Call for applications to finance projects in 7 Mediterranean countries

Call for applications to finance projects in 7 Mediterranean countries

Call for applications to finance projects in 7 Mediterranean countries

 

Green Economy: UfM launches call for applications to finance projects in 7 Mediterranean countries

The above image is of UfM

Call for applications to finance projects in 7 Mediterranean countries

(TAP) – On 16/03/2023, TUNIS/Tunisia. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) launched a call for applications to finance projects aimed at promoting employment and entrepreneurship in the green economy sector. The aim is to support the environmental transition of the economies of 7 Mediterranean countries, including Tunisia.

 

According to information published Thursday by the UfM, this call for applications is intended for NGOs working to support vulnerable populations disproportionately affected by the consequences of climate change and by the evolution of the socio-economic context.

 

Eligible for this call for applications are non-profit NGOs active in the field of environmental transition of economies in an inclusive manner and with respect for social justice. These NGOs must be based in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Mauritania, Palestine or Tunisia, with priority given to regional projects. The deadline for applications is May 29, 2023.

 

The selected candidates will benefit from financial support ranging from 150,000 to 300,000 euros (which represents a sum varying between 500,000 and 1 million dinars) per project, as well as from the UfM’s technical expertise, which will give them greater visibility.

 

Funded by the UfM with the support of the German Development Cooperation (GIZ), on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), this initiative, in its first edition, launched in 2020, helped 18,000 people, mainly young people and women, from seven UfM member states (Greece, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco and Tunisia).

These projects address employment challenges in the areas of entrepreneurship, women’s empowerment, sustainable tourism, and education and research.

The green economy, as well as “green” jobs, are set to play a key role in the sustainable recovery of the Mediterranean region from the COVID-19 pandemic.

.

Sustainable Cities and their Digital Twins

Sustainable Cities and their Digital Twins

There is more and more belief that the key to sustainable cities may lie in increasingly sophisticated digital twins. Let us see what Anthropocene has published.

 


The key to sustainable cities may lie in increasingly sophisticated digital twins

Researchers offer the first rigorous analysis “In silico” equivalents of urban areas as a powerful tool for sustainable development
March 14, 2023

Dynamic computer models of cities known as ‘digital twins’ could help drive sustainable development across the world’s urban areas, an international team of authors argues in the journal Nature Sustainability.

Digital twins are more than just static models. They incorporate near-real-time data from sensors and other sources to produce “virtual replicas,” the authors explain—“in silico equivalents of real-world objects.”

The concept of digital twins first arose in manufacturing, and they are primarily used in product and process engineering. But the models have also been employed in fields ranging from personalized medicine to climate forecasting, at scales from the molecular to the planetary.

Many researchers have posited that digital twins will be a powerful tool for sustainability efforts. But nobody has taken a rigorous look at the benefits and pitfalls of urban digital twins. The new study takes on that task, paying particular attention to the potential for the modeling approach to help achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals.

Digital twins have a variety of potential benefits in this realm, the researchers say. They can help cities allocate resources more efficiently—design more effective water grids, predict traffic congestion to guide transportation planning, simulate consumer behavior to recommend energy-saving measures, and so on.

In addition, “In silico models provide a virtual space where new clean technologies, which promise resource efficiency but may cause unintended harm, can be tested at a speed and scale that may otherwise be inhibited by the precautionary principle,” the researchers write. For example, they could help cities figure out how to incorporate renewable sources of energy into the grid without compromising reliability.

Digital twins could also help scientists and policymakers to collaborate across disciplines, agencies, levels of government, and geographic distances. And they could aid cities in monitoring and reporting progress on the Sustainable Development Goals or other sustainability aims.

Some of the authors of the paper have been involved in the development of a digital twin for Fishermans Bend, an urban renewal project in Melbourne, Australia. The model includes more than 1,400 layers of both historical and real-time data from public and private sources. More than 20 government agencies and municipalities are using the model to analyze how proposed buildings will affect sunlight falling on open space and vegetation, forecast tram traffic patterns, and address other planning questions.

Digital twin models are also being used in cities including Zurich, Singapore, and Shanghai to monitor noise and pollution and facilitate urban planning that takes into account population growth and climate change.

