26 May 2026 7:53 pm

Is the Gulf Losing Its Grip on the Oil Industry?

Is the Gulf Losing Its Grip on the Oil Industry?

A panoramic view of Dubai’s industrial waterfront with modern buildings. by Joerg Hartmann via Pexels

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Is the Gulf losing its grip on the oil world?

Adi Imsirovic, University of Oxford

One of the most striking features of the Iran war has been the resilience of the global oil market. Despite the disruption of flows through the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint, prices have generally hovered around US$100 (£75) per barrel – a lower level than many observers had expected.

A key reason for this resilience is the growing importance of oil production in the Americas. Even before the war, the International Energy Agency predicted that virtually all global oil demand growth in 2026 could be met by rising supply from North and South American countries such as the US, Canada, Brazil, Guyana and Argentina.

At that time, the Opec oil producers’ cartel was also preparing to increase output, raising expectations of a period of oversupply and weak prices. The war changed that picture dramatically. The closure of Hormuz has removed up to 14 million barrels a day from the market, propelling prices higher and triggering large global stock draws instead of the expected stock builds.

Yet high prices are often the best cure for shortages. Oil producers across the Americas have responded to the disruption by increasing output and exports. In the US, crude exports rose to a record 6.44 million barrels a day in April. It is also adding new export infrastructure, with nearly 800,000 barrels a day of additional dock capacity due to come online in 2026.

Meanwhile, Brazil has added eight new offshore floating oil production vessels in recent years, with a combined capacity approaching 1.5 million barrels a day. Its oil production is also expected to rise sharply again in 2026.

Petrobras, Brazil’s state oil company, recently started a new production project at one of these vessels in the Búzios field off the coast of Rio de Janeiro. Production began five months ahead of schedule, partly to take advantage of elevated global prices.

Elsewhere in South America, Guyana has emerged as one of the world’s fastest-growing oil producers. Guyanese oil output has already reached around 900,000 barrels a day and could almost double by the end of the decade. Even Venezuela, long associated with declining oil production and economic crisis, has substantially increased exports in response to higher prices.

Taken together, the Americas are expected to produce around 30 million barrels of oil per day later in 2026, approaching pre-war Opec production levels. The US alone remains the world’s largest producer, with its total production of liquid hydrocarbons reaching almost 22 million barrels a day in April.

A US oil tanker off the coast of Alaska.
A US oil tanker off the coast of Alaska.
Natalia Bratslavsky / Shutterstock

Opec helped create this boom

This rise in western hemispheric production did not happen in isolation. Ironically, it was helped by Opec itself. For years, Opec’s de facto leader Saudi Arabia and its partners restricted oil output to support higher prices. Those elevated prices helped make more expensive projects in the Americas commercially viable, especially US shale production.

Saudi Arabia’s strategy of “higher for longer” prices was partly driven by domestic economic ambitions. To finance projects linked to its economic diversification plans, including the vast new Neom city development, the Saudis need oil prices of at least US$90 a barrel. The result has been a powerful incentive for producers outside Opec to expand.

Yet, despite this momentum, declaring a permanent shift in oil’s centre of gravity away from the Middle East would be premature. The economics of production still strongly favour Gulf producers, with oil extraction costs in the Persian Gulf remaining among the lowest in the world.

In some fields, Saudi Arabia and neighbouring producers can extract oil for less than US$10 a barrel. Across the Gulf region more broadly, average production costs are estimated at roughly US$27 a barrel. By contrast, much of North American shale production requires prices closer to between US$50 and US$65 a barrel to remain profitable.

That difference matters enormously during periods of lower prices. If markets weaken again, higher-cost producers in the Americas would come under pressure first. Gulf producers, with vast reserves and extremely low costs, would probably be able to outlast them.

Geography also favours the Middle East in many key markets. For growing Asian economies such as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, importing oil from the nearby Gulf remains the cheapest option.

Many Asian refineries were designed specifically to process Middle Eastern crude grades, which are rich in middle distillates such as diesel and jet fuel – the hydrocarbons that typically drive economic development. Much of the shale oil exported from the US is lighter and less suitable as a direct replacement.

