Over the last decade, India’s foreign policy has undergone major changes. One of the most significant changes has been the transformation of India’s relations with the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region. For a very long time, India’s engagement with the region centered around its energy demands and the presence of a large Indian diaspora. Of late, however, one sees a shift in the dynamic wherein both the economic and political aspects of the relationship have undergone positive transformations. India signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Oman in December 2025 and with the UAE in 2022. Both agreements indicate the growing economic co-operation between India and MENA nations and a mutual desire to further diversify the relationship. India today boasts a sustained growth of 6-7 per cent[1] and is likely to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2028,[2] thus offering the MENA nations a large market.
Political Ties
From a political standpoint, India today shares excellent relations with all key players in the region, from the UAE to Saudi Arabia and Israel. This is reflected in the frequent high-level visits by political leaders from the region and India. For instance, Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi has visited the UAE seven times since he became the PM in 2014, indicating the strength of the bilateral relationship. Similarly, he has paid visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar, among others. This acceleration of ties with the Gulf countries in the last decade or so has been one of the significant changes in India’s foreign policy outreach.
India also shed its hesitancy about developing ties with Israel in recent years. For much of India’s foreign policy formulations post-1947, it seemed more inclined to the Palestinian cause. This is easy to understand when one looks at the early years of India’s independence and the sentiment that was largely based on anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. But as the Indian story grew over the last many decades, New Delhi’s growing relationship with Israel was also an indication of a confident and growth-oriented India. India and Israel today enjoy a robust partnership, with defense being a cornerstone of this relationship; today, Israel is India’s third-largest supplier of military equipment, with Russia taking the top spot.[3] However, it is important to note that India continues to support a two-state solution to the Palestine issue.
Credit in this aspect is also due to Indian foreign policymakers who have deftly balanced India’s ties with Israel and with other states in the Middle East. For India, this engagement is also a part of its own desire to be seen as a global player and hence the acronym, “Extended Neighborhood”. By including the Gulf nations as part of its neighborhood, India has indicated that it acknowledges the enormous benefits that both India and the MENA region can have from each other. Also, for many decades post-1947, India was more keenly invested in South Asia or its immediate neighbors, such as Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan, among others. Now with a growing economy and an increasingly large diaspora based in the Gulf, India’s priorities have shifted beyond the immediate neighborhood to the extended region.
Economics Ties
With the MENA region, India’s core strength lies in the economic field and the potential it offers for future growth and development. The GCC, comprising Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain, is India’s largest trading partner bloc, with bilateral trade reaching almost US$179 billion in 2024-25.[4] Further, as of 2024, GCC exports to India accounted for US$90 billion—representing 71% of the bloc’s total exports.[5]
During the visit of the UAE President H.H. Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan to India in January 2026, it was decided that India and the UAE will target doubling bilateral trade to US$200 billion within the next six years.[6] However, many people familiar with the matter point out that there is sometimes a mismatch between the desire by many Gulf countries to invest in India and India’s inability to provide them with the correct options to do so. This has led to slower investment in India by many of the Gulf countries, including Saudi Arabia. One course correction, then, would be for India to provide more concrete investment opportunities for nations in the Gulf where they feel encouraged to invest.
Japan offers an interesting example in this scenario. It has invested heavily in India, particularly in the North-East (NE) region of the country. It has also set an ambitious target of US$68 billion as its investment plans in India over the next decade, and ranks among the top five FDI investors in India currently. Japan has primarily focused on the infrastructure sector in the NE and has invested around US$2 billion in the region, building roads and highways.[7] For Japan, the NE region of India is an important part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision, which aims to bring countries together so that trade routes in the Indo-Pacific remain open for all. Japan already has a major presence in Myanmar and Bangladesh, and by becoming a major investment player in the NE region, Japan is able to protect its strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific.