But there are pitfalls to the digital twin approach, too. Because they require so much data, advanced computing power, and technological know-how, digital twins have the potential to exacerbate digital divides, especially between high-income and lower-income countries.

What’s more, even the most complex model may fall short in representing the multifarious nature of a real-life city. The data necessary to underpin a successful digital twin may be unavailable, inaccessible, or incompatible with other sources. And the social-science aspects of digital twins are especially poorly understood.

Finally, models can be optimized for the wrong targets. There are inherent contradictions between different Sustainable Development Goals, and programmers have to take care about how outcomes and parameters are prioritized, the researchers say. For whom and by whom are these decisions made—and who’s left out of the process?

To avoid these pitfalls of digital twins—and reap the potential benefits, the researchers recommend that governments and international institutions get involved in bridging digital divides; leaving digital twin technology to the marketplace virtually guarantees that low-resource countries will be left behind.

They also call on those creating and implementing digital twins of cities to pay attention to social and ethical responsibility. “A central question that derives from these issues is: to what extent are those who may be affected by the decisions based on simulation models included in their design and deployment?” they write.

“Interestingly in such instances, digital twins themselves can raise awareness among planners and policymakers of socioeconomic inequalities, thereby becoming instruments of inclusion,” the researchers add.

Source: Tzachor A. et al. “Potential and limitations of digital twins to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.” Nature Sustainability 2022.

Image: ©ESRI

.

The finance sector can accelerate the transformation to a net-zero built environment

The finance sector can accelerate the transformation to a net-zero built environment

The finance sector can accelerate the transformation to a net-zero built environment – Here’s how

13 Mar 2023

Real estate is the world’s most valuable asset class representing two-thirds of global wealth. With more than 13% of global GDP related to construction and 12% of employment, its size means it is responsible for an astonishing 40% of global energy-related carbon emissions (14 Gt per year). This is because it makes up over one-third of global final energy use and consumes 40% of raw materials globally. Achieving net-zero carbon emissions in the built environment by 2050 will require investments of USD $1.7 trillion annually and will create half a million more direct jobs.

Real estate assets are a valuable and growing component of institutional investment portfolios. At the same time, ambitious policies and regulations, changing public awareness and radically shifting demand drivers are pushing finance sector stakeholders to focus on sustainability in their portfolios because it affects business in the short, medium and long term. When put together, the finance sector has a unique opportunity to shape demand and drive transformation in the built environment.

Achieving net-zero emissions in the built environment by 2050 is the last stop along an arduous path. The specific targets all actors need to aim for are for all newly constructed buildings to have net-zero operational emissions by 2030 and for all buildings – including existing ones – to have net-zero emissions by 2050. And embodied carbon emissions – emissions from material production and construction processes – must be at least 40-50% lower by 2030 than today and net zero by 2050. Unfortunately, we are not on track.

Halving emissions by 2030 is, therefore, the first stop and must effectively happen today. This is because the lead times in typically built environment projects can easily be 8 to 10 years, so companies planning and designing projects today must already include these targets for 2030.

Achieving this massive transformation at the speed and scale required means that all actors have to share the same vision of halving emissions by 2030 and reaching net zero across the entire life cycle by 2050. They also must deeply and radically collaborate to realize this vision – across governments, the finance sector, businesses along the full value chain, science and civil society. The collaboration needs to focus on the following three critical levers for market transformation (WBCSD and GlobalABC, 2021):

  1. Adopt whole-life carbon (WLC) and life-cycle thinking and concepts across the value chain and the market to align on key indicators, metrics and targets consistently.
  2. Treat carbon like cost: Internalize the WLC emissions costs and reflect them in the price of products and services throughout the value chain, including in governance mechanisms, procurement and taxonomy, from governments and the financial sector.
  3. Foster a positive and reinforcing supply and demand dynamic that incentivizes low-carbon solutions along the value chain. This requires signals from government and finance and, most importantly, collaboration between industry players along the whole value chain.

The role of the finance sector

Finance sector stakeholders strongly influence built environment impacts through loans and investments in built assets and – indirectly – investing in value chain businesses. When mobilizing financial capital, they can set requirements for low-carbon solutions in building projects and across the value chain. Investors, asset managers, banks, advisors and insurers all influence if and how buildings are constructed. They play a crucial role in the very early stages of buildings when decisions significantly impact their future emissions. This includes the energy performance of buildings and setting requirements to reduce emissions from building materials and the construction process.

