Why smart cities must become integrated urban ecosystems

Why smart cities must become integrated urban ecosystems

Buildings, illuminated, water, nature, waterfront, skyscrapers, skyline, city lights, cityscape, city view, urban, urban landscape, metropolitan, Dubai city, lights, night, reflection, night photography by Pexels via pixabay

.

Why smart cities must become integrated urban ecosystems

Built Environment and Infrastructure

Cities are now at the centre of humanity’s social, economic and environmental future.

By :

This article is part of: World Economic Forum Annual Meeting
  • Nearly half of the world’s population lives in urban areas, with nearly 4 billion people calling cities home.
  • As urban populations continue to grow, cities face challenges such as ageing infrastructure and rising demand for energy.
  • Innovation and collaboration are key to building integrated smart cities for a more sustainable and connected world.

The future of cities depends on the reinvention of how we envision, build and operate communities. We are embracing that responsibility with optimism and a firm belief that integrated smart cities can create a more sustainable and connected world.

Cities across the world are going through a period of profound transformation. According to the United Nations, approximately 45% of the global population lives in urban areas in 2025, with nearly 4 billion people calling cities home.

This represents an extraordinary shift from just decades ago. Cities are now at the centre of humanity’s social, economic and environmental future. As urban populations continue to grow, cities face mounting challenges, including ageing infrastructure, rapidly rising demand for energy, and ever-changing human expectations for digital connectivity and an increased quality of life.

As a result, smart cities have naturally become an important focal point for many sectors, but discussions still remain dominated by technology companies. While digital platforms, internet of things (IoT) devices and AI are all essential components of urban innovation, they alone cannot constitute the complex machine that is the modern city.

Smart cities rely on interplay of multiple systems

Urban environments inevitably rely on the interplay of infrastructure, energy, buildings, mobility and water management – systems that must be conceived, built and operated with precision and long-term stewardship. This is why we, at GS E&C, believe that the future of smart cities requires not only technological innovation, but also the deep engineering, construction and operational expertise that firms like ours have been refining for decades.

The construction industry is at an inflection point, as well. The traditional EPC model – design, build and hand over – no longer aligns with how modern cities function or what today’s society demands. Buildings and infrastructure now generate continuous data.

For example, housing systems interact dynamically with energy and environmental conditions, and people increasingly expect personalized services embedded throughout their daily lives. The boundary between digital and physical systems has blurred, transforming cities into networks that change and evolve in real time.

This convergence reveals a fundamental strategic direction for us. Construction firms must evolve into long-term service providers. The future of urban development lies not in isolated projects, but in integrated ecosystems that require continuous operation and innovation through reinvention.

Urgent need to reshape how urban systems impact environment

The need for this shift is underscored by an urgent global reality. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the construction sector consumes 34% of global energy and accounts for 37% of global carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions.

Operational emissions from buildings alone reached nearly 9.8 billion tons of CO₂ in 2023. This means that everything in this industry, from the materials we use to the way we operate buildings and infrastructure, is imperative to addressing climate change.

Cities occupy just a small fraction of Earth’s land mass, yet their energy use and emissions will determine the trajectory of the whole planet. Firms like ours have a responsibility – and simultaneously, an extraordinary opportunity – to reshape how urban systems impact the environment.

This evolution is the foundation of our strategic transformation. We aim to shift from a project-based general contractor to a total service provider capable of integrating planning, construction, technology and long-term operation. Our goal is to create urban environments that are not only more efficient and sustainable, but also more connected and resilient.

Integrated vision redefines how smart cities work

To guide this transition, GS E&C developed Life Weaver, the company’s integrated vision for smart cities. Life Weaver is more than just a technological blueprint; it is a new philosophy for how cities should function.

It rests on five principles: harmonized flow of energy, mobility and data; innovation emerging from urban challenges; invisible technology that enhances human desires and creativity; ecological co-evolution with natural systems; and integrated experiences that dissolve the boundaries between services and spaces.

These principles redefine what a city can be – an adaptive ecosystem that is both sustainable and intuitive. Life Weaver envisions urban environments where energy circulates cleanly and efficiently, mobility networks reduce friction and services anticipate the needs of the residents. Technology becomes a seamless backdrop, empowering people without overwhelming them.

