How Severe Has the Economic Impact of the Iran War Been?

May 15, 2026

Silhouette of Kuwait City’s skyline with a vibrant sunset backdrop, highlighting the urban landscape. by Abdullah Alsaibaie via Pexels

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How severe has the economic impact of the Iran war been for the Gulf states?

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By Emilie Rutledge, The Open University

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The US and Israel’s war on Iran has cast a long shadow over the Gulf. It has placed many of the economies that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) regional grouping – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia – under substantial strain.

Since the war began in February, the World Bank has downgraded its 2026 GDP growth forecast for the region from 4.4% to just 1.3%.. Some thinktanks, including Oxford Economics, even predict that some GCC economies will enter recession in the second half of the year.

However, the effects of the war have differed across the region. While the Gulf states are often viewed as a unified economic bloc bound by a shared dependence on hydrocarbons, the conflict has revealed significant differences in their economic vulnerability and resilience.

Countries like Qatar and Kuwait have seen their oil and gas exports seriously disrupted by the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz. But Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which have access to bypass infrastructure, have been partly able to circumvent this limitation.

Saudi Arabia has diverted 7 million barrels of crude per day through its east-west pipeline, allowing it to export oil from Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE, meanwhile, has utilised a pipeline from Habshan to Fujairah to export up to 1.8 million barrels of oil each day from the Gulf of Oman.

This infrastructure has enabled both countries to capitalise on soaring global oil prices. Saudi Aramco, Saudi Arabia’s state oil company, reported a 26% jump in profits in the first quarter of 2026.

Disruption to energy exports is one part of the story. The war has also caused substantial physical damage to energy infrastructure across the region. Around 80 energy facilities, ranging from production plants to refineries and pipelines, have been targeted by Iranian missile and drone attacks so far.

It will take months – and in some cases years – to repair the damage (which stands at an estimated US$58 billion) once the war ends. Qatar’s liquified natural gas industry, in particular, has suffered serious damage. QatarEnergy, the state-owned energy company, says it will take up to five years to repair its Ras Laffan industrial hub alone.

Gulf diversification

The GCC states have adopted strategies to diversify their economies away from a dependency on hydrocarbons. Tourism and aviation are two central pillars of this, with GCC countries investing heavily in these sectors. The Gulf is now home to some of the busiest international airport hubs in the world.

But these industries, too, have been damaged by the war. Financial analysis firm, Moody’s, suggested recently that hotel occupancy in Dubai is set to plummet to 10% in the second quarter of 2026 from 80% before the war. Some Iranian attacks have targeted civilian areas, including hotels and residential buildings, prompting tourists to stay away.

The Iran war has also placed Gulf airlines such as Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways under increasing financial pressure. More than 30,000 flights to the Middle East were cancelled in the first month of the war and jet fuel prices – the biggest variable cost to airlines – are up 90% on the annual average.

The logistics sector is another area of Gulf diversification. It has grown rapidly since the early 2000s thanks to the region’s strategic position between east-west trade routes. The UAE’s Jebel Ali Port, for instance, is now one of the world’s largest container ports and the base of Dubai’s multinational logistics firm, DP World.

However, Jebel Ali has seen a 40% drop in vessels due to the war, with container carriers rerouting to alternatives such as Salalah in Oman and Colombo in Sri Lanka. And while DP World has opened emergency land corridors to ports outside the Gulf to keep cargo moving, these routes are costly and have limited capacity.

The UAE and Qatar also both serve as major air freight hubs, acting as bridges for cargo travelling between Asia and Europe. But this has been affected by the war too. Freight rates have increased following attacks on both Dubai and Doha that led to grounded flights and air space closures.

In the long-term, the economic impact of the war on the Gulf economies will hinge on its duration and political outcome. But the risks are firmly tilted to the downside. The fiscal outlook for some GCC states is deteriorating, with several facing scenarios where government spending exceeds revenue. Public sector debt in some GCC states is rising too.

Moody’s has downgraded its outlook on Bahrain, which was already facing longstanding financial issues prior to the war, from “stable” to “negative”. This will make it harder for Bahrain to access much-needed capital and increase future borrowing costs.