To understand how the finance sector can exert this influence, let’s look at what holds us back today.

Challenges and opportunities

The transition’s challenges are many and complex. For instance, there is a lack of true collaboration and understanding between the construction, real estate and finance sectors, despite their deep link and reliance. Poor data availability, quality, and limited transparency are holding up measurement, benchmarking, and target-setting processes for net-zero emissions pathways. The built environment and finance sectors are facing a skills shortage in terms of understanding, writing and using reporting and disclosure documents effectively to determine how the results could drive investments. And financial services organizations have traditionally prioritized short-term financial returns over positive, but more difficult to assess, environmental, social and governance (ESG) returns.

However, in all of these, there are opportunities. Stakeholders can find new ways of working together, and legally binding contracts, for example, can help ensure the right incentives, procurement methods and metrics to support net-zero emissions goals for project delivery (see WBCSD’s Decarbonizing construction – Guidance for investors and developers to reduce embodied carbon).

Alignment on the growing number of guides, standards, tools and certifications for assessment and reporting would ensure data availability, quality and transparency (note World Green Building Council’s (WorldGBC) BuildingLife project, the RICS professional statement on whole life carbon, and the Ashrae-International Code Council (ICC) Whole Life Carbon Approach Standard).

Training and upskilling on sustainability-related disclosures and strategies to align with the Paris Agreement would ensure investors and built environment professionals see the value in these documents from both sides. They would become part of the central decision-making process for investments, linking non-financial concerns with financial impact. The Urban Land Institute (ULI) Europe’s C Change project, which is currently addressing transition risk in valuation, is an example of progress in this area. Changing the corporate culture will further the idea that the ultimate goal is to ensure strong returns on investment while creating value beyond shareholders, managing the multifaceted risks of transitioning to net-zero emissions and safeguarding people and the environment.

Understanding these and other challenges and opportunities will help the sector adapt strategies and solutions that will be the key to achieving net-zero emissions.

No-regret actions for finance sector stakeholders

Four specific interventions sit at the core of strategies to reduce the full life-cycle emissions of projects in the built environment: Accountability, Ambition, Action and Advocacy.

  • Finance stakeholders in the built environment can achieve accountability through standardized data measurement and transparent reporting.
  • In setting credible, science-based net-zero emissions targets, they raise ambition.
  • They take action by developing climate transition plans and placing whole-life carbon at the center of decarbonization strategies and decisions.
  • By working with the public sector and organizations like WBCSD and its partners in the BuildingToCOP Coalition and Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction (GlobalABC), they place advocacy for policies and regulations targeting sustainable finance at the heart of efforts to level the playing field for the market.

For asset owners and investors, achieving the transition means setting clear portfolio- and asset-specific targets and timelines. They also must embed critical climate and ESG factors into requests for proposals, investment mandates, manager selection and stewardship engagement with portfolio companies and incorporate the related risks (and opportunities) into valuations and, ultimately, into investment decisions.

For asset managers, the lack of consistent, comparable and decision-useful information on climate impact is still a barrier to better implementation. However, growing demand and regulatory pressures motivate every firm to overcome data challenges through proprietary work or third parties. Standardized frameworks and local/regional taxonomies help the asset management industry with enhanced tools for assessment, benchmarking and reporting. WBCSD’s Net-zero buildings – Where do we stand? report lays the basis for a harmonized whole-life carbon assessment and reporting framework.

Finance providers can acquire a better understanding of the emissions from the products they are financing using adequate data, tools and standards, including the cost of carbon and transition risk considerations. The ability to accurately measure and standardize (whole life) carbon emissions could help them link their financial offerings to carbon targets and potentially provide lower costs for low-carbon projects. For that to happen, they need clear and transparent information to reliably assess the business case and build trust with the market.

For insurance providers, it means developing methodologies to assess and quantify different climate change scenarios and integrating both physical and transition risks into decisions to enter or exit an underwriting.