To make this vision a reality, we are working on building the capabilities required for operating smart cities. Our Zero Energy City frameworks integrate renewable power generation, energy storage systems and energy prosumers – who produce and consume their own energy – to achieve net zero.

Meanwhile, our smart home and IoT platforms create secure and connected living environments that are capable of automation and personalization. We will work to advance digital twins, data platforms and cybersecurity infrastructures to ensure that cities can be well managed as coherent, intelligent systems.

Our investment arm plays a critical role in this picture, as well. We collaborate with startups in AI, robotics, renewable energy and advanced materials to accelerate innovation. Partnerships with leading academic institutions, including Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST), enable us to study, test and deploy new solutions in real environments.

Why smart cities must improve human experience

Yet, at the heart of our vision remains people. The ultimate goal of smart cities must be to improve human experience. Smart cities should reduce energy costs, enhance safety, create cleaner environments and shorten commutes. They should enable healthy lifestyles, support vulnerable populations and foster a greater sense of community. They need to be inclusive places where technology adapts to the lives of people – not the other way around.

As cities become the primary setting of global life – accounting for nearly half of the world population and over 80% of global GDP according to the International Energy Agency (IEA) – their success will define our collective future. This is why transformation towards integrated smart cities matters. It is not simply technological innovation, but rather, an imperative for society.

No single sector can accomplish this alone. Smart cities require collaboration across construction, technology, energy, mobility, academia, the public sector and governments. GS E&C is committed to leading through such partnerships and redefining what it means to build – not just for today, but for future generations as well.

The future of cities depends on the reinvention of how we envision, build and operate communities. We are embracing that responsibility with optimism and a firm belief that integrated smart cities can create a more sustainable and connected world.

*


 

*

How AI could split the world again if we don’t intervene

How AI could split the world again if we don’t intervene

A robotic hand reaching into a digital network on a blue background, symbolizing AI technology. by Tara Winstead via Pexels

.

The next great divergence: How AI could split the world again if we don’t intervene

In BROOKINGS, January 8, 2026


  • AI, like past general-purpose technologies, risks driving a new global divergence unless deliberate action ensures its benefits are broadly shared rather than geographically concentrated.

Shutterstock/Andrii Yalanskyi

 

In the 19th century, the Industrial Revolution—driven by new general-purpose technologies like the steam engine and mechanized production—spurred a dramatic split in global fortunes known as the “Great Divergence.” By 1800, most countries were poor: Life expectancy was below 40, and literacy rates rarely exceeded 12%, with “almost no income gap” between regions. By 1900, however, industrialized powers enjoyed vastly higher incomes and lifespans than those left behind.

Artificial intelligence (AI) may play a similar role today. AI is emerging as a new general-purpose technology with enormous transformative potential. It can expand opportunities and unlock breakthroughs in education, healthcare, and productivity. Yet, as we analyze in UNDP Asia-Pacific’s new report “The Next Great Divergence,” AI also carries a serious risk of widening inequality between countries.

This may sound counterintuitive. Many believe AI will level the playing field and unlock new leapfrogging opportunities in education, health care, and productivity. And it can. But our analysis shows that without deliberate intervention, the centrifugal forces may dominate, widening gaps between nations and setting the stage for a “Next Great Divergence.”

Socrates and Edison were both wrong

Every major technological revolution arrives with a mix of hysteria and hype. In ancient Athens, Socrates worried that writing would weaken memory, an irony preserved for us only because Plato wrote his claims down. Two millennia later, Thomas Edison predicted that motion pictures would replace textbooks, believing film would teach “every branch of human knowledge.”

Both misjudged the role of technology. They focused on whether new tools would replace existing ones, rather than how capabilities would spread. Today, we replay that same binary debate. Will AI replace work, or solve every human problem? In arguing about what AI is, we ignore where it is landing and who stands to benefit.

The real issue is not the nature of the technology, but the geography of its impact. We are focused on what AI can do and not enough on where it is doing it.

AI lands in a deeply unequal world

AI is not entering a level playing field. It is arriving in a world marked by extraordinary inequality. Nowhere is this more evident than in Asia and the Pacific, the most economically diverse region globally. Incomes differ by nearly two hundred times between the richest country, Singapore, and one of the poorest, Afghanistan.

These divides shape two structural asymmetries: a capability gap and a vulnerability gap, which together amplify unequal impacts of AI across countries.

