Close-up of a woman holding a Save the earth sign promoting environmental awareness. by Artem Podrez via Pexels

 

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Universities must highlight equity issues in sustainability

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With the United Nations climate conference in Antalya, Türkiye, concluding this week, attention should shift from the negotiating rooms to the choices governments make at home. Those choices involve a contradiction: countries need one another to tackle climate change, yet they compete for the minerals, technologies and industrial capacity required for the energy transition.

National resilience is a reasonable goal, but we rarely ask how one country’s efforts to secure it affect the choices available to others.

Take an electric car sold in a wealthy country. Its emissions while being driven are far lower than those of a comparable gasoline vehicle, especially where electricity is clean. But the battery has its own history: mineral extraction, processing, transport and manufacturing, often spread across several countries.

People living near a mine may have little influence over the conditions under which its resources are extracted. The cleaner journey on the road tells only part of the story.

Sustainable development has long asked us to consider the lives of future generations. I want to pose a less comfortable question alongside it. What if a country secures its own future by imposing greater risks and costs on people living elsewhere today?

Universities cannot treat this as a problem for diplomats alone. We educate the engineers, economists and policy-makers who will make these choices. We also produce many of the indicators used to declare that development has succeeded. We need to pay attention to what our measurements overlook. A university’s responsibility begins before the calculation, when we decide what to include.

A shared agenda, competing interests

The Sustainable Development Goals, adopted in 2015, gave governments a common vocabulary for addressing poverty, health, education and the environment. The agreement did not settle disputes over priorities or who should pay. However, it did establish that these problems could not be addressed in isolation.

The political landscape has shifted. The pandemic exposed the fragility of far-flung supply chains; since then, strategic competition has made reliance on foreign suppliers a national security concern.

Governments subsidise domestic industries, restrict access to advanced technologies and compete for critical raw materials. UN Trade and Development’s 2026 report describes the growing use of trade, finance and technology policy as tools of geo-economic competition. A World Trade Organization staff working paper models substantial losses if trade fragments along geopolitical lines.

There are good reasons for a government to worry about an unreliable source of medicines, food or energy. No responsible policy-maker would ignore those vulnerabilities. The difficulty arises when the cost of protecting one population is shifted to another. Large economies can offer subsidies and secure long-term contracts that smaller, poorer countries cannot match.

Domestic indicators rarely make the transfer clear. A country can report stronger supply security or faster industrial growth without accounting for the opportunities it has taken from its trading partners. The measure is accurate within its own boundaries, but those boundaries are the problem.

Who pays for the green transition?

The energy transition brings this issue into sharp focus. Batteries, electricity grids, turbines and solar panels depend on mining and industrial processing. The economic rewards are not evenly distributed across the supply chain, nor are the environmental pressures.

In its June 2026 Global Trade Update, UN Trade and Development counted nearly 100 new export-related measures affecting energy-transition minerals since 2020.

Producing countries want more than raw material exports. They are pressing for local processing, employment and a greater share of the value their minerals generate. These demands belong in the sustainability debate. Mining can bring roads, jobs and tax revenue. It can also consume scarce water, damage ecosystems and leave communities with liabilities that persist after extraction ends.

Whether the bargain is acceptable depends on the terms: who can refuse a project, who benefits, which safeguards are enforced and who pays for restoration. The emissions profile of a finished battery cannot answer those questions.

The Sustainable Development Solutions Network’s Sustainable Development Report 2026 examines how national consumption and policy affect other countries through its international spillover measures. Its analysis reveals a troubling pattern: high-income countries often perform well on domestic sustainable development measures while generating substantial negative effects abroad.

Domestic environmental improvements can coexist with damage elsewhere in the production chain. That does not negate the gains from cutting domestic emissions. It does challenge the habit of treating those gains as a complete accounting. A serious national sustainability report should examine the consequences of imports as well as the domestic improvements recorded.

The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism illustrates another difficulty. Its definitive regime took effect on 1 January 2026, requiring importers of covered goods to account for embedded emissions. Certificate sales for 2026 imports begin in February 2027.

The mechanism seeks to prevent production from shifting to places with weaker climate constraints. The purpose has merit. Yet a producer in a country without affordable clean power or access to investment capital may find compliance much harder than a competitor in Europe. Fair climate rules also require attention to unequal capacity to meet them.

When a government celebrates a greener economy, it should be able to answer more than how much carbon it has saved. Where did the materials come from? Who bore the environmental risk? What remained in the communities that supplied them? Who can afford resilience?

Consider a second inequality: the capacity to absorb shocks. Richer states can subsidise energy bills, finance flood defences, maintain emergency reserves and support research during a crisis.

Governments with heavy debt and narrow tax bases face the same threats with far fewer options. Those choices are narrowing as climate adaptation becomes more urgent. The OECD reported in April 2026 that official development assistance fell 23.1% in real terms in 2025, the largest annual decline in its historical series. The support that countries need for long-term planning is vulnerable to short-term political decisions in donor capitals.

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals Report 2026 is equally sobering. Of 139 targets with sufficient trend data, only 15% were on track, and another 21% were making moderate progress. There have been real gains in health, electricity access and connectivity. But the overall pace is insufficient, and an improving average can mask countries that are losing room to manoeuvre.