So, for Indian policymakers, the challenge is to identify such regions and projects where the MENA countries can invest but also tie into their core geopolitical interests. The large Indian diaspora that lives in the MENA region also sends remittances back home, which make for a significant chunk of the capital inflow. According to a Reserve Bank of India (RBI) report, remittances from the UAE alone amounted to US$15.40 billion in the financial year 2020-21, representing 18% of India’s total inward remittances. In 2023-24, the UAE became the second largest source of India’s remittances, increasing its share from 18% to 19.2%.[8]
Saudi Arabia is another country that has promised to invest heavily in India. Saudi Arabia wants to expand its investments in fast-growing economies as part of its Vision 2030 diversification strategy, and India is keen to attract this capital. Both nations also formed a high-level task force in 2024 to expedite Riyadh’s plan to invest US$100 billion in India.[9] The idea is to promote investment in areas like energy, infrastructure and pharmaceuticals. India is also negotiating a bilateral investment treaty with Saudi Arabia.
Of late, India has also strengthened its economic ties with Oman. The FTA signed in December 2025 has been a milestone in that direction, under which Oman will provide India duty-free access to 98% of its tariff lines, which covers 99% of what India exports to Oman.[10] For India, Oman also has strategic significance since it occupies a critical position along the Strait of Hormuz, a key transit route for global energy shipments. India-Oman bilateral trade today exceeds US$10 billion annually.
With Qatar, India is actively pursuing an FTA, and expectations are that it will be finalized by mid-2026. Qatar plays a pivotal role in India’s energy security, accounting for 40% of the country’s total natural gas imports. Another landmark agreement was signed in February 2024 between Qatar Energy and Petronet LNG Limited. Under this, Qatar will supply 7.5 million metric tonnes per annum of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to India from 2028 for 20 years.[11] So, in all, India and the MENA region today are already connected by strong economic ties. The next step would be to enhance this economic relationship.
With Iran, India has strong historical ties and longstanding trade links in agriculture, pharmaceuticals, tea and other commodities. According to international trade data, India’s exports to Iran were roughly US$1.24 billion in 2024.[12] However, trade has been constrained by sanctions and financing limitations, particularly around energy and banking channels. From a strategic viewpoint, the Chabahar port project remains central to India’s connectivity strategy, offering access to Afghanistan and Central Asia via a route that bypasses Pakistan. However, India’s Union Budget 2026-27 has made no allocation for the Chabahar port, which indicates a freeze in India’s activities in the port. Chabahar had received 4 billion INR (Indian Rupees) allocation in the previous fiscal.[13] Going ahead, India’s approach will likely balance strategic connectivity interests with sensitivity to broader geopolitical pressures.
India-Türkiye relations have been under geopolitical tensions of late, and that has found its way into the economic aspect also not warming up to its full potential. Türkiye is a moderate but diversified trade partner for India, with economic exchanges spanning motor vehicles, chemicals, textiles and machinery. Precise recent bilateral figures vary by source, but Türkiye typically ranks among India’s medium-sized trade partners. Both countries share an interest in defense manufacturing, tourism, and digital services. This bilateral relationship offers scope to deepen ties through expanded industrial cooperation and supply-chain linkages, but all that will depend on how the strategic part of the relationship unfolds going ahead.
In 2023-24, India-Jordan bilateral trade was valued at US$2.875 billion, with Indian exports to Jordan amounting to US$1.465 billion.[14] Key exports from India include fertilisers, pharmaceuticals, textiles and food products. It is also important to note here that Jordan’s market also serves as a gateway for re-exports to neighboring Levant markets.
There are ample opportunities for both India and Jordan to further cooperate in sectors such as healthcare services, renewable energy, education and skills development partnerships. Also, Jordan’s trade agreements with Western markets make it an attractive partner for Indian firms seeking broader access to the region.
As Syria undertakes plans to rebuild the country after decades of war, India has made a reach out, indicating that it wants to be a partner in the reconstruction of Syria.[15] Also, a stable Syria will ensure secure trade routes and energy corridors critical to India’s economy as New Delhi steps up its economic ties in the MENA region. But there remains much work to be done in the India-Syria ties and taking the economic relationship forward.