A map showing pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have both invested heavily in infrastructure to bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
Peter Hermes Furian / Shutterstock

At the same time, Gulf producers are investing heavily to protect their long-term role in global energy markets. The United Arab Emirates is expanding pipeline infrastructure that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, including upgrading its Habshan-Fujairah pipeline.

And Saudi Arabia already operates its vast East-West Pipeline, which is capable of transporting 7 million barrels per day of oil to the Red Sea. These projects are designed to reduce vulnerability to regional instability and secure export routes for decades to come.

The Americas are unquestionably transforming the global oil market. The region is now effectively what is known as a swing producer, providing some flexibility during supply crises and geopolitical shocks.

But long-term dominance in oil markets is determined not only by production volumes. Cost, geography, infrastructure and reserve size matter too. On those measures, the Middle East still holds a formidable advantage.

For as long as the world continues to consume large volumes of oil, the Gulf is likely to remain the industry’s core production and export hub – even if the Americas are becoming an increasingly important source of crude oil.The Conversation

Adi Imsirovic, Lecturer in Energy Systems, University of Oxford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Conversation

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What to Play Next: Rethinking Development Today

What to Play Next: Rethinking Development Today

View of an unfinished high-rise building under construction against a clear blue sky, showcasing urban development. by The Capturist via Pexels

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By Heiner Janus and Michael Roll – 
What to Play Next: Development after the End of Development

Heiner Janus and Michael Roll argue that the largest aid contraction on record coincides with a reopened decades-old fault line: what “development” means, who it serves — and how the field can reinvent itself for what comes next.

Manchester embodies reinvention like few other places. It built the world’s first industrial economy, watched it rust, and recast itself as the capital of England’s north. When protests turned deadly at the Peterloo massacre, it helped galvanise a tradition of organised labour and democratic reform — one that later produced the suffragettes, founded there by Emmeline Pankhurst. And when Joy Division collapsed, the remaining members re-emerged as New Order. That instinct — not to reassemble what broke but to build something new — was the animating spirit when the University of Manchester’s Global Development Institute convened researchers in mid-April to ask: is the era of Development over? And if so, what replaces it?

The question is sharpened by recent events. According to preliminary OECD data, official development assistance by DAC members fell by 23.1 percent from 2024 to 2025, the largest annual contraction on record, bringing aid back to where it stood when the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were adopted in 2015. The SDGs themselves, once billed as a universal aspiration, have been formally denounced by Washington at the United Nations General Assembly. Yet the upheaval is not just institutional. It has reopened a fault line that has run through the concept of “development” from the start: what the term actually means and who it refers to.

Two distinctions matter. The first is between big-D Development, the organised international project of aid agencies, multilateral institutions, and global goal-setting, and small-d development, the messy, nationally driven process of economic and social transformation that has always owed more to domestic politics than to foreign assistance. The dismantling of the former does not necessarily halt the latter. The second distinction concerns geography. Is development a universal process, occurring in Manchester, Mumbai and Mombasa alike, or does it describe a specific relationship between richer and poorer parts of the world? The conference confronted both questions, and the answers offered little comfort.

The opening plenary dispensed with the notion that this crisis is a temporary disruption. Lee Jones of Queen Mary University argued that we are witnessing a “second Cold War” — not a systemic battle between rival ideologies, as in the first, but a positional struggle within globalised capitalism, where the pillars of the neoliberal order are being pulled apart from the inside. The implications he drew were blunt: the multilateral system is unlikely to survive in its current form, major powers are converging on a miserly approach to development spending, and what remains will be “small-d development” — capitalist integration through reworked value chains, constrained to strategically relevant geographies. National security and economic competition will trump poverty reduction and climate action.

Yuen Yuen Ang of Johns Hopkins University drew a sharper conclusion. The “polycrisis,” she argued, is paralysing only for those attached to the old order. No society has ever escaped poverty through aid or randomised controlled trials. The era of aid dependence is ending, and the spread of universal institutions has ground to a halt. For the global majority, which has never been the producer of the dominant development paradigm, this represents what she calls a “polytunity”: an opening to redefine development itself, away from assimilation and mimicry and toward what she terms an adaptive, inclusive, and moral political economy.