Lastly, investment advisors and data providers can facilitate top-down learning as they share and spread best practices and become significant players in the standardization and harmonization of data and target-setting (including but not limited to the Carbon Risk Real Estate Monitor (CRREM), Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi) and GRESB).

What’s next? Achieving a breakthrough in buildings

To reduce built environment emissions globally from 14 Gt per year to 7 Gt per year seems to be a daunting task. However, with a clear focus on whole-life carbon emissions alongside cost, the finance sector can help accelerate this transition. There is evidence that we can reduce construction emissions by half today and cost-effectively. And evidence is also emerging that retrofitting building portfolios to net-zero emissions can be achieved competitively.

What needs to happen next is for all stakeholders – finance, national and local governments, and businesses along the value chain – to come together and co-develop roadmaps for a net-zero built environment that identify a clear vision, actions and accountability. Building on the aforementioned built environment market transformation levers, they can drive a united response and decisive action, thereby overcoming the fragmentation of efforts seen so far. The emerging Buildings Breakthrough with national governments committed to transforming their built environment will provide a platform to join efforts and collaborate to achieve a future in which the built environment turns from a problem into a solution to tackle climate change.

We cannot wait – because for the built environment, 2030 is today.

.

 

BRICS and Realignment in the Middle East & North Africa

BRICS and Realignment in the Middle East & North Africa

With all respect to the author, BRICS and Realignment in the Middle East & North Africa would be a more comprehensive title; please read on to understand this, however minor but essential point.

 


BRICS and Realignment in the Middle East

Published January 4th, 2023 

The contrast of the BRICS summit in June with the meeting of G-7 leaders held only a day prior, served as a foretaste of geopolitical competition to come. It won speculation over whether a new geopolitical bloc, even an international order, might finally be finding form.

The summit came ahead of news that several MENA states are expected to be soon welcomed into BRICS. Regardless of whether BRICS lives up to its potential, this news is further indication that the region’s relationship with the West is heading into a wintry chapter as regimes seek to profit from new opportunities in a multipolar world.

Indeed, the competition and conflict redefining geopolitics has also questioned whether realignments are afoot in the Middle East. Developments like regional interest in BRICS and OPEC+ oil cuts suggest that popular belief in MENA neutrality, in what plausibly seems to be a new cold war, merits consideration and even revision.

China’s President Xi Jinping (L), India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi (2nd L), Russia’s President Vladimir Putin (C), South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa (2nd R) and Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro (R) are pictured before posing for a family picture during the 11th BRICS Summit on November 14, 2019 in Brasilia, Brazil. (Photo by Sergio LIMA / AFP)

BRICS: A New Geopolitical Bloc?

Global economic power has been reclaimed in the 21st century. The establishment of BRICS in 2006 is a testament to this seismic shift on the world stage. The organisation is membered by industrialised developing countries with emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.

Representing 23% of the global economy, 18% of global trade, and a combined gross domestic product akin to that of the US, BRICS possesses immense economic power. When the first summit was held, the organisation’s initial goals were modest and focused on investment. But amid the shifting tides of geopolitics, and the concentrated and accruing economic power of BRICS, it bears the hallmarks of a new geopolitical bloc.

Representing 23% of the global economy, 18% of global trade, and a combined gross domestic product akin to that of the US, BRICS possesses immense economic power.

In reality, the potential of BRICS rests on the dazzling rise of China’s economy. China’s GDP is more than double that of the other four BRICS members: almost $18 trillion compared with Brazil ($1.6 trillion), Russia ($1.8 trillion), India ($3.2 trillion) and South Africa ($400 billion). Without China, the organisation would fade into irrelevance; with China, its economic clout, and so potential to exercise geopolitical power, is vast.

As observed in Forbes: “If intra-BRICS commodity trade were to be settled in a commodity-linked basket of currencies among members as well as willing non-members, it would constitute an effective end to the petrodollar, a key pillar of the G7-led global financial system.” The strong resistance of the Russian ruble to Western sanctions – reaping reward from global energy prices – has boosted confidence in this aspiration.

In reality, the potential of BRICS rests on the dazzling rise of China’s economy. China’s GDP is more than double that of the other four BRICS members

President Putin even proposed at the recent BRICS summit the creation of an “international reserve currency based on the basket of currencies of our countries” to counterweight US hegemony in the IMF. The desire to create an economic order removed from the US-led dominated one has gained impetus as Russia and its allies have been disturbed by the velocity of Western-sanctions, from which they seek permanent protection and relief.