Talks have been ongoing since 2004[16] between India and the GCC countries to sign an FTA. In 2004, a Framework Agreement was signed between India and the GCC, which intended for further negotiations to take place, eventually leading to an FTA. Two rounds in 2006 and 2008 did take place, but since then, the momentum has slowed down.
India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal, in a recent statement, was, however, optimistic about an India-GCC FTA.[17] On 5 February 2026, India and the GCC signed the terms of reference between the two parties, providing a fresh impetus to the FTA.[18] India, in the last few years, has shown a great desire to sign FTAs with a number of countries, and in January 2026, the ‘mother of all deals’, i.e., the India-EU FTA, was also inked. This is also significant, keeping in mind the changing world order and questions being raised over the future of institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO). But indications are that the India-GCC FTA is something India is keen on, and one can expect a further round of negotiations later this year.
Strategic Initiatives
Adding to the economic heft of the India-MENA ties are two important strategic initiatives, IMEC and I2U2. India today, as one of the world’s fastest-growing economies, offers a huge market for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). Strategic initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which was announced in New Delhi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September 2023, indicate how India, the Middle East, and Europe today want to work together for greater connectivity and trade.
The critique here is that the project has been slow to take off. The terrorist attacks by Hamas on Israel in 2023, followed by some reluctance on the part of Saudi Arabia, and Europe’s preoccupation with adjusting to a fast-changing world, have all played a role in IMEC slowing down. It is understood from people familiar with the details that both India and the UAE have already completed substantial work with regard to the IMEC. However, it remains a challenge for India and MENA to get IMEC back on a priority level where work can begin in earnest.
Another strategic initiative has been the I2U2 grouping comprising India, Israel, the UAE and the United States. Right from its inception in 2022, the I2U2 thrust was economic rather than geopolitical. This grouping sought to integrate the Middle East with India and the United States in a rather ambitious approach. The war in Gaza has again slowed down the grouping and its activities.
The main areas of focus for the I2U2 grouping include food security, renewable energy, healthcare, water management, transportation, and emerging technologies. The UAE, as part of the I2U2 grouping, has made a commitment of US$2 billion to construct food parks in India.[19] The idea is that while India provides the land, the United States logistics, and Israel brings its agricultural technology to the table. This is an excellent example of the kind of economic possibilities that are possible within the grouping.
Future Areas of Co-operation
Nuclear energy, space and building infrastructure in other places like Africa are some of the areas of future co-operation between India and MENA. For instance, building railway networks in various African countries is something India and the MENA countries can jointly look at. India enjoys tremendous goodwill in the continent, and so do countries like the UAE. Again, both countries have excellent know-how of building railway infrastructure. The combined strengths of India and the UAE can then make this a great economic partnership, which will also benefit the African countries greatly.
Looking ahead, the move will be to diversify and invest in technologies of the future, like artificial intelligence (AI), which can be used in various fields, like healthcare, etc. As the world shifts toward a digital economy, another area of co-operation opens up. India has already digitized its economy, with people using less cash in their daily transactions and relying more on Apps like PayTm, etc. The downside of a growing digital economy is also growing concerns of data theft and online scams. Again, there is potential for work in these areas. Defense is another sector where India and the Gulf states can work together. Joint defense production is again an area of future collaboration.
In October 2025, a transformative journey took place as a high-level delegation from across Africa, including representatives from Kenya and Ghana, arrived in India with a single, urgent mission: to unlock the future of sustainable cooling. Supported by the Mission Efficiency framework and partners like SEforALL, Daikin India, BEE and EESL, this South-South exchange was more than just a site visit; it was ablueprint for how emerging economies can collaborate to solve the climate crisis while driving prosperity.
The context for this visit is a cooling imperative that Africa cannot ignore. As the continent faces rapid urbanization and rising temperatures, the demand for cooling is expected to skyrocket. Currently, only 13% of African households have access to air conditioning, yet cooling could consume up to 60% of peak energy loads by 2040. The solutions explored during this three-day tour offered a triple win: the potential to reduce emissions by 68% by 2050, create hundreds of thousands of green jobs and significantly improve food security and healthcare.