If Jones and Ang diagnosed a paradigm in collapse, Daniela Gabor, SOAS University of London, examined the financial architecture being built in its place. Her concept of the “Wall Street consensus” describes a world where development has been recast as an investible asset class: states de-risk while private capital extracts. The Lake Turkana wind farm in Kenya served as her case in point, a project assembled through a patchwork of dozens of financial agencies that ended up owned by BlackRock, structured in a way she called fundamentally anti-developmental. She pointed to fossil fuel subsidies rolled out in response to rising energy prices, and donor agencies bluntly subsidising domestic companies, as variations on the same theme.

The Wall Street consensus, Gabor argued, is a weak strategy of American hegemony for three reasons: it is not fast enough, not just enough, and not stable enough. Even the World Bank’s renewed interest in industrial policy amounts to little more than subsidising private capital with public money. In closing, she called for a new state-coordinated developmentalism — one that covers all states and combines industrial policy with decarbonisation.

The sharpest challenge to the current development cooperation system came from Ken Opalo of Georgetown University, who opened the second day by accusing the development community of navel-gazing. The sky has not fallen in most low-income countries, he argued, and the pathologies of aid dependency may mean its decline is less catastrophic than the sector assumes. The SDGs, in his telling, represent the lowest common denominator imaginable: any education minister merely parroting SDGs is not thinking about context, and without context, policy outruns the capacity to implement it. His prescription was a pivot from “nano-development,” meaning small, tightly measured interventions, to national development and the proactive use of policy autonomy: context-specific knowledge production, support for local priorities rather than donor-driven faddism, and honest conversations about how European trade and environmental policies actively harm the countries they claim to help.

The closing plenary surfaced the underlying tension. “Development” is becoming a dirty word, observed one participant working in a development agency. Partners find it patronising; within five years it may no longer function as a policy category. Another colleague noted that geopolitics had dominated the conference at the expense of other forms of politics, and that the return to thinking in terms of national development risks ignoring the inequalities within states that development studies had spent decades trying to illuminate. The field is being asked to reopen debates it thought it had closed. Whether development studies can survive without big-D Development remains an open question. The field’s fragmentation and its uncertain institutional footing suggest that muddling through is not an option.

Yet there is a counterweight that has been overlooked: bureaucratic inertia itself. Research on how officials in development agencies behave suggests that career bureaucrats are driven less by ideology than by institutional incentives — blame avoidance, risk aversion, and the desire to keep programmes running. These instincts are usually treated as pathologies. They often are. But in a period of erratic political disruption, they also act as a brake. Bureaucratic routines absorb and dissipate radical policy shifts. Budget lines survive reorganisations; institutions outlast the politicians who threaten to abolish them. None of this defends the status quo. But it does mean that the window for reinvention may be wider than the rhetoric of crisis suggests. The machinery slows the demolition, buying time for those willing to design what comes next.

Manchester knows something about that. Development studies at the university began in the late 1950s as a training centre for “overseas administrators.” Over the following decades it was rebuilt, first into a research institute, then into the Global Development Institute — now one of Europe’s largest centres for the study of development. A key leader in this transformation was David Hulme, the institute’s long-serving executive director, who retires this year. The conference closed with a standing ovation in his honour — a reminder that institutions, like cities, are shaped by people willing to keep innovating. The development community now faces the same test. The raw material for reinvention exists. As any member of New Order could confirm, the hardest part is not letting go. It is deciding what to play next.

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Heiner Janus is a Project Lead and Senior Researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), where he leads a research project on the effectiveness of development policy.

Michael Roll is a Project Lead and Senior Researcher at IDOS, where he works on the governance of urban sustainability transformations in the Transformative Urban Coalitions (TUC) project.

Photo by Austin Garcia from Pexels

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Riyadh Metro Finally: The Snøhetta Station

Riyadh Metro Finally: The Snøhetta Station

Cityscape of Riyadh with busy streets and modern skyscrapers on a sunny day. by Fahad Puthawala via Pexels

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Riyadh finally has a metro, and its symbol is the Snøhetta station

The new Riyadh metro station is set to transform the Al-Qiri transport hub. Designed by Snøhetta, it features a large reflective canopy, bright underground spaces, and an underground garden intended to serve as a new urban public square. Snøhetta talks to Domus about the project.
This article was previously published in Domus 1112, May 2026.
As one of four main hubs in the Saudi capital’s new metro system, connecting two of the main metro lines, the station in the his toric Al-Qiri district is designed as an open urban and pedestrian plaza with a large stainless steel canopy that acts as an urban periscope.

The station levels are visually linked by the mirror-like overhang structure that reflects the outside inwards and the inside outwards, while also directing natural light into the underground station and providing shade to the surrounding public areas.
Qasr Alhokm Metro Station, Snøhetta, Riyadh, 2025. Photo Iwan Baan
The steel canopy serves as the focal point and marks the station’s main entrance. The supporting steel space frame allows the canopy to extend above and beyond its base to form a massive cone wall. Beneath ground level, the sloping interior walls are finished with a rendered surface inspired by the ar ea’s traditional architecture. Acting as both a unifying architectural element and a point of orientation within the building, the steel canopy also reflects indirect sunlight down wards from its mirror-like surface.

 Designed to create subtle glimpses between the different sections of the station, the patterned openings – formed by 326 tri angular carvings in three different sizes – al so filter light gently into the atrium.

When passengers step off a train and look up, they see a 360-degree view of the ur ban landscape reflected on the underside of the canopy, giving them an immediate pic ture of where they are in the city. Likewise, people arriving from the city can look up to the canopy and see a mirrored reflection of everything happening below. The two metro lines traverse the open space within trans parent tubes, creating a striking visual pres ence and enhancing wayfinding throughout the station. The platforms are also each en capsulated within glazed tubes that pro trude into the atrium void, allowing a seam less integration between interior and exte rior, and opening the platform areas to the grandeur of the atrium for both arriving and departing travellers.
Qasr Alhokm Metro Station, Snøhetta, Riyadh, 2025. Photo Iwan Baan
At the base of the atrium, at around 35 metres below city level, an accessible garden helps to maintain a temperate environment even during the hot summer periods. Wa ter for irrigation is collected from the paved plaza areas and canopy above. The new pla za and garden further strengthen the public realm, providing valuable shared spaces for the nearby communities.With respect for the station’s historic setting, the inner atrium walls are adorned with a window-cut pattern inspired by tradi tional Najdi motifs, echoing the architectur al character of the surrounding neighbour hoods.
Qasr Alhokm Metro Station, Snøhetta, Riyadh, 2025. Photo Iwan Baan
Designed to create subtle glimpses between the different sections of the station, the patterned openings – formed by 326 tri angular carvings in three different sizes – al so filter light gently into the atrium.
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Building Resilience in Europe and Central Asia Today

Building Resilience in Europe and Central Asia Today

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Building Resilience in Europe and Central Asia: A Smart Investment for Growth and Jobs

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Building Resilience in Europe and Central Asia Today Building Resilience in Europe and Central Asia: A Smart Investment for Growth and Jobs Apartment buildings in Kazakhstan. Photo: IK PhotoStudio

The data is clear: Investments in adaptation and resilience deliver high economic returns but remain insufficient and poorly targeted. Evidence shows that targeted, early investments in resilient infrastructure, climate-smart agriculture, and early warning systems can deliver strong economic and social returns and reduce losses, even under uncertain futures.

However, adaptation finance in Europe and Central Asia is the lowest among all regions as a share of GDP, despite being the world’s fastest-warming continent. In 2025, floods, droughts, and heatwaves cut an estimated US$50 billion from that year’s EU output. By 2029, the longer-term effects are projected to reach US$147 billion, with some countries facing losses approaching 3% of their gross value added.

How countries prepare makes a decisive difference. In Poland, years of investment in flood defenses and early warning systems shielded millions from the worst impacts when, in 2024, Storm Boris killed dozens and caused billions in damages across Central and Eastern Europe. This reflects a broader pattern: countries that invest in resilience before shocks fare better.

A new World Bank report, Building Resilience and Climate Adaptation in Europe and Central Asia, takes stock of where the region stands, what the business case for adaptation is, and what it would take to close the adaptation gap. The findings, compiling evidence from the World Bank Group’s Country Climate and Development Reports, are instructive.