GCC economies invest their surplus oil and gas revenues through sovereign wealth funds, which collectively manage between US$4 trillion and US$6 trillion in global assets. Governments are likely to draw on these funds to support domestic spending on reconstruction and bolstering their defences after the war.

This could undermine their future potential to fund large long-term diversification mega-projects such as Saudi Arabia’s Neom City. Plans for Neom, which was initially proposed as a linear city to home 9 million people, have already been scaled down in recent years due to issues including funding pressures.

The Gulf’s loss of “safe-haven” status due to the war, and the resulting reputational damage, cannot easily be reversed. Even after the conflict ends, higher risk premiums will persist for those doing business in the Gulf. Shipping disruptions could take months to unwind, and a prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be likely to trigger permanent rerouting.

If the conflict drags on, structural shifts in global supply chains may deepen, with lasting costs for the Gulf economies.

Emilie Rutledge, Senior Lecturer in Economics, The Open University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Gulf State Cooperation Has Long Been Shaped by Iran

May 14, 2026

Scenic view of Musandam’s rugged mountains and serene coastline under a clear sky. by Siarhei Nester via Pexels

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Gulf state cooperation has long been shaped by the threat of Iran − but shows of unity belie division

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Leaders attend the 45th Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in Kuwait City, Kuwait on Dec.01, 2024. Amiri Diwan of Kuwait/Handout/Anadolu via Getty Images
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Firmesk Rahim, UMass Boston

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Arab Gulf countries, battered economically and physically by the war with Iran, were keen to put on a united front at a key regional meeting on April 28, 2026.

Gathering in the Saudi city Jeddah, representatives of the Gulf Cooperation Council warned the Iranian government in Tehran that an attack on any one of its six members would be taken as an attack on all. Rejecting Iran’s claims to control of the Strait of Hormuz, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani later described the summit as embodying “the unified Gulf stance” over the conflict.

The show of togetherness may seem at odds with other recent developments that have seen members of the GCC split over policy and vision for the region – not least the United Arab Emirate’s decision to quit the oil cartel OPEC.

But to followers of Gulf politics, like myself, the scene felt familiar. Time and again, Iran has accomplished what no outside mediator could: It has pushed divided Gulf Arab states together. When tensions rise, the monarchies of the GCC – Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman – tend to stand united, at least publicly.

From revolution to coordination

The modern Gulf security environment was profoundly shaped by the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Iran shares a narrow and strategically vital waterway with the Gulf states but has long differed in identity and outlook. Specifically, Iran’s Shiite revolutionary model contrasts with the Sunni-led monarchies across the region.

Before 1979, when Iran was ruled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi Iran and Saudi Arabia, the largest of the Sunni Arab Gulf states, were regarded by Washington as “twin pillars,” protecting American interests in the Middle East. Their relationship was cooperative, but not close.

Then the emergence of the Islamic Republic after the revolution in 1979 introduced a new kind of regional actor – one defined not only by state power but also by Shiite ideological ambition.

Gulf monarchies’ concern over both external security and internal stability was reinforced by the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure in Saudi Arabia, when Islamist militants seized Islam’s holiest site. The event, alongside Iran’s revolution, exposed the vulnerability of Gulf regimes to religiously driven upheaval.

A large plume of smoke is seen amongst buildings — The 1979 siege at Mecca’s Grand Mosque raised concern over security across the Gulf region. AFP via Getty Images

In response to this revolution ideology, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established the GCC in 1981. Although officially framed as a platform for economic and political cooperation, the organization also reflected shared security concerns and Arab identity.

But unity had limits. Member states did not all view threats to their respective regimes in the same way.

Saudi Arabia worried about U.S. pressure for reforms; Kuwait feared neighboring Iraq; Bahrain was concerned about Iran’s influence over its own Shiite population; and the UAE worried about both Iran and its own large foreign workforce. Meanwhile, Oman and Qatar followed a more independent or balanced approach.

These differences would shape the trajectory of the GCC, and Arab Gulf states’ relationship with Tehran.

The eight-year Iran–Iraq War, which began in 1980, brought to the fore fears of Iran’s influence across the region. While Oman declared neutrality, other GCC states supported Iraq by funneling billions of dollars to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

This revealed an early pattern: Gulf states could coordinate politically, but avoided acting as a single strategic bloc. The GCC broadly favored Iraq as a counterweight to Iran, but there was no unified strategy or formal policy.

Security dependence

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 reshaped the region’s security structure again. In early 1991, the move prompted a U.S.-led coalition, including Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, to expel Iraqi forces. Saudi Arabia’s role was especially significant: It not only hosted coalition forces but also actively participated militarily – marking one of the first major episodes in which a GCC state was directly involved in the defense of another member.

Soldiers are seen walking in a line in the desert. — American troops at Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield.
Eric Bouvet/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images

During – and especially after – the Gulf War, GCC states deepened their reliance on the United States, agreeing to host U.S. military bases and expanding long-term defense cooperation.

This external security umbrella provided a measure of stability, but it also introduced new differences. While Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Bahrain aligned more closely with Washington’s strategic framework, others – notably Oman and Qatar – maintained a more flexible approach. As a result, the appearance of unity coexisted with growing variation in national strategies.

This pattern has continued in recent years, significantly through diplomatic moves to normalize ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords. While the UAE and Bahrain moved quickly to formalize ties with Israel, others remained more cautious.

The effort to contain Iran

When it comes to combating Iranian influence, GCC states have long played different roles.

Oman has consistently acted as a mediator, maintaining open channels with Tehran and facilitating quiet diplomacy — including back-channel talks between Iran and Western states.

Qatar also kept communication open, partly because of shared economic interests with Iran – particularly the management of the North Field/South Pars gas reserve.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE, by contrast, have generally taken a more cautious and at times confrontational stance toward Iran. Both view Iran as a regional competitor and a source of security concerns, particularly due to Tehran’s missile program and its support for ideologically opposed non-state actors.

This contrasting approach to Iran across the GCC allows different states to engage Tehran through multiple channels, but it also makes it harder to form a consistent, unified GCC strategy.

A changing regional balance

The 2003 Iraq War marked a turning point in the GCC-Iran dynamic. The removal of Iraq as a regional counterweight allowed Iran to expand its influence.

And this development sharpened divisions within the GCC.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE increasingly viewed Iran as a direct strategic threat requiring containment. Qatar and Oman, however, emphasized dialogue and mediation.

These differences became more visible during the Qatar diplomatic crisis of 2017. The dispute centered around Qatar’s support for Islamist political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, considered a terrorist organization by the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Qatar and imposed a full air, land and sea blockade in June 2017. The three nations accused Qatar of supporting extremist groups and maintaining close ties with Iran. Isolated, Qatar relied on Iran for airspace, trade routes and supplies, strengthening the relationship between the countries. The blockade eventually ended in January 2021, when the parties signed a declaration restoring diplomatic and trade relations at a GCC summit in Saudi Arabia.

GCC under attack

The series of events that began with the Oct. 7, 2023, attack by Iranian-backed Hamas in Israel shook up GCC relations with Tehran.

In June 2025, in response to the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran, Tehran struck a U.S. base in Qatar – the first such attack on a GCC state by Tehran.

At an extraordinary meeting in Doha, Qatar’s capital, GCC members pledged full solidarity with Qatar and strongly condemned the Iranian attack.

But it was not enough to prevent Iran from attacking all six GCC states in response to the ongoing conflict begun in February 2026 by U.S. and Israel.

The subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, affecting 20% of global oil supplies, has sparked what many see as the biggest crisis in the Gulf since the inception of the GCC.

The GCC responded by emphasizing collective security and unity. But yet again, the public show of togetherness masks divergent views on how to respond. When the war ends, each state will likely return to its own strategic and foreign policy approach.

Understanding the pattern

Since 1979, Tehran’s actions in the Gulf region have exposed two parallel developments. On the surface, there are shared concerns among GCC members and public shows of unity. But underneath this facade of unity, each state has continued to develop its own national priorities and risk tolerance.

The combination of these two factors helps explain why the GCC often appears unified during crises, while remaining internally divided over how to respond to them.

Rather than viewing the GCC as a fully cohesive bloc, it may be more accurate to see it as a framework where cooperation and disagreement coexist.

Firmesk Rahim, PhD Student, UMass Boston

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Why Saudi Arabia’s Urban Future is About Livability

May 13, 2026

Stunning historic architecture in Jeddah’s Al-Balad, showcasing Saudi culture and design. by abdullah alallah via Pexels

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Why Saudi Arabia’s urban future is about livability. Not just smart systems

The country has become one of the world’s largest smart city laboratories—testing technology, infrastructure, and urban design across its national landscape.

[Source photo: Krishna Prasad/Fast Company Middle East]

By Heba Hashem

In Saudi Arabia, about 84% of its population now lives in cities, putting significant pressure on urban systems. Population growth, climate challenges, traffic jams, and higher expectations for quality of life are all adding to the strain. To address this, Saudi Arabia has launched a broad smart city plan to improve everything from traffic flow to energy use.The groundwork for this transformation was laid in 2015, when the government unveiled plans to upgrade 17 cities, including Riyadh, Makkah, and Jeddah. A year later, Vision 2030 was launched, marking the kingdom’s first blueprint for smart city development.Today, these plans are becoming a reality. Riyadh is launching a smart city program that includes planting more trees and introducing self-driving transport. Al Khobar is using AI-powered traffic signals to reduce congestion, and Makkah is developing into a smart city ready to handle 30 million pilgrims each year by 2030.

THE RISE OF THE COGNITIVE ECOSYSTEM

The smart city model has now moved beyond simple connectivity and automation toward the “cognitive city”—urban environments that not only collect data but learn from it and respond in real time.

Digital twins—virtual replicas of physical environments—anchor this vision, allowing operators to simulate traffic flows, monitor infrastructure, and optimize resource use.

“Digital twin technology is creating tangible value in areas such as urban planning, infrastructure optimization, and predictive maintenance by enabling simulation and real-time operational insights,” says Mosab Erar, vertical business director at Hikvision MEA.

Yet the path forward is not without hurdles. “Key limitations often stem from fragmented systems and data silos, which require strong data governance frameworks and seamless cross-platform integration to fully realize the potential of digital twins in complex urban environments,” adds Erar.

THE HUMAN SIDE OF HIGH-TECH

As cities become increasingly connected, Yasser Elsheshtawy, an adjunct professor at Columbia University, warns that planners should not treat older cities as blank slates for new technology.

“Retrofitting smart infrastructure into long-established cities such as Makkah or Riyadh is fundamentally different from building a new city like NEOM because existing urban environments are shaped by lived practices, informal adaptations, and deeply rooted social relationships,” he says.

His concern is that pursuing efficiency could come at a human cost. “The biggest challenge is that ‘smart’ systems can easily become overly technocratic, prioritizing efficiency and centralized control at the expense of people’s sense of ownership over their neighborhoods,” says Elsheshtawy.

“The goal should be to enhance flexibility, resilience, and everyday usability—allowing technology to enable urban life rather than dominate it quietly.”

DESIGNING THE ‘FIVE-MINUTE’ OASIS

While megaprojects like NEOM, Qiddiya entertainment city, and Red Sea Global signal the scale of Saudi Arabia’s ambition, the most meaningful changes are those transforming everyday life.

For example, Riyadh is developing New Murabba as a 15-minute city, where people can access everything they need on foot. In reality, planners are taking this idea even further.

Mustafa Chehabeddine, design principal at global architecture firm KPF, explains that the first residential district at Riyadh’s new downtown functions as a network of five-minute communities.

“KPF is designing Community 2, the first residential community at New Murabba, as a 15-minute city,” he says. “But, during Riyadh’s hot season, the challenge is to make the radius even smaller.”

To counter extreme heat, the design prioritizes proximity and comfort through shaded, accessible spaces. “We’re implementing five-minute communities within the neighborhood, with pedestrian heat refuges provided every one or two minutes, whether that’s a shop, shaded landscape area, or protected courtyard,” he explains.

The approach blends traditional courtyard urbanism with new technologies such as motion-activated misting systems and cooling fans, ensuring walkability even in the hottest weather.

THE CHALLENGE OF LEGACY INFRASTRUCTURE

It’s one thing to build a city from the ground up, but quite another to modernize long-established urban centers.

“Retrofitting established cities such as Makkah and Riyadh comes with challenges, including infrastructure constraints, integration with legacy systems, and the need to minimize disruption to daily operations,” says Erar.

Bruce Fisher, design principal at KPF, points to the structural consequences of decades of car-centric planning, particularly in cities like Jeddah.

“Jeddah is a sprawling, largely gridded city built on an urban planning model of square super-blocks, wide roads, and highways that have pushed the city steadily northward over the past four decades,” he says.

He adds that the city is “primarily a car-centric, largely unwalkable city.”

“To meet even the minimum standards of a smart city, it must densify in strategic locations capable of supporting transit-oriented development.”

Sometimes, the best solutions come from the past as well as the future. Fisher points to Jeddah’s historic Al Balad district, with its winding, shaded, walkable streets, as a good example of people-friendly urban design.

“Transit is the critical enabler of this kind of smart, culturally resonant, and environmentally responsive urbanism — one that puts people, rather than cars, at the center of urban form,” he says. “A kilometer of mass transit may lack the visual drama of a kilometer-tall tower, but the two work best in tandem — transit unlocks the density.”

CHANGING THE CAR CULTURE

Currently, over 85% of daily trips in Riyadh are made in private cars.

Saudi Arabia is investing in AI-powered transportation and public transit. In 2025, WeRide started a robotaxi service in Riyadh with Uber, and the Saudi company Front End announced plans to use autonomous aerial vehicles.

Elsheshtawy believes the real challenge remains behavioral. “AI-driven mobility can optimize traffic flows, improve safety, and enhance coordination across transport networks, but congestion will persist if people continue to rely overwhelmingly on private cars,” he says.

He argues that public transport requires more than efficient systems. “It demands convenient last-mile connectivity, walkable environments, shaded pedestrian routes, mixed-use development around transit hubs, and a cultural shift that makes public transport a desirable option.”

Projects such as the Riyadh Metro offer a glimpse of that future. By combining data-driven mobility, multimodal integration, and transit-oriented development, the system aims to change how the city moves. It’s real “smartness,” Elsheshtawy notes, lies in its potential to reconfigure urban behavior—encouraging a shift away from car dependency.

Over 1,808km Pedestrian, Cycling Paths Delivered By Qatar

May 12, 2026

Scenic view of Doha skyline with pastel-colored buildings along the waterfront. by Mary Rose Relente via Pexels. Qatar eyes sustainable future with eco-initiatives

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Over 1,808km Pedestrian, Cycling Paths Delivered By Ashghal, Qatar

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A standout feature of this network is the 33-kilometer Olympic Cycling Track, which holds the Guinness World Record for the longest continuous cycle path

By Jinal Shah

MEP MiddleEast – May 11, 2026

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Over 1,808km Pedestrian, Cycling Paths Delivered By Ashghal, Qatar — 1824245123

Highlights by Level4 AI

The Public Works Authority, Ashghal, has delivered more than 1,808 kilometers of pedestrian and cycling tracks between 2020 and 2025 in Doha, Qatar. This project is not merely an infrastructure task but a strategic alignment with the Qatar National Vision 2030.

Olympic Cycling Track

A standout feature of this network is the 33-kilometer Olympic Cycling Track, which holds the Guinness World Record for the longest continuous cycle path. It is a dedicated 7-meter-wide, bidirectional path separated from traffic.

The track includes 29 underpasses and five bridges, allowing cyclists to ride continuously without stopping at intersections. The route is fully illuminated for night cycling and includes 100 benches and 20 rest areas.

Safe And Accessible Transit For All

The development comes as part of its ongoing efforts to enhance road safety and provide a safer, more sustainable mobility environment for all road users, while developing a modern and integrated road network that supports sustainable transportation across cities and residential areas. The paths are strategically designed to link with the Doha Metro stations and major bus hubs, facilitating “first and last-mile” connectivity for commuters.

The network includes both shared pedestrian and cycling paths, as well as dedicated cycling tracks. Also, it has successfully integrated pedestrian and cycling tracks into highway, main road, and local road projects. This has improved accessibility for pedestrians and cyclists, while enhancing safety and traffic flow on Qatar roads.

Top Cycling Routes

Some of the top cycling routes in the country are 5/6 Park (1.1km), Lusail International Circuit (5.3km), Olympic Cycling Track (33km), Al Bidda Park (5km), Aspire Zone Park (5km) and Al Khor Road (38km – track integrates with Olympic track).

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Diriyah Company Awards $490 Million Contract: Details

May 11, 2026

A historic tower in Diriyah, Saudi Arabia, framed by tree branches under a bright blue sky. by Abdul7amid Al Fadhly via Pexels

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Diriyah Company awards $490 million contract to build Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art

PIF Riyadh – 10 May 2026

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Diriyah Company awards $490 million contract to build Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art

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Contract underscores PIF-owned Diriyah Company’s ambition to develop the country’s leading historical, cultural and lifestyle destination
Diriyah awards work to Albawani Company Ltd. and Hassan Allam Construction Saudi L.L.C., in a boost to Saudi Arabia’s private sector
Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art will serve as a premier center of artistic exploration while supporting PIF’s drive to expand and diversify the Saudi economy

PIF-owned Diriyah Company has awarded a $490 million (SAR 1.84 billion) construction contract for the Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art (SAMoCA), in Diriyah.

The contract has been awarded to a joint venture between Albawani Company Ltd. and Hassan Allam Construction Saudi L.L.C., reflecting Diriyah Company’s ambition to develop a major cultural destination that attracts visitors and supports long-term growth.

SAMoCA is a flagship project by the Museums Commission. It aims to document, research, exhibit and champion Saudi modern and contemporary art. The museum will serve as a premier center of artistic exploration while supporting Saudi artists across generations to imagine and shape the nation’s creative possibilities.

Diriyah Company is developing the Diriyah project, the birthplace of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and a major historical, cultural and lifestyle destination. Diriyah is one of five giga-projects – together with ROSHN, Red Sea Global, Qiddiya and NEOM – that are driving expansion and diversification of the Saudi economy. Diriyah’s broad mission underscores its commitment to ensuring successful business outcomes and sustainable growth under the strategic direction of Vision 2030.

The museum, designed by the U.K.-based firm Godwin Austen Johnson with multidisciplinary support from Rafaat Miller Consulting, will have a gross floor area of 45,252 square meters and a total built-up area of 77,428 square meters. Notably, SAMoCA has recently achieved Mostadam Gold sustainability certification at both the design and construction stages.

The new museum at Diriyah will serve as the flagship home of SAMoCA, while SAMOCA at JAX Center continues to operate as a dynamic exhibition space in Riyadh’s creative district.

Commenting on the long-term impact of this new cultural asset, Jerry Inzerillo, Group Chief Executive Officer of Diriyah Company, said: “The Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art will provide Saudi and international artists with a truly world-class platform – one that invites global voices to engage with the Kingdom as it is today. This iconic asset will further elevate Diriyah’s reputation as the Kingdom’s capital of culture – and underscores our unwavering commitment to developing a vibrant city that serves our community, and the nation at large.”

Eng. Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Hammad, Chief Executive Officer of the Museums Commission, added: “The Saudi Arabia Museum of Contemporary Art will be the epicenter of Saudi modern and contemporary art. Set against the historic legacy of Diriyah, it is designed to document and champion generations of Saudi artists, from pioneers to emerging voices, while inviting international dialogue into that story. We are committed to ensuring this dynamic platform remains accessible and inspiring for all.”

Diriyah, the $63.2 billion integrated urban development, has now awarded over $29 billion in construction contracts. Once complete, the ‘City of Earth’ will contribute approximately $18.6 billion (SAR 70 billion) directly to Saudi Arabia’s GDP, create more than 180,000 jobs, be home to an estimated 100,000 people, and welcome 50 million annual visits.

It will include museums, shopping districts, a university, the Diriyah Opera House, the Diriyah Arena, a variety of food and beverage outlets, and 34 world-class resorts and hotels spanning its two main masterplans.

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