At the outset of war this year, intra-BRICS trade suddenly won significant sway over oil geopolitics through Western-sanctioned Russian crude oil exports being snapped up by the likes of China, India and Brazil. These purchases have offered welcome relief to the Russian economy and its military expenditures, softening the bite of Western sanctions (including the recently announced policy of capping prices on Russia’s oil exports).

The attendance of President Putin at its virtual summit in June was a jarring reminder to the West of how its mood of anger and reproach not shared universally; for most governments, ethical concerns about Russia’s violence do not eclipse the strategic value of Moscow’s energy and economic deals (hence why Western aims to blackball Russia on the world stage yields only limited success).

intra-BRICS trade suddenly won significant sway over oil geopolitics through Western-sanctioned Russian crude oil exports being snapped up by the likes of China, India and Brazil

By opting to remove Russia from the international economic system, the process of deglobalisation – hastened by the Covid-19 pandemic – assumed new intensity; with its promise of straining geopolitical tensions even further, BRICS is another symptom of this global trend. The consolidation of the organisation could define two dominant blocks in geopolitics, although many countries will resist this simplified division in preference for the strategic rewards of neutrality.

In which case, the symbiosis between the main economies – the US, China, the EU, but so too emerging ones like Brazil and India – which has been a major determinant of stability in world politics for decades, could falter with competition. Moreover, the deepening rift between G-7 countries and BRICS questions how, for example, cooperative climate action might be possible going forward? It foreshadows a fraught future for multilateralism. But such views are based on the idea that BRICS will decisively shift from an economic club into a coherent political organisation. There is some scepticism over whether BRICS members have the ability to reach a level of cohesion which would permit united political action.

BRICS has little to show for itself apart from the New Development Bank, established to offer an alternative to the World Bank for emerging economies.

A decade ago, a panel at the Wilson Centre strongly agreed that the differences between the group –  namely, trajectories of economic growth and ideological principles – far outweighed commonalities. Anti-Westernism alone is an insufficient ingredient to build and sustain cohesion amongst diverse actors. It is also true that since its birth, BRICS has little to show for itself apart from the New Development Bank, established to offer an alternative to the World Bank for emerging economies.

The institutionalisation of BRICS remains therefore  weak. Nonetheless, news of its expansive ambitions makes such criticisms now seem tenuous. As BRICS members hunt for a credible alternative to the US-led global order with increasing zeal, the organisation could demonstrate in the coming years that it counts for much more than an empty acronym.

AFP File Photo

BRICS, the Middle East, and the West

With war in Ukraine squeezing and shaping world politics, competition between the West and its rivals gained definition.  In this context, BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – has naturally sought to build up the organisation’s membership.

MENA countries have been among those touted as potential members in the near future. The president of the BRICS International Forum announced that he expects Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to join the group “very soon”. BRICS has caught the interest of other MENA countries who might follow suit; in November came news that Algeria had officially applied to join the organisation. The organisation, which has called up speculation as to whether it might qualify as a new geopolitical bloc, seeks to recruit “node” countries of strategic location and economic power.

If BRICS members wish to present the organisation as a credible alternative to the US-led economic order, it needs to co-opt as much of the world economy as possible. The inclusion of the three countries would represent an important win for BRICS and further address the lop-sided distribution of economic power between the West and the Rest: Saudi Arabia with its vast energy reserves, Turkey through its location and economic growth, and the UAE as a global centre of commerce and finance (the inclusion of key commercial and logistical centres within the group would offer more control over world trade).

The organisation, which has called up speculation as to whether it might qualify as a new geopolitical bloc, seeks to recruit “node” countries of strategic location and economic power.

In particular, bringing in oil-producing states, like Saudi Arabia, into the fold would consolidate BRICS’s control over global oil production itself – whose value in geopolitics has been laid bare this year since Russia invaded Ukraine. From a regional perspective, the incentives for joining BRICS are building and the interest expressed by Saudi Arabia, amongst others, has come as little surprise.