The potential impact of smart investments is considerable. Across the region, World Bank modeling suggests that adaptation and resilience investments equivalent to approximately 1.7% of GDP through 2030 would offset, on average, more than one-third of projected climate-induced economic losses. At the project level, the public investment case for adaptation is also compelling, with most adaptation investments yielding benefits outweighing costs by a factor of 2-10, and some substantially higher. The cost of inaction is also significant. Without adequate adaptation, the short-term losses outlined above propagate into the long-term, leading to annual losses across ECA reaching nearly 6% of GDP by 2050. The transport sector, for example, already sustains damage from hotter temperatures and increasing instances of extreme weather at roughly three times the rate of other regions. For firms, a single-unit rise in temperature variability (that is, larger swings around normal seasonal patterns) is associated with a 9% drop in sales on average.

Across the region, extreme weather events are a direct threat to the jobs and livelihoods that underpin household welfare and economic stability. More than one in three people across ECA live in areas of high exposure to such risks, and substantially more in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Moldova, and Romania. Poverty is the single largest driver, accounting for roughly 40% of households’ exposure across the region, rising 70%-90% in some countries. In Moldova, where agriculture supports more than 30% of all jobs, a single drought in 2020 pushed rural poverty up by more than 8 percentage points. In Tajikistan, continued inaction could push an additional 100,000 people into poverty by 2030.

Despite this evidence, Europe and Central Asia significantly under invests in adaptation. The best available data suggests that ECA received just US$3 billion in adaptation finance in 2023. This is the lowest share relative to its economy of any region, and well below the estimated annual needs, which could reach US$20 billion. Private finance, although probably underreported, accounts for barely 2% of that total.

While adaptation is often seen as a government responsibility, resilience is fundamentally built through private decisions by households and firms. But these need to be enabled by the right public information, incentives, and finance.

To close the adaptation gap and accelerate progress, the report identifies five areas where policy can make the biggest difference, including putting private actors in a position to adapt:

  1. Accelerate income growth and close gaps in inclusion: Economic development remains the most powerful tool for building resilience. By focusing on inclusive growth, countries can empower households and firms to invest in their own protection and diversify their economies away from climate-sensitive sectors.
  2. Improve access to information and finance: Governments, firms, and households need reliable climate data and risk information to make informed decisions. Expanding access to finance, especially for the most vulnerable, is crucial for unlocking private investment in adaptation.
  3. Strengthen safety nets and insurance: Adaptive social protection systems and well-functioning insurance markets are essential to protect people and businesses from the financial fallout of increasingly extreme weather shocks, reducing the burden on public finances.
  4. Build resilient infrastructure: Upgrading legacy infrastructure to withstand future climate impacts, mainstreaming adaptation standards in new investments, and promoting sustainable land and water management will reduce exposure and enhance resilience across sectors.
  5. Establish robust macro-fiscal and financial sector policies: Governments must integrate climate risks into fiscal planning, strengthen public investment management, and create enabling environments for private sector participation in adaptation.

Addressing these priorities is not a radical departure from standard development practice – it extends what governments in the region already do. The adjustment required is to adopt a clearer view of how a changing climate alters the risk environment. Countries that make that shift stand to protect not only their populations, but also the jobs, investments, and fiscal positions on which their development depends. The World Bank Group’s work in Europe and Central Asia is increasingly helping countries make exactly that adjustment. The returns are proven and the approach is known; what’s needed now is sequenced execution.

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How Severe Has the Economic Impact of the Iran War Been?

How Severe Has the Economic Impact of the Iran War Been?

Silhouette of Kuwait City’s skyline with a vibrant sunset backdrop, highlighting the urban landscape. by Abdullah Alsaibaie via Pexels

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How severe has the economic impact of the Iran war been for the Gulf states?

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By Emilie Rutledge, The Open University

 

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The US and Israel’s war on Iran has cast a long shadow over the Gulf. It has placed many of the economies that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regional grouping – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia – under substantial strain.

Since the war began in February, the World Bank has downgraded its 2026 GDP growth forecast for the region from 4.4% to just 1.3%.. Some thinktanks, including Oxford Economics, even predict that some GCC economies will enter recession in the second half of the year.

However, the effects of the war have differed across the region. While the Gulf states are often viewed as a unified economic bloc bound by a shared dependence on hydrocarbons, the conflict has revealed significant differences in their economic vulnerability and resilience.

