferme que la précédente présidence américaine dans la région. Du point de vue de Riyad et Abu Dhabi, la nouvelle administration américaine leur a donné l’autorisation d’agir fortement contre leur ennuyeux voisin, le Qatar. Il s’agit donc d’isoler l’Iran mais aussi de faire quelque chose sur le front dérangeant des liens entre certains pays du Golfe, dont des Saoudiens et des Koweïtiens à des organisations extrémistes telles que Al-Qaïda et l’Etat islamique (voir à ce propos le livre le Christian Chesnot et Georges Malbrunot, “Nos très chers émirs”). Ceci inclut aussi des citoyens qatariens et des pressions existantes aux Etats-Unis, comme au Congrès, pour que des actions soient prises. Cela pourrait aller jusqu’au déménagement des installations militaires du Qatar, incluant actuellement le CENTCOM et une base aérienne majeure.
Dans ce contexte, la charge contre le Qatar est un moyen de lâcher du lest en pointant du doigt vers un coupable “idéal”.
Lundi 5 juin, le Qatar recevait Youssef al-Qaradawi. Que cela signifie-t-il?
Nous pouvons certainement voir cette rencontre à deux niveaux. Tout d’abord, elle illustre la volonté du Qatar de ne pas se laisser dicter son comportement par d’autres Etats, fussent-ils les Etats-Unis ou des régimes voisins du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe. Le Qatar a en effet toujours suivi une politique étrangère indépendante et se démarque par sa volonté de parler à tous les acteurs régionaux, quels qu’ils soient (en quelque sorte sa « marque de fabrique »). La rencontre avec Youssef al-Qaradawi peut également être vue comme un entretien qui a pour but de voir comment tactiquement répondre à cette mise au ban du Qatar sur la scène régionale et les suites donner à la relation avec les Frères Musulmans.
Est-ce qu’on peut s’attendre à une rupture des liens entre le Qatar et les Frères Musulmans ?
Pas véritablement sur le fond. Si la pression devient trop forte sur le Qatar, l’émirat prendra alors ses distances comme il l’a fait en 2014 lors du précédent incident diplomatique entre Doha, Riyad, Abou Dhabi et Manama. Ces trois pays avaient alors retiré pendant huit mois leurs ambassadeurs du Qatar mais sans rupture des relations diplomatique et à l’instauration d’un blocus contre Doha. Le Qatar avait à ce moment réduit sa relation avec la confrérie mais sans toutefois revenir sur l’essentiel de la relation stratégique entre les Frères Musulmans et l’émirat. L’incident actuel est bien le plus grave en revanche mais l’intensité de la rupture des liens entre le Qatar et les Frères Musulmans dépendra certainement de la position des Etats-Unis dans les semaines suivantes et de la volonté de l’administration Trump de mettre la pression sur le Qatar – notamment afin d’isoler l’Iran – en s’appuyant sur Ryad et Abou-Dhabi.
Dans l’optique d’une telle hypothétique rupture, le prix à payer serait certainement plus élevé pour les mouvements issus de la confrérie, que le Qatar a soutenu financièrement – comme le Hamas – ou bien médiatiquement, notamment avec sa chaine télévisée Al-Jazzera. Cela dit sur le Qatar s’engage dans un bras de fer avec les membres du Conseil de Coopération du Golfe, dont l’Arabie Saoudite, les dégâts à court terme peuvent être rapidement importants. Sa seule frontière terrestre, dont l’émirat dépend pour son approvisionnement en nourriture – importée majoritairement – est fermée, et les conséquences économiques peuvent être majeures (par exemple pour Qatar Airways) pour Doha.
Une remise en question de la relation forte entre le Qatar et les Frères Musulmans ne changerait pas trop la politique étrangère du Qatar dans la région finalement puisque Doha avait déjà revu à la baisse ses ambitions régionales afin de se concentrer sur une politique traditionnelle de médiations comme cela a été le cas en Syrie avec l’accord dit « des quatre villes ». En Libye le Qatar a cessé ses livraisons d’armes et soutient le processus de réunification patronné par l’ONU.