A government may know it needs flood protection, reliable electricity and more resilient food systems, yet lack the funds to build them. That shortfall cannot always be explained by poor planning. Debt-servicing costs, expensive credit and the limited share of value retained from exports constrain what a government can do.

I worry that resilience is becoming a privilege bought by those who already have the greatest resources. We advise poorer countries to adapt, diversify and prepare, yet too often we give less attention to the conditions that prevent them from doing so. A useful measure of development would include a country’s freedom to make decisions when circumstances turn against it.

This is not an argument for every country to produce everything itself. Such a strategy would be costly and, in many cases, impossible. Diversified trade, regional arrangements and shared emergency reserves can reduce vulnerability without excluding economies that lack large domestic markets.

The task is to design interdependence more carefully, not to pretend it can be abolished. Universities can test those arrangements against evidence rather than accepting self-sufficiency as a political slogan.

AI presents a similar problem

Artificial intelligence promises practical sustainability benefits: improved weather and climate models, more efficient energy management and support for agricultural decision-making.

However, the infrastructure behind these tools is costly and energy-intensive. The International Energy Agency projects that global data centre electricity use will rise from about 485 terawatt-hours in 2025 to 950 in 2030.

Electricity demand is only part of the issue. Advanced chips, computing infrastructure and the capital to build them are concentrated in a small number of companies and countries. A university can acquire powerful AI tools without meaningful control over how they work, what happens to its data or whether its researchers can switch providers. Access and autonomy are not the same thing.

Building an independent AI industry in every country would be neither realistic nor environmentally sensible. The better question is what a partnership leaves behind. Can local researchers develop and adapt tools themselves? Do they retain meaningful control over their data? Are they becoming less dependent on a particular supplier, or more?

A technology can improve efficiency while narrowing the choices available to its users. We should be able to judge both consequences, not just the one that fits comfortably on a performance dashboard.

What universities should measure

Universities often report their sustainability credentials through emissions reductions, energy-efficient buildings, grants and publications. These are legitimate achievements, but they do not necessarily indicate whether our purchases, research projects and international partnerships leave others better off. The gap is evident in the curriculum as well.

Imagine students evaluating a new battery. They might compare energy density, useful life, cost and carbon emissions. That is necessary technical work. I would also ask them to trace materials to their sources, identify the labour and environmental protections in place, examine how much economic value remains in the producing country and consider whether an alternative design alters the distribution of risk.

Engineering does not become less rigorous when these questions are asked. It becomes more attentive to the actual conditions under which a technology will be produced and used.

One practical change would be to require a brief ‘boundary statement’ for major sustainability projects. Researchers would identify what their analysis excludes, whose interests may be affected beyond the immediate study area and which claims remain uncertain.

Such a statement will not settle every ethical dispute, but it will make the limits of a technical conclusion visible to those asked to rely on it. Universities could publish these statements alongside their sustainability reports, making both the achievements they claim and the consequences their measurements leave outside the frame visible.

International research partnerships deserve the same scrutiny. Too often, an institution provides research participants, field access or local knowledge, while its overseas partner controls funding, equipment and subsequent publications. Both sides may call the project a success, but what can the local institution do on its own once the collaboration ends?

That question should be included in university assessments. Did younger researchers at the partner institution receive substantive authorship and training? Can its scholars use the data without seeking permission from abroad? Who owns the equipment, and who pays for its maintenance? Grant income and publication counts tell us little about these outcomes. Research offices could seek answers without creating a new bureaucracy.

There is also a question of independence. Public funding increasingly aligns with priorities in industrial competitiveness and technological security. Universities have reasons to contribute to national needs. They must still be willing to acknowledge that a nationally successful policy has caused harm elsewhere. A university that cannot reach that conclusion has allowed its research agenda to become too narrow.

Responsibility does not stop at a border

As 2030 approaches, calls will come for new indicators, agreements and targets. Better data will help, but another framework will achieve little if we continue counting only what happens within national borders and overlook the consequences beyond them.

I find a contradiction at the heart of our usual language about sustainability. We rightly insist that people not yet born have a claim on our decisions. Yet people alive today, whose labour and resources support our standard of living, can be almost invisible in those same calculations.

Why are we more comfortable acknowledging responsibility across generations than across borders?

This is not a claim that international trade is inherently unfair or that governments have identical duties to everyone worldwide. Trade can yield substantial gains, and national governments are accountable to their own populations. The point is narrower and harder to dismiss: benefits recorded in one place cannot establish the sustainability of a system whose costs fall elsewhere.

For universities, the response begins with the work we already do. Students can learn to trace a supply chain beyond the factory gate. Research teams can state the limits of their measurements. Institutions can examine whether international collaborations grant partners greater authority over their own futures. Our sustainability reports should confront the same questions we teach students to ask of governments and firms.

Climate negotiations will continue to clash with national security concerns and economic competition. Those tensions are real. They should make our claims of progress more rigorous, not complacent. The achievement worth claiming is not simply that we have protected our own future. It is that we have done so without narrowing the future available to others.

James Yoonil Auh is a former vice-president of the National Labor College in the United States and Kyung Hee Cyber University in South Korea. He currently teaches at Judson University in the USA.

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