The delegation’s journey began at the Daikin facility in Neemrana, where they witnessed firsthand the power of integrated manufacturing. From the production of low-GWP refrigerants like R-32 to the implementation of circular economy practices, the site showcased how industry can balance growth with environmental stewardship. A highlight of the visit was the Center of Excellence, where the focus on technician training and female participation sparked conversations about how Africa can replicate these models to empower its youth and women in the green economy.
Moving beyond the factory floor, the exchange delved into the complex world of policy frameworks and market implementation. Through roundtables with India’s Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) and Energy Efficiency Services Limited (EESL), delegates explored the ‘India journey’ — from the National Cooling Action Plan to innovative financing models like UJALA. These sessions unpicked the mechanics of bulk procurement and Energy Service Company (ESCO) contracts, providing the African leaders with a toolkit to build bankable, scalable projects back home.
Perhaps the most resonant outcome of the exchange was the shared vision for human-centric development. Participants recognized that the cooling sector isn’t just about machines; it is about the thousands of jobs created across the value chain, from installation to maintenance. By establishing localized ‘Centers of Excellence’ and harmonizing regional standards, African nations can ensure that the transition to sustainable cooling is inclusive, creating a resilient workforce that can sustain long-term economic growth.
As the visit concluded, the path forward became clear: the future of climate resilience lies in South-South collaboration. By sharing technology, harmonizing policies and mobilizing blended finance, India and Africa are not just fulfilling global pledges — they are building a shared foundation for prosperity. The partnerships sparked this October promise to accelerate a cooling transformation that will save energy, boost food security, and improve the quality of life for millions across the African continent.
It is quite disturbing that while the planet is gasping for breath, the gregarious nature of humans has set the world on fire by waging constant war. Our green planet, that blue dot in the universe, is collapsing and its ecosystem is breaking. Climate change has wrought the greatest havoc, and the planet today is oscillating between hope and despair.
The burning planet is inhospitable, posing an existential crisis, leading to what is deemed to be the largest recipe for a disaster for the mass extinction of our species. The United Nations has defined climate change as “a long-term shift in global temperatures and weather patterns, primarily driven by human activities like burning fossil fuels, since the 1800s. The damage is already done. The planet needs to survive, as we do not have a second one. Our planet has to be sustainable. At this juncture, green finance works like a catalyst that will protect the damage from further loss of biodiversity, natural ecosystem and life forms on Earth.
Sustainable development is defined by the Brundtland report as meeting present needs without compromising the needs of future generations. It balances three interconnected pillars of economic growth, social inclusion, and environmental protection. The origin of the concept is found in the report “Our Common Future”, gaining momentum in Rio Earth Summit. In 2015, the Sustainable Goals Agenda was adopted, establishing 17 parameters. Greta Thunberg’s 2019 speech, “How dare you,” to compromise our future brought the subject into focus, and it became of paramount importance. Focused and urgent steps in the subsequent IPCC, are essential to advancing sustainable development and safeguarding the future of our planet.
The 17 sustainable goals, which were adopted in 2015 was to be realised by 2030, though at present, we are far from the goals and dreams. The goals border on eradication of poverty, Zero hunger, Good health, all-around education, understand equality, clean water and sanitation, affordable and clean energy, sustainable cities, responsible consumption and production, climate action, life below water, life on land. But during the Paris agreement of 2015, it was decided that the temperature of the planet be kept below 2 degrees Celsius above the preindustrial period,1850 to 1900, by the turn of the century to avoid any climate disaster. But 2 degrees Celsius would again cause irreversible changes, such as greater sea-water precipitation, the killing of natural systems and the biosphere, which may accelerate the pace of climate change. Thus, it was decided to set it at 1.5% above pre-industrial levels, to minimise loss and ensure some degree of sustainability.
Let us know that the concept of green finance originated as a movement in 1970, finding its roots in the concept of sustainable development. The United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative was established in 1992. The Paris agreement, a watershed moment in the development of green finance, solidified it as a critical tool, and subsequently, the G20 nations formally focused on it. Green finance is aimed at ensuring the flow of public, private, and non-profit finance organisations’ participation to meet the sustainable development priorities.