Many in the region likely deem it short-sighted to avoid the potential benefits which BRICS, taut with economic/political power and potential, might afford them; in a world retreating to multipolarity, MENA regimes are united in their desire to exploit and exhaust new opportunities. BRICS membership from a regional perspective, therefore, presents a tantalising prospect.

Despite its vast wealth and intimate security relations with the US, Saudi Arabia seeks to grow interactions with China and other emerging economies, given the demands of its restless economy in transformation. But economic interests are only part of the appeal; strategic considerations of geopolitics play a decisive role too. States like Saudi Arabia are presently reassessing who exactly are and are not their allies.

The cooperation of China and other BRICS members, like Russia and India, represent a welcome antidote for MENA countries to their fussy relations with the West. Indeed, it was symbolic that news of Saudi Arabia’s interest in membership of the BRICS group arrived just ahead of President Biden’s visit to the Middle East in July.

economic interests are only part of the appeal; strategic considerations of geopolitics play a decisive role too. States like Saudi Arabia are presently reassessing who exactly are and are not their allies.

This economic and geopolitical logic is also shared by Turkey and Egypt; however, although the West may regard the accession of countries like Egypt to BRICS as evidence of strategic realignment, some argue that it is more plausible to see it as a natural continuation of foreign policies defined by the principle of balanced international relations. At the same time, suggestions that BRICS represents an attempt to refashion the 1956 Non-Aligned Movement, whose members sought to minimise the Cold War’s interruptions behind a shield of neutrality, ignores its membership’s antipathy to the West.

BRICS seeks to develop and define a credible alternative to the US-led global economy – and particularly the US dollar. With the economic isolation of Russia, MENA regimes have been reminded of the heavy consequences when states fall foul of Washington, and the appeal of an alternative. Western sanctions have stifled many regimes in contemporary history, like those of Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Sudan. A new economic system out of the thumb of the West would enable MENA regimes in order to indulge their strategic whims with less consequence.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (R) shaking hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a GCC-China Summit in the Saudi capital Riyadh, on December 9, 2022. (Photo by SPA/AFP)

Middle Eastern Realignment in a Multipolar Order?

Moscow’s efforts to marshal diplomatic support for its invasion of Ukraine might seem to undercut claims of geopolitical reshuffle in the region; despite some hesitation, a U.N. resolution condemning Russia in March was supported by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.

But this incidence of the region rhetorically aligning with the West has proved anomalous in 2022, a year which has been defined more by tension than cooperation. This condemnation has not translated into support for Western sanctions. Like much of the non-Western world, MENA states are not moved by and even deeply suspicious of Western efforts to preserve a rule-based order.

High-minded Western words about ideas of democracy and freedom are far less appealing to MENA autocracies than the respectful and predictable indifference of Russia and China; the anti-Westernism which courses through the region is shared by its regimes too, ever indignant at the meddling in and criticism of their internal affairs by Western countries.

In Washington today, there is considerable animus towards Riyadh since it took a collective decision with its OPEC counterparts to raise global oil prices by announcing its largest supply cut in years – coolly rebuffing the pleas by the Biden administration.

The Biden’s administration’s resolve to renew democracy worldwide is a continually raw reminder to MENA leaders of their ideological friction with the West. This reality was encapsulated in recent months in Western fury about Qatar’s hosting of the World Cup (which, ironically, may be regarded as the best World Cup tournament ever after such a dazzling final).

The controversy surrounding OPEC has led to the further perishing of US-Saudi Arabia relations. In Washington today, there is considerable animus towards Riyadh since it took a collective decision with its OPEC counterparts to raise global oil prices by announcing its largest supply cut in years – coolly rebuffing the pleas by the Biden administration. Consequently, there is now a growing and plausible view in the US that Saudi Arabia is no longer an ally given its decision to blunt the punitive action of the West against Russia.

As the shadows of competition are thrown further across the Middle East, policy makers on both sides of the geopolitical division are carefully observing the initial reactions of regional regimes when taking stock of their friends and adversaries “It’s clear that OPEC+ is aligning with Russia” retorted a wounded White House when the decision was taken in October, directing the criticism at its long-standing ally in the Gulf.