Countries like Qatar and Kuwait have seen their oil and gas exports seriously disrupted by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. But Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have access to bypass infrastructure, have been partly able to circumvent this limitation.

Saudi Arabia has diverted 7 million barrels of crude per day through its east-west pipeline, allowing it to export oil from Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE, meanwhile, has utilised a pipeline from Habshan to Fujairah to export up to 1.8 million barrels of oil each day from the Gulf of Oman.

This infrastructure has enabled both countries to capitalise on soaring global oil prices. Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state oil company, reported a 26% jump in profits in the first quarter of 2026.

Disruption to energy exports is one part of the story. The war has also caused substantial physical damage to energy infrastructure across the region. Around 80 energy facilities, ranging from production plants to refineries and pipelines, have been targeted by Iranian missile and drone attacks so far.

It will take months – and in some cases years – to repair the damage (which stands at an estimated US$58 billion) once the war ends. Qatar’s liquified natural gas industry, in particular, has suffered serious damage. QatarEnergy, the state-owned energy company, says it will take up to five years to repair its Ras Laffan industrial hub alone.

Gulf diversification

The GCC states have adopted strategies to diversify their economies away from a dependency on hydrocarbons. Tourism and aviation are two central pillars of this, with GCC countries investing heavily in these sectors. The Gulf is now home to some of the busiest international airport hubs in the world.

But these industries, too, have been damaged by the war. Financial analysis firm, Moody’s, suggested recently that hotel occupancy in Dubai is set to plummet to 10% in the second quarter of 2026 from 80% before the war. Some Iranian attacks have targeted civilian areas, including hotels and residential buildings, prompting tourists to stay away.

The Iran war has also placed Gulf airlines such as Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways under increasing financial pressure. More than 30,000 flights to the Middle East were cancelled in the first month of the war and jet fuel prices – the biggest variable cost to airlines – are up 90% on the annual average.

The logistics sector is another area of Gulf diversification. It has grown rapidly since the early 2000s thanks to the region’s strategic position between east-west trade routes. The UAE’s Jebel Ali Port, for instance, is now one of the world’s largest container ports and the base of Dubai’s multinational logistics firm, DP World.

However, Jebel Ali has seen a 40% drop in vessels due to the war, with container carriers rerouting to alternatives such as Salalah in Oman and Colombo in Sri Lanka. And while DP World has opened emergency land corridors to ports outside the Gulf to keep cargo moving, these routes are costly and have limited capacity.

The UAE and Qatar also both serve as major air freight hubs, acting as bridges for cargo travelling between Asia and Europe. But this has been affected by the war too. Freight rates have increased following attacks on both Dubai and Doha that led to grounded flights and air space closures.

In the long-term, the economic impact of the war on the Gulf economies will hinge on its duration and political outcome. But the risks are firmly tilted to the downside. The fiscal outlook for some GCC states is deteriorating, with several facing scenarios where government spending exceeds revenue. Public sector debt in some GCC states is rising too.

Moody’s has downgraded its outlook on Bahrain, which was already facing longstanding financial issues prior to the war, from “stable” to “negative”. This will make it harder for Bahrain to access much-needed capital and increase future borrowing costs.

GCC economies invest their surplus oil and gas revenues through sovereign wealth funds, which collectively manage between US$4 trillion and US$6 trillion in global assets. Governments are likely to draw on these funds to support domestic spending on reconstruction and bolstering their defences after the war.

This could undermine their future potential to fund large long-term diversification mega-projects such as Saudi Arabia’s Neom City. Plans for Neom, which was initially proposed as a linear city to home 9 million people, have already been scaled down in recent years due to issues including funding pressures.

The Gulf’s loss of “safe-haven” status due to the war, and the resulting reputational damage, cannot easily be reversed. Even after the conflict ends, higher risk premiums will persist for those doing business in the Gulf. Shipping disruptions could take months to unwind, and a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be likely to trigger permanent rerouting.

If the conflict drags on, structural shifts in global supply chains may deepen, with lasting costs for the Gulf economies.The Conversation

Emilie Rutledge, Senior Lecturer in Economics, The Open University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Conversation.


 

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