The Green Climate Fund was officially established at COP 16, in Mexico, in 2010. In the COP 21, another conference of parties, it was decided to create a climate fund of 100 billion US dollars to assist the least developed countries for a spurt in growth of green finance. Finally, in the 29th Conference of the Parties (COP29), it was decided to have a collective action.
Rising temperature, erratic monsoon, flood, glacier melting, hurricane, the sustainability is under question, and it seems climate change is becoming a real, more intense, and global concern. In 2023, the concept of Environmental, Social, and Governance was adopted to measure sustainability. Thus, green finance made inroads as traditional finance failed to make inroads. Green finance is a tool as well as a mechanism that meets the funding gaps of climate finance. The traditional banking system is averse to going for green finance, as it has a long gestation period, lower returns, and higher risks. The adoption of BASEL norms and the prudential guidelines of income recognition, asset classification, and provisioning make it difficult for banks to enter the new terrain of financing.
Banks mobilize resources and allocate them for advances. The resources are mainly demand deposits such as savings bank and current deposits, or short-term- medium term fixed deposits, whereas green finance is preferably long-term, leading to Asset Liability mismatch, leading to the generation of NPA. So, venture capital or NBFC finance is available as long-term finance, or pension funds and insurance funds are more useful and practicable sources of finance to redeem green finance. The most important forms are the issuance of green bonds by the state and central government, which would go a long way in solving the issue of green finance where mushrooming of equity or hybrid funds and mobilizing resources through IPO for renewable energy. But in the Indian context, electric vehicles, wind energy, etc. though we’re launched with fanfare, ultimately they appeared to be a fiasco.
Despite all this, the financing gap for achieving the covenants of SDG in developing countries is estimated at 4 trillion annually, as per UNCTAD data. Global climate finance reached approximately $1.3 trillion per year as per the climate policy report of 2023. Here comes the concept of “Net Zero,” which means steps are to be initiated to ensure that the greenhouse gases, and particularly, carbon related emission has to be balanced by absorption of that much carbon dioxide, so that net accretion becomes zero. The challenge is not conceptual, but a reality. More than 140 countries have since adopted the Net Zero target within the global framework.
Climate risks are factored into insurance pricing, sovereign ratings, and supply chains, as per World Bank and IMF analysis. The resilient investment, it is observed, generates strong economic returns, and the global commission on adaptation estimates cost-benefit ratios between 2:1 and 10:1. This means each dollar spent in green finance may pay back several dollars in the future and thus, is helpful in climate crisis mitigation. Besides, providing energy security, reducing fossil fuel and carbon footprints shields the nation from global price vulnerability, and this leads to macroeconomic stability. Let all central banks monitor green finance like all other traditional finance, and it would bring climate sustainability. Interestingly, a nation’s fiscal policy must be explored to find out areas where rebates would be available for income tax, and subsidies must enhance the flow of green finance.
As per IPCC findings, developed economies contribute disproportionately to historical emissions. International climate finance commitments seek to mobilise US$100 billion. To steer clear of the climate crisis, nations must try to convert the challenge into an opportunity. Then this blue dot in the universe becomes a livable planet.
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(The writer is a former General Manager of Bank of India. Views expressed are personal.)
While air conditioning protects people from dangerous heat, it also significantly worsens global warming—by 2050, potentially producing more carbon dioxide than the current annual emissions of the United States, a new study reveals.
Scientists have combined climate science, energy modelling, and inequality analysis to create a unique framework using a set of well‑established global “storylines”—Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and Representative Concentration Pathways (SSP and RCP scenarios)—a set of “futures” ranging from strong climate action to high emissions.
The study reveals that, by 2050, air-conditioning use will more than double. Electricity for cooling could reach 4,493 TWh under mid‑range scenarios, and much more in high‑emissions futures. Emissions from air conditioning could reach 8.5 GtCO₂‑eq per year in the worst‑case scenario—more than the current annual emissions of the United States (5.9 GtCO₂‑eq).