Suggestions that Saudi Arabia may be sidling up to Russia on a political footing has been treated with scorn by commentators, whose main criticism is that this position is too binary. “The Saudis weren’t thinking about Ukraine – like many people in Asia and Africa, they don’t think in absolute terms of being pro- or anti-Russian,” wrote Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.

The desire to engage more with organisations like BRICS, so the argument proceeds, does not amount to a rejection of the West but represents the desire of Riyadh (and Cairo, Ankara, and Algiers) to strategically plant its feet on both sides of the geopolitical divide. By doing so, MENA states seek to maximise the benefits of geopolitical competition, minimise its consequences, and evade its constraints.

There is a popular perception that every time the US does not get its way in the Middle East, Washington vainly misreads this as a snub; that the US fails to understand that decisions and policies can occur with little consideration of it.  And there is some truth to this view. However, the divergences between the US and MENA states on vital issues in US foreign policy are stacking up.

Whatever the intentions, the action of MENA countries in OPEC+ is not neutral; on the contrary, they have adopted a policy supportive of Russia on the defining geopolitical issue of 2022

Whatever the intentions, the action of MENA countries in OPEC+ is not neutral; on the contrary, they have adopted a policy supportive of Russia on the defining geopolitical issue of 2022. And on other key divisions of contemporary geopolitics – like sovereignty in Taiwan – Arab governments have embraced Beijing’s position. Now with tacit support for Russia through OPEC in the Gulf, in addition to support for China’s repression in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the Middle East is sharply opposed to the US and wider West on the essential geopolitical issues of today and tomorrow.

Only this month, President Xi was honoured by Arab leaders in Saudi Arabia, serving as further evidence to some that MENA states are eyeing alternatives to the “liberal world order,” regarding China’s authoritarianism as a more natural ally given their own politics. Saudi officials insisted that the generous reception of Xi is perfectly suitable for a state as powerful as China; yet its timing brimmed with geopolitical symbolism and was credibly seen as a rebuke to the US given its contrast with the wintry welcome which met Biden in July.

Sergio LIMA / AFP(L to R) South Africa’s President Cyril Ramaphosa, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, China’s President Xi Jinping, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, Brazil’s President Jair Bolsonaro at the 11th BRICS Summit, Brasilia, Brazil, November 14, 2019.

New Friends and Foes

A feeling of change hangs over MENA geopolitics as wider international dynamics evolve. Many commentators and scholars have been rightly dismissing simplistic readings of this change which talk of the emergence of well-defined boundaries and blocs; they remind audiences of the banal but important fact that geopolitics resists crude simplifications (whose consequences in policy making were painfully present and predictable in the Cold War of the last century).

there is a growing and tangible dislocation between the region and the West.

Despite this wisdom, there is also a risk that such commentary becomes too focused on teasing out nuance while failing to see the woods from the trees. Whether shown by news of BRICS pulling new membership from the Middle East, or by Gulf leaders humiliating President Biden over oil production, there is a growing and tangible dislocation between the region and the West.

Talk of neutrality and the need to avoid simplifications may prevail for the time being in policy chatter, but the sense of striking geopolitical shift – even realignment – in the Middle East is gathering credibility. For as the geopolitical crises of the 21st century continue to fall thick and fast, the West and their supposed allies from the region are likely to repeatedly find themselves on opposing sides of the geopolitical divide.

.

.

 

People who migrated to European countries are . . .

People who migrated to European countries are . . .

According to the following, people who migrated to European countries are . . . like all those Turkish people who are worse off than those who stayed at home.  Let us see why and how.

 


Many Turkish people who migrated to European countries are worse off than those who stayed at home

Sebnem Eroglu, University of Bristol

Many people migrate to another country to earn a decent income and to attain a better standard of living. But my recent research shows that across all destinations and generations studied, many migrants from Turkey to European countries are financially worse off than those who stayed at home.

Even if there are some non-monetary benefits of staying in the destination country, such as living in a more orderly environment, this raises fundamental questions. Primarily, why are 79% of the first-generation men who contributed to the growth of Europe by taking on some of the dirtiest, riskiest manual jobs – like working in asbestos processing and sewage canals – still living in income poverty? There is a strong indication that the European labour markets and welfare states are failing migrants and their descendants.