Figure 1. The world is unequally prepared for AI, which will manifest itself in the uneven accrual of dividends and disruptions

Source: UNDPIMF AI Preparedness Index (2023).

The capability gap

Innovation is concentrating quickly at the top. The IMF’s AI Preparedness Index shows that high-income countries are already far better positioned to benefit from AI. Many low-income countries still struggle with basic electricitybroadband, and foundational digital infrastructure.

The internal contrasts within Asia-Pacific are equally striking. Six economies alone account for more than 3,000 newly funded AI firms. China accounts for nearly 70% of global AI patents. Several economies in the region are now major AI developers.

Yet basic digital access remains a major barrier across much of the region. Roughly one quarter of Asia-Pacific’s population remains offline. Even where networks exist, a vast skills deficit persists. Only about one in four urban residents and fewer than one in five rural residents can perform a basic spreadsheet calculation. The capacity gap is also gendered: In South Asia, women are up to 40% less likely than men to own a smartphone.

These gaps mean that while some countries are rapidly building domestic AI ecosystems, many are not yet able to participate in the AI economy at all.

The vulnerability gap

While capability concentrates at the top, risks radiate downward.

Labor markets illustrate this clearly. Women’s jobs are nearly twice as likely as men’s jobs to face high exposure to AI-driven automation. About 4.7% of female employment in a recent sample fell into high-exposure categories, compared with 2.4% for men.

Generational divides are also emerging. Employment for workers aged 22-25 in high-exposure occupations has fallen by about 5% in recent years, suggesting that AI is reducing entry-level opportunities even as older workers experience productivity gains.

Beyond jobs, AI’s energy needs introduce new environmental vulnerabilities. Electricity consumption by data centers may nearly triple by 2030. Countries with fragile, fossil-fuel-based power systems risk hosting energy-hungry “data farms” for global AI, bearing environmental costs while capturing little of the economic value.

Taken together, the capability and vulnerability gaps are producing a world in which AI benefits concentrate in the better-positioned countries, while disruptions fall most heavily on populations least prepared to manage them.

Three strategic choices

A widening divide is not inevitable. Policymakers have a window to steer AI toward convergence through three strategic choices.

1. Don’t repeat the “One Laptop per Child” mistake

The One Laptop per Child initiative showed that technology will fail if deployed into environments without the “soft infrastructure” needed to use it. Laptops were delivered, but without trained teachers, high-quality localized content, and reliable connectivity, the devices were often unused or misused.

The same risk exists with AI. Pilots can appear promising, but if people lack the skills to use, trust, or meaningfully benefit from AI tools, adoption will stall.

With fewer than 20% of rural residents in the Asia-Pacific capable of basic digital tasks, human capital must be the priority. This means investing in computer science and data science education, training civil servants in data governance, and embedding AI literacy across society. Empowering people must come alongside deploying systems.

2. Build regional AI public goods

Few countries can build a full AI ecosystem on their own. To reduce dependency on a handful of technology giants, countries should treat core AI enablers—compute infrastructure, data, and foundational models—as regional public goods.

Regional compute and data commons would allow countries to pool resources and gain access to shared capabilities. For example, an ASEAN-wide cloud for AI research or a South Asia initiative to create local-language large language models could widen access and strengthen collective bargaining power.

A regional approach also enables a “green AI industrial policy”. As data center demand grows, governments can require energy-efficient architectures and renewable-powered compute expansion, ensuring sustainable growth rather than replicating past patterns of extractive digital infrastructure.

3. Tailor AI roadmaps to local capacity

A single AI strategy cannot fit all countries. Approaches must reflect starting points (Table 1):

  • Lower-capacity contexts will need to focus on basic connectivity. Offline-capable AI for healthcare triage or agricultural support through feature phones can deliver real value where broadband is limited.
  • Transitional-capacity economies can scale proven pilots, build civic data infrastructures, and establish privacy and governance frameworks that avoid dependency and scattered experiments.
  • Higher-capacity countries have the opportunity to lead on standards, safety, and sustainability. They can strengthen regulatory oversight, push for energy-efficient AI research, and contribute regionally by sharing models and expertise.

Tiered strategies help ensure that countries build from foundations they can sustain, rather than adopting technologies mismatched to their institutional realities.

Table 1. Roadmaps tailored to different starting points

Source: The Next Great Divergence, UNDP, 2025.

Leave no mind behind

AI is becoming the general-purpose infrastructure of the 21st century, as fundamental as electricity or roads. It is critical that we don’t allow access to this infrastructure to be deeply unequal. By investing in human capital and institutions, treating connectivity and computing power as public goods, and designing inclusive, tiered roadmaps, we can ensure that AI’s immense productivity potential is shared.

If the 21st Century marks the start of the next Great Divergence, it will not be because of AI alone. It will be because we did not act.

Authors

Key Themes Shaping the MENA Region in 2026

Key Themes Shaping the MENA Region in 2026

Image for illustration: A collection of antique Dallah coffee pots displayed in a Doha market, showcasing Middle Eastern culture. By Fernando B M via pexels

.

Age of Agility: Key Themes Shaping the MENA Region in 2026

By Jack Kennedy, Jessica Leyland, Kevjn Lim, Ph.D., Zaineb Al Assam, Jamil Naayem, and Ralf Wiegert

In S&P Global – 7 January 2026

,


In 2026, we expect the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region to experience contrasting trends of growth and conflict instability.

S&P Global Market Intelligence forecasts that MENA will be the only major global region with anticipated economic growth in 2026 surpassing that of 2025, following a notable increase of 2.5 percentage points in real GDP growth between 2024 and 2025.

Unresolved conflicts from 2025 are likely to pose significant risks to this forecast, keeping the MENA region, especially the Gulf, at the center of broader global geopolitical trends.

Key takeaways

  • Unresolved conflict escalation pathways from the 12-day June war between Israel/the US and Iran continue to represent the main driver of MENA regional instability and severe interstate war risks in 2026.
  • Military supply chain vulnerabilities and constraints are likely to determine the willingness of all belligerent parties to commit to renewed conflict, spurring more armed exchanges with limited scope and duration.
  • Gulf states, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia, will continue to focus on integrating US-designed computing, networking, and cloud technologies into their economies. This ongoing strategic shift is expected to stimulate economic growth and enhance security and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) geopolitical alliances by 2026.
  • The GCC states will drive economic growth in the MENA region, largely driven by increased hydrocarbon output, continued economic diversification efforts, and declining borrowing costs in the GCC.
  • Lower oil prices will hinder MENA hydrocarbon exporters’ external sector performances and likely constrain their ability to generate foreign currency earnings in 2026.

Shifting asymmetric power in MENA

Unresolved conflict escalation pathways from the 12-day June war between Israel/the US and Iran continue to represent the main driver of regional instability and severe interstate war risks in 2026. US-Iran negotiations over a new nuclear agreement have not yet officially resumed. Further airstrikes in 2026 are likely if Israel (and/or the US) assesses that Iran is making significant progress in reconstituting its enrichment, ballistic missile and advanced air defense capabilities. This is especially likely if no US-Iran nuclear agreement is reached, again triggering Iranian counterstrikes on Israeli territory and maintaining the severe risk of escalation to interstate war.

A resumption of war, with Iran’s conventional offensive capabilities weakened, would increase the likelihood of Iran seeking to at least partially obstruct vessel passage in the Strait of Hormuz, significantly disrupting international trade routes and impacting global energy prices to a higher degree than during the June war.

Supply-chain vulnerabilities will probably determine the willingness of the parties involved to commit to renewed conflict, encouraging more armed exchanges of limited scope and duration. The capacity to sustain and replenish air defense interceptors almost certainly influenced Israeli and the US strategy during the June war.

Militant access to relatively affordable offensive capabilities such as uncrewed systems and cruise and ballistic missiles, and a probable increased reliance on other state-fostered capabilities including AI, will continue posing security challenges to established military powers, and maintain the risk of periodic armed exchanges.

Gulf states, notably the UAE and Saudi Arabia, are positioning themselves for a recalibration of shifting power dynamics, focusing on integrating US-designed computing, networking, and cloud technologies into their economies.

Both governments have recognized AI and data center development as core components of their economic diversification plans. The UAE currently leads the Middle East in data center market size, while Saudi Arabia — which ranks second — is also making significant investments to expand its capabilities. The growth of Saudi Arabia’s data centers is anticipated to support broader Vision 2030 infrastructure objectives, particularly in constructing and expanding desalination plants necessary for cooling.

Substantial investments in AI and data centers also come with risks from technological and security perspectives. The ongoing technological rivalry and strategic competition between the US and mainland China is likely to influence GCC access to critical technologies.

GCC countries' contribution to MENA region GDP growth

Shaky economic foundations, new trade realities in MENA

Risks to the MENA region’s 2026 economic outlook are heavily weighted to the downside due to severe regional war risks and soft hydrocarbon prices. We forecast the MENA region, on aggregate, to record sustained economic growth in 2026, but with stark contrasts within the region. The GCC states will drive economic growth in MENA. Real GDP growth will be largely driven by increased hydrocarbon outputs, continued economic diversification efforts, and declining borrowing costs in the GCC.

The growth trend in the MENA region is, in large part, due to the unwinding of oil output restrictions by OPEC+ until September 2025. The region’s oil producers are critically dependent on global oil demand and oil prices. S&P Global Energy projects an average oil price of US$58 per barrel (Brent) in 2026, down by 16% from projected 2025 averages. This will squeeze oil revenues, which could fall further if global growth performs less strongly, weakening demand for oil.

Non-hydrocarbon growth momentum is set to continue across the GCC economies, in line with their economic development strategies and partly helped by hydrocarbon output increases in conformity with OPEC+ decisions. GCC development plans focusing on reducing reliance on hydrocarbons and encouraging private sector involvement into their economies, coupled with robust domestic demand, are likely to drive the recovery of the non-hydrocarbon economy in 2026.

Such a sustained strong momentum will likely be facilitated by further monetary easing by GCC central banks in line with US Federal Reserve moves. Given the long-standing currency pegs to the dollar, which are unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, we currently forecast two policy rate cuts in GCC states in 2026, leading to less costly borrowing and supporting investment activity in the GCC.

Lower energy prices will continue to place adverse pressure on the external balances of hydrocarbon exporters and their ability to accumulate foreign reserves. Outside the GCC, weaker energy prices will also widen the current account deficits of Algeria, Iraq and Libya.

The pause in Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea is unlikely to hold through 2026 if, as is likely, the Gaza ceasefire collapses; we therefore forecast that any recovery in Suez Canal revenues will at best be gradual.

The Age of Agility Is Here

Key economic, geopolitical and trade drivers for the year ahead

This article was published by S&P Global Market Intelligence and not by S&P Global Ratings, which is a separately managed division of S&P Global.

*


 

*

10 positive economic outcomes for developing countries in 2025

10 positive economic outcomes for developing countries in 2025

Shutterstock/chaphot

.

10 positive economic outcomes for developing countries in 2025

In BROOKINGS on January 6, 2026


  • From a growing global middle class to expanding trade and faster, market-driven clean energy adoption, 2025 delivered tangible progress for developing economies despite a difficult global backdrop.
  • Inflation and food price increases are being held in check, and advances in digital public infrastructure, nutrition, and weather forecasting improved everyday resilience for hundreds of millions of people.
  • These gains show that, even amid crisis, targeted investments and multilateral cooperation can still move the needle on sustainable development.

2025 was not a good year for emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). It saw a new normal emerge of a world with slow growth, trade wars, overwhelming debt service burdens, collapsing aid, global warming, natural disasters, and conflict.

Amid this litany of woes, it is easy to forget that there were also positive developments. In this commentary, I focus on areas of significant year-over-year progress in EMDEs. This progress may have been slower than potential, but it is nevertheless worth celebrating.

10 positive economic outcomes in EMDEs in 2025

  1. A growing middle class. In spite of slowing growth, about 108 million additional citizens in EMDEs were able to join the ranks of the middle class in 2025, according to data from the World Data Lab. (Disclosure: I am a co-founder of World Data Lab and its Chief Economist.) Most of these new entrants were in South and South East Asia, but Africa and Latin America also saw an increase in their middle-class populations. Globally, the middle class accounted for over half the world’s population for the first time ever.
  2. An expansion of trade. International trade grew strongly in 2025, notwithstanding tariff wars, protectionist measures, and onshoring policies. UNCTAD’s nowcast suggests that global trade in goods and services will exceed $35 trillion in 2025, a rise of 7% over 2024. East Asia’s growth led the way, but African exports also grew strongly—faster than China’s, for example. As one example, Africa led all regions with a 10% rise in tourist arrivals through the first three-quarters of the year. Overall, services growth and South-South trade were leading drivers for EMDE exports.
  3. Faster green energy transitions. In 2025, low-carbon energy transitions in EMDEs became driven by the private sector—utility-scale firms and individual households—responding to lower prices for solar cells and panels. Between August 2022 and August 2025, the average export price of Chinese cells fell from $0.19/W to $0.03/W. Previously, investments depended on government policy, incentives, and publicly mobilized financing. As Tim Appenzeller writes in Science magazine: “That change in motivation may be the most important breakthrough of all, ensuring that this year’s inflection points are just the beginning.”

The scale and speed of the energy transition are impressive. Globally, in the first half of 2025, renewables accounted for a higher share of electricity (34.3%) than coal (33.1%) for the first time ever. This trend was driven by EMDEs: The U.S. and Europe used more coal in 2025 as renewables did not keep pace with demand. China’s story is well-known, but India also added a record 29.5 GW of solar capacity in the first nine months of the year. Similarly, Pakistan has installed around 18GW of solar panels and is on track to produce 20% of its electricity from solar in 2026, compared to 1% in 2023. The focus on renewables spreads well beyond these examples. In Africa, 29 African governments launched National Energy Compacts in 2025 to accelerate energy access and security as part of the newly formed M300 initiative of the World Bank and the African Development Bank.

  1. Peaking global greenhouse gas emissions. It is still too early to tell, but it is possible that 2025 will mark the year when global greenhouse gas emissions flatten or declineClimate TRACE, a non-profit coalition estimating real-time emissions, showed declining emissions in the early part of 2025 but now a very small increase of 55% in 2025 over 2024, perhaps because of data center use. The start of a downward global trend in emissions would be very good news for EMDEs. They bear the brunt of the natural disasters generated by climate change due to poor infrastructure, vulnerable populations, and reliance on agriculture. The World Resources Institute reckons the world is projected to warm by 2.3-2.9 °C; a dangerous prospect, and a far cry from the Paris 1.5 degree target, but roughly half of what was anticipated when the Paris Agreement was made a decade ago.
  2. Signs that multilateralism can still work. The reports of the death of multilateralism in 2025 were exaggerated. True, some events disappointed, notably the shelving of previously-agreed-upon maritime emissions levies, and the adjournment of talks on a global plastics pollution treaty, but there were examples of success in other areas. A High Seas treaty protecting biodiversity beyond national jurisdictions (BBNJ) was ratified and will legally enter into force in January 2026, providing an established process for marine protected areas and other matters. Both the World Bank and IMF successfully shored up support from their major shareholder, the United States. The International Finance Corporation launched an inaugural collateralized loan obligation, establishing a new class of assets in EMDEs with the potential to reach scale by tapping into global institutional investors.
  3. Business is still investing in sustainability. Despite reports to the contrary and a clear rollback in public policy requirements in the U.S. and Europe, business is still investing in sustainability. The green debt market surpassed $3 trillion in 2025 and, notwithstanding some slowdowns in the U.S. and Europe, issuances in the Asia Pacific region have strongly trended upward. Cost reductions and revenue growth drive corporate sustainability efforts, and there was solid growth in assets and returns in ESG funds in 2025, with particular interest from younger investors.
  4. Inflation and food price increases are being held in check. While negative news on inflation dominated headlines in several advanced economies, EMDE inflation in 2025 was the lowest since the IMF began its tracking in 2016. While there are regional differences, 12-month trailing inflation in Africa is ending the year at half its 2024 level. Some of this is attributable to low prices for traded foodstuffs. The FAO’s commodity price index shows declines in 2025 of the nominal international prices of cereals, dairy, and sugar.
  5. Going digital. After a slow start in building digital infrastructure backbones, developing countries are catching up to the rest of the world. According to the 2025 State of Digital Public Infrastructure report, as of 2025, at least 64 countries (including advanced economies) have DPI-like digital ID systems, 97 countries have DPI-like digital payment systems, and 103 countries have DPI-like data exchange systems, with many more in the planned or piloting stage. According to the same report, “Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and the Caribbean have the most dynamic and rapidly evolving picture for deployments …”
  6. Better nutrition. School meals have long been recognized as highly impactful for nutrition, learning, and overall child well-being. The latest State of School Feeding Worldwide report, released in 2025, finds that 466 million children worldwide receive school meals, with almost half of all primary school children covered. 60% more children are being reached in low-income countries compared to two years ago. Almost all the funding is from national government budgets, suggesting that school meals might escape the effects of the sharp aid reductions of 2025.
  7. More useful weather forecasting. The Extraordinary World Meteorological Congress in October 2025 reported on its shift to go beyond assessing “what the weather will be” to “what the weather will do to lives, infrastructure and livelihoods,” by integrating AI into its operational forecasts. The Early Warnings for All initiative, aimed at providing coverage of multi-hazard forecasts to all people by 2027, had an “unprecedented pace of progress” in 2025, with new pilots and capacity-building projects aimed at developing countries.

All is not well for people living in developing countries. But 2025 did see progress, at considerable scale, in a range of areas. Sustainable development practitioners should celebrate the positives while continuing to advocate for faster progress.

With Chinese investment, Egypt turns to Solar Panel Manufacturing

With Chinese investment, Egypt turns to Solar Panel Manufacturing

.

Vietnam on the Nile? With Chinese investment, Egypt turns to Solar Panel Manufacturing

.

Ann Arbor (Informed Comment) – A new $210 million facility is being built in Egypt to produce 4 gigwatts of solar components annually.

These numbers are not world shaking, but this development is. Egypt has enormous industrial potential. It has as many as 2.5 million workers in various sectors of the textile industry and 33 million over all, and the country’s literacy rate is now on the order of 75%. Literate workers are valuable because they are able to read and follow instructions.

If Egypt becomes a hub for producing solar cells, panels and arrays, it could be an engine for economic growth and also for the production of inexpensive energy in the country, which also acts as a fillip to economic growth.

Green Building Africa reports that “The $210 million Atum Solar project is being developed in the TEDA industrial zone in Sokhna and will have an annual production capacity of 2 GW of solar cells and 2 GW of solar modules.” The investors include JA Solar, a Chinese solar panel manufacturer, as well as concerns in the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt itself. The UAE and Bahrain have substantial investment capital lying about from oil sales, but small domestic populations and lack what economists call absorptive capacity. Egypt is a promising investment field for them as a fellow Arab country with a big workforce.

The plant will create over 800 direct jobs, and likely many more indirect ones.

The solar cells will be exported to the United States. Note that this facility is a way for JA Solar to sidestep the stiff US tariffs on Chinese solar cells, since the units will come from Egypt. The panels will be sold inside Egypt and also to other African countries.

The energy consultancy Ember reported last summer that there are now the first signs of large-scale African adoption of solar panels.

I commented about a year ago on a report that Sweden’s Sunshine Pro has partnered with Egyptian institutions to establish a solar panel manufacturing facility with a capacity to produce 1 gigawatt of solar panels annually.

Egypt is, of course, creating large solar farms for electricity generation, and so will have a use for these domestically produced panels. By the start of 2024, the Egyptians had installed 1.8 gigawatts of solar, most of it at the Benban Solar Park some 400 miles south of Cairo in the Aswan Governorate. It now, at the beginning of 2026, has about 2.8 gigawatts of solar capacity, with plans for a rapid build out the rest of this year. Cairo is hoping for 12 gigawatts of sustainables by the end of 2026.

As Chinese labor costs have risen, Chinese companies have been moving to other countries for some manufacturing purposes, benefiting from their cheaper labor costs. It is even government policy, with the slogan “Go out!” attached to it. Since China is the preeminent leader in greentech, it is natural that some of the expansion of Chinese investments in factories abroad would be in sustainables.

One advantage for Chinese firms of investing in a facility abroad is that they can often lower their tariff costs. For instance, the African Union has low tariffs for member states, so a factory that is partially Chinese-owned established in an African country can export cheaply throughout the continent. That role seems to be envisioned for the panels produced at the Atum plant, while the solar cells (the basic component of the panels) will be sent to the US.

If Egyptians manage their affairs well, they could become the Vietnam of the Middle East with regard to solar panel production. Vietnam now produces 18 gigawatts of solar panels annually and is the fourth-largest panel exporter, having 12% of the world market, up from almost nothing a decade ago.