Publishing their findings in Nature Communications, the international research group led by the University of Birmingham warns that most of this extra warming is caused by income-enabled growth in cooling consumption, more households adopting and using air conditioning, and not just rising temperatures.
Projected warming and inequality in cooling
Researchers estimate that air-conditioning use will add 0.03°C to 0.07°C of global warming by 2050, depending on the emissions pathway the world follows. This is the equivalent of around 74–183 billion transatlantic return flights. The predicted rise in temperature is a significant increase compared with the narrow margin left to keep warming below 1.5°C.
The paper also reveals a major global inequality—regions that need cooling the most, such as South Asia and Africa, have the least access to air conditioning. Wealthier regions such as Europe and North America have lower cooling needs but higher air-conditioning usage.
Professor Yuli Shan from the University of Birmingham, the corresponding author, said, “Global warming is raising temperatures and causing more heat waves, and as economic growth in some of the worst-affected countries means more people can offset extreme heat with air conditioning.
“As global temperatures rise, we risk being locked into an ‘arms race’ where defending ourselves against extreme heat is causing the issue to get worse. The world must transition quickly to cleaner, more efficient cooling technologies—while ensuring fair access to cooling, especially for vulnerable populations.”
As well as adopting a rapid transition to clean electricity, the research team recommends the fast adoption of low‑pollution cooling liquids in air-conditioning systems refrigerants and better building design—using insulation and shading more effectively. Researchers also advocate for behavioral changes such as turning the air conditioning down and shifting cooling away from peak hours.
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The development dilemma of cooling access
The study uncovers a fundamental development dilemma. Low-income limits regional access to cooling, yet closing this gap to deliver equitable thermal comfort would generate substantial additional warming impact.
Increasing demand resulting from rising incomes in low-income regions could have significant effects: an additional 94 million units at medium-income levels, 150 million units at high-income levels, and up to over 220 million units at the highest-income levels.
Dr. Hongzhi Zhang, from Beijing Institute of Technology, the first author of this study, said, “The study reveals that if all low‑income regions gained the same access to air conditioning as rich regions, related global emissions would jump dramatically—adding up to 0.05°C extra warming even in the most climate‑friendly scenario.”
Dr. Hongzhi Zhang was a visiting Ph.D. student at the University of Birmingham, supervised by Professor Yuli Shan.
How the modeling and analysis were done
Using their analysis framework, the researchers estimated how much cooling people will need as temperatures rise. They included humidity and weighted the results by where people live, as cooling needs matter more in areas with large populations.
They then fed these cooling‑need estimates into a global energy–economy model (GCAM) projecting how many air conditioners people will buy, how much electricity will be used, and how much greenhouse gas emissions the devices will produce.
The team ran GCAM under each of the five SSP‑RCP scenarios, so they could understand how air-conditioning use and emissions change in a sustainable world vs. a fossil‑fuel‑heavy world and how much warming comes specifically from air-conditioning use in each case.
Researchers then compared regions by income and climate conditions, building an econometric model to reveal areas where people “need” air conditioning but can’t afford it.
Finally, they measured how much extra warming AC emissions will cause, using a climate emulator called MAGICC, which estimates how emissions translate into additional warming.
Researchers at the University of Birmingham are using their wide-ranging pure and applied atmospheric research to provide solutions to the pressing problems of extreme weather and climate change which impact on our planet.
This study examines the interplay between climate change, violent conflict and forced migration in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), focusing on asylum flows to the European Union (EU). By integrating high-resolution climate, conflict and socioeconomic data spanning 2000 to 2023, we develop a comprehensive empirical framework to identify the key drivers of cross-border migration. Using a machine learning approach with a Random Forest Model (RFM), we compare its predictive performance against the traditional Gravity Model (GM). The RFM, which captures nonlinear relationships and variable interactions, significantly outperforms the GM, explaining over 53% of the variance in migration patterns. Our findings highlight the predominant influence of conflict and economic instability as primary predictors, while climate-related stressors, particularly drought severity and agricultural decline, function as threat multipliers, exacerbating existing vulnerabilities and amplifying displacement pressures. The analysis demonstrates that climate conditions alone are insufficient to explain migration surges; rather, it is the convergence of environmental, political and socio-economic fragilities that drives forced mobility. This research offers critical insights for migration governance and underscores the importance of integrated policy responses that address both immediate humanitarian needs and long-term structural resilience in the face of accelerating climate change. A key limitation is that the analysis focuses exclusively on asylum applications from MENA countries to the EU, does not capture internal or regional displacement and relies on country-level, predictive modelling that cannot establish causal relationships or reflect subnational climate–conflict heterogeneity.
1 Introduction
1.1 Climate Change, Vulnerability and Emerging Security Risks
Climate change impacts are intensifying globally, with rising temperatures, extreme heat and droughts increasingly affecting ecosystems, economies and human security (Mukherjee and Mishra 2021; Gao et al. 2023; Wu et al. 2024; Li et al. 2025). These climatic pressures disproportionately undermine livelihoods in low- and middle-income regions, where water scarcity and agricultural decline exacerbate poverty and inequality (Abel et al. 2019; Cattaneo and Foreman 2023; Schutte et al. 2021; Clements 2024; Wang, et al. 2025a). Such vulnerabilities heighten exposure to food insecurity and economic fragility, particularly among rural, marginalised and gender-vulnerable populations (Maconga 2023; Schuster et al. 2024; Alam et al. 2024; Dirie et al. 2024; Amin 2025). These dynamics have amplified global concern over the climate change–conflict–migration (CCM) nexus, whereby environmental stressors interact with structural political and socioeconomic weaknesses to intensify instability and displacement (Abel et al. 2019; Mach et al. 2020; Eklund et al. 2022; Anderson et al. 2021; Han et al. 2024; Zheng et al. 2025).
1.2 Climate Change, Conflict Dynamics and Pathways of Migration
Environmental stress influences mobility through both direct impacts (e.g., infrastructure loss, agricultural collapse) and indirect mechanisms such as economic decline or heightened violence (Khavarian-Garmsir et al. 2019; Mukherjee and Fransen 2024). Forced displacement often emerges where climatic, political and socioeconomic pressures intersect (Abel et al. 2019; Lunt et al. 2016; Schuster et al. 2024; Wang et al. 2025b). These interlinkages form the core of the CCM nexus, which emphasises how climate stress interacts with conflict dynamics to shape diverse mobility outcomes. Migration responses range from temporary internal displacement to long-distance international movement, although high vulnerability may also generate immobility traps (Schutte et al. 2021; Ngcamu 2023; Thalheimer et al. 2025; Cattaneo et al. 2019). Persistent conceptual and methodological challenges complicate the measurement of climate-induced migration (Cattaneo et al. 2019; Hällfors et al. 2024). Earlier narratives portrayed environmental migration as a security threat (Hartmann 2010; Black et al. 2011; Koubi et al. 2018, 2021), particularly in rural regions of the Global South (Almulhim et al. 2024). Within the CCM nexus, one of the most extensively documented pathways is the effect of agricultural production shocks on conflict, which heighten resource competition and socioeconomic stress (Falco et al. 2019; Xie et al. 2024). More broadly, climate anomalies influence civil unrest through economic channels, mental health impacts and food insecurity (Miguel et al. 2004; Basu et al. 2017; Meadows et al. 2024; Hsiang et al. 2013; Kori 2023). Despite the expanding literature, empirical integration of CCM mechanisms into a unified analytical framework remains limited and contested (Watson et al. 2023).
1.3 Forced Migration Trends and Evidence From the MENA Region
Traditional models of asylum migration emphasise political repression and violence as primary drivers (Moore and Shellman 2004), yet contemporary evidence points to a far more complex interplay of environmental, economic and political pressures, consistent with the CCM nexus (Abel et al. 2019; Schutte et al. 2021; Schuster et al. 2024). According to UNHCR’s Global Trends report (UNHCR 2023; https://www.unhcr.org/media/global-trends-report-2023), 108.4 million people were forcibly displaced worldwide at the end of 2022, increasing to 117.3 million by the end of 2023, the highest numbers ever recorded (Wu and Wang 2018). Complementary estimates from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) indicate that over 32 million internal displacements in 2022 were triggered by disasters, many of them climate-related. These official statistics underscore the scale and complexity of contemporary mobility pressures and highlight the growing relevance of climate–conflict interactions. Although climate impacts most often generate short-distance or internal displacement (Missirian and Schlenker 2017; Abel et al. 2019; Cuong et al. 2024), deteriorating environmental conditions in origin countries have also been linked to rising asylum applications to the EU, with potential increases of up to threefold under high-warming scenarios (Missirian and Schlenker 2017). The MENA region illustrates these compound dynamics vividly. The severe 2006–2010 drought in Syria contributed to agricultural collapse and rural–urban migration (Gleick 2014; Kelley et al. 2015; Mathbout et al. 2018), but it was the interaction of environmental stress with longstanding political repression, governance failures and economic decline (De Châtel 2014; Selby et al. 2017; Eklund et al. 2022; Alhaj Omar et al. 2023) that precipitated civil conflict and one of the largest forced displacement crises in modern history. This convergence exemplifies the intertwined mechanisms central to the CCM nexus.
1.4 Gaps in Knowledge and Need for Integrated Analytical Approaches
Despite substantial progress, important gaps remain in understanding how climate change, conflict, and socioeconomic conditions jointly shape migration outcomes. Climate–conflict research has improved spatial and temporal resolution using subnational datasets (Koren and Bagozzi 2017; Delazeri et al. 2022; Sundberg and Melander 2013; Gleditsch 2020; Vesco et al. 2022; Martínez Flores et al. 2024), while migration studies show that climatic variability affects key economic mediators such as GDP, wages and agricultural productivity (Beine and Parsons 2015; Martínez-Zarzoso 2020; Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2023). Yet findings remain heterogeneous across regions, periods and population groups. In the MENA region specifically, drought and temperature anomalies aggravate instability (Suleymanov 2024; Ranucci et al. 2025), but their impacts are intertwined with governance weaknesses, economic fragility and social vulnerability (Ash and Obradovich 2020; Dinc and Eklund 2023). A major methodological limitation is that most migration-modelling studies rely on linear or log-linear approaches, such as gravity models or fixed-effects regressions, that assume additive, monotonic relationships and therefore cannot capture the nonlinear thresholds, compound effects and interaction pathways central to the CCM nexus. For example, drought may influence migration only once critical severity levels are reached, or conflict may magnify climatic stress depending on economic resilience or governance capacity. These dynamics remain underexplored because conventional econometric models impose restrictive functional forms that obscure such complexities. This study addresses this conceptual gap by employing a Random Forest–based analytical framework capable of modelling nonlinear, interactive and multi-scalar relationships that traditional methods cannot detect. Our variable selection, encompassing climate, conflict, socioeconomic, governance, demographic, and geographic indicators, is grounded in the CCM framework and reflects the theorised channels through which environmental stress interacts with political instability and structural vulnerabilities to shape migration decisions. By integrating these dimensions into a unified empirical design, this study provides a more comprehensive assessment of CCM dynamics and advances beyond the constraints of existing linear modelling approaches.
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework guiding this study, synthesised from the existing literature on the climate–conflict–migration nexus. The framework illustrates the hypothesised pathways through which climatic stressors, particularly drought and water scarcity, interact with agricultural impacts, socioeconomic vulnerability, political instability and conflict dynamics to shape migration outcomes. Rather than representing a methodological component, the framework serves as an integrative lens that structures the study’s analytical focus and informs the interpretation of the empirical results.
Interconnected drivers of migration: climate, conflict and social unrest. Conceptual framework derived from the climate–conflict–migration literature and visualised in R (DiagrammeR package).
Historical total annual precipitation (TP) and reference evapotranspiration (ET0) (upper panel) and mean annual temperature (MAT) and hypsometric elevation (ElV) (lower panel) across Arab states, 2000–2023.
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