In my recent book, Poverty and International Migration, I examined the poverty status of three generations of migrants from Turkey to multiple European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. I compared them with the “returnees” who moved back to Turkey and the “stayers” who have never left the country.

The study covers the period from early 1960s to the time of their interview (2010-2012), and draws on a sample of 5,980 adults within 1,992 families. The sample was composed of living male ancestors (those who went first were typically men), their children and grandchildren.

For my research, the poverty line was set at 60% of the median disposable household income (adjusted for household size) for every country studied. Those who fall below the country threshold are defined as the income poor.

Data for this research is drawn from the 2000 Families Survey which I conducted with academics based in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands. The survey generated what is believed to be the world’s largest database on labour migration to Europe through locating the male ancestors who moved to Europe from five high migration regions in Turkey during the guest-worker years of 1960-1974 and their counterparts who did not migrate at the time.

It charts the family members who were living in various European countries up to the fourth generation, and those that stayed behind in Turkey. The period corresponds to a time when labourers from Turkey were invited through bi-lateral agreements between states to contribute to the building of western and northern Europe.

The results presented in my book show that four-fifths (79%) of the first-generation men who came to Europe as guest-workers and ended up settling there lived below an income poverty line, compared with a third (33%) of those that had stayed in the home country. By the third generation, around half (49%) of those living in Europe were still poor, compared with just over a quarter (27%) of those who remained behind.

Migrants from three family generations residing in countries renowned for the generosity of their welfare states were among the most impoverished. Some of the highest poverty rates were observed in Belgium, Sweden and Denmark.

For example, across all three generations of migrants settled in Sweden, 60% were in income poverty despite an employment rate of 61%. This was the highest level of employment observed for migrants in all the countries studied. Migrants in Sweden were also, on average, more educated than those living in other European destinations.

My findings also reveal that while more than a third (37%) of “stayers” from the third generation went on to complete higher education. This applied to less than a quarter (23%) of the third generation migrants spread across European countries.

Families playing in a park.

Turkish guest workers in a Berlin park in the 1980s. DPA/Alamy

Returnees did well

Having a university education turned out not to improve the latter’s chances of escaping poverty as much as it did for the family members who had not left home. The “returnees” to Turkey were, on the other hand, found to fare much better than those living in Europe and on a par with, if not better than, the “stayers”.

Less than a quarter of first- and third-generation returnees (23% and 24% respectively) experienced income poverty and 43% from the third generation attained a higher education qualification. The money they earned abroad along with their educational qualifications seemed to buy them more economic advantage in Turkey than in the destination country.

The results of the research should not be taken to mean that international migration is economically a bad decision as we still do not know how impoverished these people were prior to migration. First-generation migrants are anecdotally known to be poorer at the time of migration than those who decided not to migrate during guest-worker years, and are likely to have made some economic gains from their move. The returnees’ improved situation does lend support to this.

Nor should the findings lead to the suggestion that if migrants do not earn enough in their new home country, they should go back. Early findings from another piece of research I am currently undertaking suggests that while income poverty considerably reduces migrants’ life satisfaction, there are added non-monetary benefits of migration to a new destination. The exact nature of these benefits remains unknown but it is likely to do, for example, with living in a better organised environment that makes everyday life easier.

However, we still left with the question of why migrants are being left in such poverty. Coupled with the findings from another recent study demonstrating that more than half of Europeans do not welcome non-EU migrants from economically poorer countries, evidence starts to suggest an undercurrent of systemic racism may be acting as a cause.

If migrants were welcome, one would expect destination countries with far more developed welfare states than Turkey to put in place measures to protect guest workers against the risk of poverty in old age, or prevent their children and grandchildren from falling so far behind their counterparts in Turkey in accessing higher education.

They would not let them settle for lower returns on their educational qualifications in more regulated labour markets. It’s also unlikely we would have observed some of the highest poverty rates in countries with generous welfare states such as Sweden – top ranked for its anti-discrimination legislation, based on equality of opportunity.

Overall, the picture for “unwanted” migrants appears to be rather bleak. Unless major systemic changes are made, substantial improvement to their prospects are unlikely.The Conversation

Sebnem Eroglu, Senior Lecturer in Social Policy, University of Bristol

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The Conversation.

.

 

%d bloggers like this: