24 June 2026 6:59 am
Sustainability Rhetoric vs. Economic Reality Explained

Sustainability Rhetoric vs. Economic Reality Explained

A scenic aerial view of the densely packed historic cityscape of Fès, Morocco, under a clear sky. by Moussa Idrissi via Pexels

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Sustainability rhetoric vs. economic reality: Can we square the circle?

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UNDP – June 22, 2026

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Photograph of a worker in a palm oil plantation with piles of oil palm fruit.

A worker collects palm oil seeds at the Namorambe plantation in Deli Serdang, North Sumatra on May 12, 2022. (AFP/Andi)

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Global economic shocks and climate volatility are no longer temporary disruptions; they are structural crises deeply embedded in our strained natural systems. For resource-rich nations like Indonesia, surviving the next shock requires rewriting the global incentive structure to value nature on the national balance sheet and fairly compensate the smallholders on the front lines.

The recent military escalation in the Middle East has shown, once again, how quickly shocks travel through the global economy and across markets, and are felt locally. Net oil importers suffered fiscal pressures, while increasing fertilizer prices will ultimately raise food prices almost everywhere. For the poorest households, which spend most of their income on essentials like food, it translated into an affordability shock almost overnight.

These episodes are often treated as temporary disruptions, but they reflect something deeper and structural. Around 90 percent of people globally live with degraded land, polluted air, or water stress—evidence that shocks occur within already strained systems. Food systems, energy systems and ecosystems are deeply interconnected. When one is stressed, effects cascade across the others.

The health of the “next crop” illustrates these systemic linkages. If costly fertilizer remains out-of-reach for small farmers, output falls and incomes suffer. Yet, overuse elsewhere is already eroding productivity: half of global food supply is produced in areas where nitrogen use reduces yields, while pollution costs reach up to US$3.4 trillion annually. Resilience, then, is not just about shock response, but whether the underlying production systems and natural resources remain viable over time.

For much of modern history, economic growth has paralleled environmental harm. Today, developing countries face a steeper challenge: grow, create jobs and protect nature simultaneously. This reflects a structural reality: economic activity is embedded in natural systems—land, water and air—and cannot replace them when they degrade. Is there an industrial country that has managed its industrialization process without placing significant strain on its natural resource base?

Climate volatility, biodiversity loss and ecosystem degradation are already undermining productivity, supply chains and livelihoods. The degradation of ecosystem services alone could cost the global economy up to $2.7 trillion annually by 2030. For Indonesia, the risk is particularly material as around a third of its GDP depends on nature linked sectors.

Recent evidence points to forest and ecosystem loss affecting rainfall, agricultural productivity and growth, with some countries already experiencing measurable GDP losses through disrupted water cycles. At the same time, investments in adaptation and resilience deliver strong returns, generating more than $10 in benefits for every dollar invested.

These realities are pushing nature and climate concerns to the forefront of public policy and decision-making. Pathways to economic growth without environmental harm exist, but not everywhere.

Why have economic systems been so slow to change, and why have production, consumption, and finance not followed suit? Is this a question of political constraint, or do underlying incentives continue to reinforce growth patterns that harm the very foundations of our lives?

The answer lies less in any single villain than in the structure of incentives. The gains from today’s patterns are concentrated and immediate, while the costs are diffuse and deferred, which is part of why correction keeps stalling.

The “trade-off’ tensions are particularly visible in global commodity and food systems, where agriculture, trade, and finance intersect. Production continues to be supported by subsidies across agriculture, energy, water and land use, amounting to roughly $2.4 trillion each year. Consumption is guided by price.

Yet environmental costs remain largely unpriced, allowing ecologically harmful goods with limited traceability to remain competitive. Financing flows reinforce these patterns, with around $7.3 trillion directed annually toward activities that deplete natural systems.

Ultimately, this is not only about protecting natural assets, but about human security and sustained progress. For countries like Indonesia, rich in natural capital, this means bringing nature and climate risks onto the balance sheet and into national accounts.

From palm oil and coffee in Sumatra to cacao in Sulawesi, over 40 million people sit at the center of global supply chains. They are expected to manage climate risks, meet evolving sustainability standards—many set in high-income consumer markets such as the EU’s new deforestation rules—and remain competitive, often with limited access to finance, technology and markets.

The imbalance is stark. Smallholder farmers who underpin these sectors operate on thin margins, bearing most of the risk while capturing only a fraction of value. In oil palm, for example, smallholders capture only around 6 percent of the value in a $280 billion global industry, while downstream firms retain roughly two-thirds of profits.

Encouraging examples show this dynamic can shift. Vietnam’s coffee sector has combined productivity gains with value addition, including recent strides in traceability to access higher-value markets. Costa Rica has aligned conservation, tourism and payments for ecosystem services showing that growth and environmental recovery can reinforce one another. These models are not perfect, but they demonstrate that sustainability is more likely to endure when it strengthens incomes and livelihoods.

These examples point to three broader shifts.

First, sustainability must translate into economic opportunity. For producers, especially smallholders, this means access to finance, technology and extension services, alongside pathways into higher-value markets so countries are not locked into low-value production stages.

Second, incentives must be realigned. Repurposing subsidies and redirecting investment toward more resilient production systems can deliver steadier income streams. This is rarely painless, since those who depend on existing subsidies tend to resist, which is part of why reform so often stalls. Crucially, financing must reach both ends: affordable credit, insurance and working capital for smallholders alongside long-term investment in processing, infrastructure and industrial upgrading that accounts for environmental costs.

Third, we must decide who bears the cost of transforming how we grow, produce and consume without further destabilizing the natural ecosystems that underpin life on the planet. For some countries in Asia-Pacific, the trade-offs may be less binding than it first appears, given the chance to build cleaner systems before high-carbon infrastructure locks in.

Developing countries continue to face higher borrowing costs and tighter fiscal space, reflecting deeper asymmetries in the global financial architecture. Much of the available finance focuses on derisking capital without lowering financing costs or enabling transformative change.

Despite growing commitments on climate and biodiversity finance, actual flows remain far below what is needed. If nature’s wealth is reflected on balance sheets, it can attract more predictable and concessional financing. Countries like Indonesia would enter negotiations with stronger leverage, backed by natural assets of global significance.

The next shock—whether geopolitical, zoonotic, climatic or economic—is not a question of if, but when. How we respond will depend on today’s choices: whether we continue to reward short-term gains or invest in a model of growth that works across the economic–nature–climate arc—one that strengthens the resilience of economies while sustaining the natural systems on which long-term prosperity depends.

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Writer: Kanni Wignaraja and Sara Ferrer Olivella

Kanni Wignaraja is United Nations assistant secretary-general and UNDP regional director for Asia and the Pacific based in New York, United States. Sara Ferrer Olivella is the resident representative of UNDP Indonesia based in Jakarta.

Source: TheJakartaPost

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Iran War May Have Transformed Asia’s Trade Dynamics

Iran War May Have Transformed Asia’s Trade Dynamics

Bustling indoor market scene with vendors selling goods, showcasing cultural heritage. by Bahram Yaghooti via Pexels

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Beyond oil: Iran war may have transformed Asia’s trade architecture

While Strait of Hormuz transit may soon normalize, the broader fragmentation pressures it’s blockade exposed will be harder to unwind

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The Strait of Hormuz blockade hit Asia’s economies particularly hard. Image: X Screengrab

The initial market reaction to US and Israeli military strikes on Iran was familiar: Brent crude surged in early Asian trading, equity markets slipped and headlines focused on the energy shock to come.

But months later, the conflict appeared to become much more than an energy disruption — it served as a stress test for Asia’s trade architecture, exposing vulnerabilities that run far deeper than elevated oil prices alone.

For corporates, logistics providers and policymakers across the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the seemingly more consequential story unfolded in shipping lanes, compliance departments, export control registers and trade finance desks.

How the region responds could influence not just its near-term economic outlook, but the structure of Asian trade for years to come.

When Hormuz closes, Asia is among the first affected

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly a third of global seaborne crude oil and around 20% of global liquefied natural gas shipments pass — had near-term consequences for Asia’s most commodity-dependent economies.

Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong all import more than 80% of their domestic energy needs. Nearly 90% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exported through the Strait flows to Asian buyers. Asia generates two-thirds of global GDP growth and accounts for 40% of world trade while remaining heavily dependent on imported energy.

The disruption extended well beyond energy. A third of global seaborne fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that as gas prices rise, fertilizer costs follow and food prices with them. Some Asian exports have also faced delays or rerouting. India’s agricultural exports to Gulf markets have reportedly slowed as freight and insurance costs spike.

In addition, Qatar is the world’s second-largest producer of helium — a critical input for semiconductor manufacturing — and reports of disruptions at LNG facilities have raised the risk of interruptions in helium production

MENA Project Momentum Holds Despite Conflict Disruption

MENA Project Momentum Holds Despite Conflict Disruption

A modern dome structure with geometric patterns surrounded by visitors outdoors, by This And No Internet 25 via Pexels

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Mena project momentum holds despite conflict disruption

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MEED – 10 June 2026

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GlobalData’s Construction Projects Momentum Index for April 2026 shows the region in third place globally, with execution-stage activity recovering even as the Israel-Iran conflict weighs on the pipeline

The Middle East and North Africa’s construction project pipeline has demonstrated considerable resilience in the months since the military conflict between the US, Israel and Iran began in late February, although the regional performance has softened from its early-year highs and the full effects of the geopolitical shock continue to ripple through the project market.

GlobalData’s Construction Projects Momentum Index (CPMI) for the Mena region recorded 0.86 in April 2026, placing the region third globally behind North-east Asia and South Asia. The Mena score represents a 12% decline from 0.98 in March, which itself was unchanged from February. The regional three-month moving average eased modestly to 0.96 in April from 0.97 in March, suggesting that while momentum has nudged lower, the pipeline has not experienced the kind of sustained deterioration that might have been expected given the severity of the geopolitical disruption.

The resilience partly reflects the composition of the regional project market. The Mena region’s largest markets, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have both continued to record solid momentum in the months following the start of hostilities in February. The UAE led the region in April with a CPMI of 1.20, easing only slightly from 1.30 in March, while Saudi Arabia recorded 0.94.

Mixed performance

The impact of the conflict is most visible at the country level, where a sharp divergence has opened up between markets directly exposed to the fighting and those insulated from it. Israel recorded the lowest CPMI score in the region in April at -3.26, reflecting substantial delays to major projects. The East Mediterranean Gas Pipeline was among the most significant casualties, with its Final Investment Decision pushed well beyond its original timeline. Iran, another direct participant in the conflict, registered a markedly weaker score of 0.53 in April, a stark reversal from its position as one of the region’s strongest performers in January, when it posted 1.31.

The conflict’s first major imprint on the index appeared in March, when the CPMI data reflected the initial shock of the escalation. Execution-stage momentum in the region dipped from 1.06 in February to 0.89 in March, while pre-execution activity slipped from 1.02 to 0.95. Infrastructure, which had been a strong performer earlier in the year, fell sharply to 0.53 in March from 1.06 in February, with the institutional sector also pulling back from 1.27 to 0.78. These moves are consistent with the channels through which conflict typically disrupts construction activity — cost inflation driven by energy price volatility, supply chain disruption and elevated risk premiums that delay investment decisions.

Stability signs

By April, some of these pressures had begun to ease, at least at the index level. Execution momentum recovered to 1.01, reversing the March dip, and infrastructure returned as the top-performing sector with a CPMI of 1.13. Commercial and leisure activity also remained solid at 0.94, building on gains that have been sustained throughout the conflict period.

Pre-execution momentum, however, continued to soften, falling to 0.86 in April from 0.95 in March. This is significant because the pre-execution stage — which captures project planning, design development and procurement preparation — is where investor caution and risk reassessment typically show up first. A sustained decline in this segment would signal a thinning of the future project pipeline, even if near-term execution activity holds up.

Kuwait offers a specific illustration of how supply chain and procurement disruptions linked to the conflict can affect individual markets. In January, Kuwait had recorded a CPMI of 0.27, depressed by delays to tender packages on Kuwait Oil Company developments including the SGC1, SGC II, SGC III and JLO Export Facility projects. The country recovered strongly to 1.43 in February and 0.90 in March, before falling back to 0.55 in April, with delays reported on Dorra Field developments. The oscillation reflects the vulnerability of projects with complex procurement requirements to the kind of supply chain uncertainty the conflict has generated.

Future pipeline

The Mena region entered 2026 from a position of strength, having ranked first globally in January with a CPMI of 1.05 — a 16% jump from December 2025’s 0.90. That momentum reflected broad-based gains across infrastructure, residential and institutional sectors, with Qatar, the UAE and Iran all posting scores above 1.20.

The conflict began when the region’s project pipeline was strong, and the data suggest that the buffer of accumulated momentum has helped absorb the initial shock. Whether that buffer holds through the remainder of 2026 will depend on how the conflict develops and, in particular, whether the more cautious behaviour visible in pre-execution activity translates into a deferral of new project launches. GlobalData’s data through April suggest the region is maintaining momentum, but the direction of the pre-execution trend is a forward-looking indicator to be watched in the coming months.

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If Kuwait Were a Company, Would You Buy In?

If Kuwait Were a Company, Would You Buy In?

Stunning view of modern skyscrapers in Kuwait City, showcasing urban architecture. by Tayssir Kadamany via Pexels

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If Kuwait were a company, would you buy the story?

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By Abdulaziz Abdullah Al Smairi

As markets dissect the newly filed SpaceX prospectus, one useful question proposes itself: what if Kuwait had to present itself to investors in the same way? A prospectus is an unforgiving document. It strips away sentiment and asks what the asset base is, where the dependencies lie and whether the story can withstand scrutiny. If Kuwait were held to that same discipline, the more revealing questions would begin well beyond the oil story.

Viewed this way, Kuwait’s central issue is not simply its dependence on oil revenues as that point is already well understood. The more important question is where its deeper strategic dependencies lie and whether they have been developed into areas of national competence. Water is an obvious case. Kuwait depends fundamentally on desalination, but dependence by itself is not a strategy.

The relevant question is whether that reliance has been translated into enduring expertise, technological depth and industrial capability. Kuwait entered this field early, and institutions such as the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research have continued to contribute to desalination and water-management technologies. But the strategic test remains straightforward: when a country relies so heavily on a capability essential to daily life, has it built a durable and exportable advantage around it?

The same test applies to oil. It is not enough for the sector to remain the economy’s dominant pillar if its cost base continues to rise and the critical knowledge remains concentrated in a generation approaching retirement, without a sufficiently visible successor bench behind them. A serious investor would ask whether Kuwait is building the managerial depth, technical capability and institutional continuity needed to protect the long-term economics of its most important sector. The same logic applies in financial services.

Having an active banking sector is not enough on its own. What matters is whether Kuwait has a deep enough bench of national talent to lead that sector over time. When the Central Bank presses for Kuwaitization, the issue is not merely one of staffing policy. It points to a wider structural requirement: building a stronger pipeline of qualified national leadership for one of the country’s most consequential sectors.

What ultimately matters in any prospectus, however, is not only the quality of the underlying assets, but the system’s ability to organize those assets into a coherent operating model. Kuwait does not lack assets, capital or institutions. The more material question is whether they are strategically connected. Do energy, logistics, education, regulation and investment promotion operate as separate administrative tracks, or as part of a broader national model for value creation?

A serious investor would want to know not only what Kuwait owns, but whether the state can align mandates, reduce duplication, assign accountability clearly and sustain execution over time. In that sense, the constraint is not resource scarcity. It is coordination capacity which is the ability to turn national strengths from parallel holdings into a development model that compounds over time and produces growth, jobs and lasting national capability.

The same logic extends to soft power. Kuwait has a meaningful legacy in journalism, culture and social action, and its past cultural, diplomatic and humanitarian role is well established. But the strategic question is whether those strengths were institutionalized in ways that continue to generate influence, renew talent and produce new generations of platforms, tools and leadership. Historical distinction has value, but in strategic terms it matters most when it is embedded in institutions, sustained over time and translated into continuing relevance.

If Kuwait were a company preparing for deeper exposure to the world, these are the questions a serious investor would ask in its prospectus: what do we truly depend on, where have we turned that dependence into national specialization, and where are we still consuming more than we are producing in knowledge, capability and leadership? Countries, like companies, are not judged only by what they own. They are judged by what they build around their critical dependencies: institutional depth, human capital and the ability to convert necessity into lasting advantage.

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Enhancing International Cooperation on Climate and Trade

Enhancing International Cooperation on Climate and Trade

Colorful international flags fluttering in the wind against a blue sky in Lisbon, Portugal. by Ivan Dražić via Pexels

Enhancing International Cooperation on Climate and Trade through the Lens of the Global Stocktake

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Trade policy is emerging as a critical tool for accelerating global climate action. The growing intersection of climate and trade policy could present opportunities for enhanced international cooperation.

Over the years, trade issues have been raised under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, with parties holding different views as to whether it is an appropriate forum to discuss trade-related climate measures (TRCMs). Nevertheless, at COP30, Parties agreed to discuss “opportunities, challenges and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade,” starting in June 2026. The Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) also launched a dedicated channel or “activation group” on climate and trade.

The Paris Agreement highlights that the outcomes of the global stocktake (GST) should inform Parties in enhancing international cooperation for climate action (Article 14, paragraph 3). In this context, the GST decision reaffirms that Parties should avoid arbitrary, unjustifiable, or disguised restrictions on international trade. Hence, trade policy may serve as a vehicle for implementing GST outcomes and strengthening international climate cooperation.

As they prepare for the climate and trade dialogues, Parties and non-Party stakeholders could consider how TRCMs can enhance international cooperation to accelerate the outcomes of the first GST (GST1). The GCAA is aligned with the GST1 and can support these efforts.

Accelerating the outcomes of GST1 through trade  

Climate and trade are both intimately connected to sustainable development goals. Several GST1 outcomes can be linked to economic sectors and have target dates, providing a useful framing for climate, sustainable development, and trade agendas to converge. These include tripling the global renewable energy capacity and doubling the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, and the transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF) in energy systems to achieve net zero global emissions by 2050.

TRCMs can enhance international cooperation to achieve relevant GST1 outcomes, advancing sustainable development goals in the context of the Paris Agreement. Properly designed and implemented TRCMs may foster and enable:

  • climate-resilient supply chains through diversification, transparency, risk management, and circular economy approaches
  • technological innovation towards climate solutions
  • cost-efficient low-carbon products and technologies with green industrial policies and market mechanisms that incentivize production and consumption of low-emission goods
  • interoperable technical frameworks, i.e., those linked to emissions measurement, reporting, and verification, carbon accounting, and life cycle assessments. These frameworks can support policies that foster market recognition and differentiation of sustainable products and infrastructure
  • local value generation, including fiscal and labor-related benefits linked to foreign investments, the upskilling and reskilling of the workforce across clean technology supply chains, and community benefit-sharing for the extraction and processing of transition minerals and metals.

International equity considerations should be embedded in TRCMs, recognizing equity’s importance for a just transition.

The Role of National Policies and Trade Agreements 

National policies are a critical vehicle for advancing GST outcomes and can have implications for trade. For example, green industrial policies, such as subsidies for the development or production of renewable energy technologies, may alter the costs of traded goods. Simultaneously, trade policies supporting open and resilient economic systems impact climate goals.

Climate-focused trade agreements, such as the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade, and Sustainability (ACCTS), demonstrate that trade can drive cooperation towards achieving GST goals such as TAFF and tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling energy efficiency. For example, fossil fuel subsidies reinforce economic inefficiencies and slow the transition. The ACCTS is the first legally binding trade agreement to introduce specific provisions restricting fossil fuel subsidies, thereby reducing some forms of government financial support that would otherwise obstruct the TAFF. Tariff and non-tariff barriers on renewable energy products raise the cost associated with these technologies. The ACCTS reduces trade barriers for environmental goods and services, including those related to renewable energy and energy efficiency. This can reduce the cost of accessing these goods, enabling economies of scale and sourcing from the lowest-cost producers.

Looking Ahead: Informing GST2 

The second GST notably culminates in 2028, coinciding with a mandated high-level event on climate and trade, in the context of the UNFCCC climate and trade dialogues. And the GCAA with climate action plans or “plans to accelerate solutions” run through at least 2028.

This alignment creates an opportunity to examine how and whether trade could inform GST2.

Catalina Cecchi Hucke, Senior Manager for International Strategies, Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 

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